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This special issue of Court Review focuses on procedural justice. TomTyler has called procedural justice the most powerful explanatory con-cept for why people obey rules that restrict their behavior in ways they
would otherwise find unacceptable. David Rottman has written “having a
sense that court decisions are made through processes that are fair is the
strongest predictor by far of whether members of the public approve of or
have confidence” in courts. Procedural justice is worthy of a deep look, and
this issue of Court Review does precisely that—it presents papers from some
of the nation’s leading scholars who have been thinking about procedural
justice and related constructs.
The special issue begins with Judges Burke and Leben’s White Paper on
procedural justice. Theirs is the first White Paper issued by the American
Judges Association (and the Burke/Leben
White Paper was recently endorsed by the
Conference of State Court Administrators at
their 2008 Annual Meeting, July 30, 2008).
Originally presented at the meeting of the
American Judges Association in September
2007 and available on the AJA website, it is
the first article in this special issue. It sum-
marizes both arguments and empirical
research making in detail the case for state
courts that Tyler and Rottman make, that is,
procedural justice matters. It matters a lot, in
their opinion. It is the key construct for court
improvement.
The rest of the issue examines procedural justice in a variety of contexts.
The issue contains an article by Tyler and an essay by Rottman. Tyler and
Rottman join Judges Burk and Leben in arguing for the centrality of procedural
justice in the justice system. Weisz, Wingrove, and Faith-Slaker join them in
extolling procedural justice concepts; they see procedural justice as important
for improving the experiences for children in the courts, though they point out
research documentation is still sparse. Support for procedural justice continues
with Denton, who explains how the California courts have embraced the pro-
cedural justice concept to drive major reforms. Abuwala and Farole also
applaud procedural justice in their study of its impact in a limited-jurisdiction-
court context (landlord-tenant, housing courts) in New York City. 
In a summary of a large body of research, Sivasubramaniam and Heuer
point out that procedural justice has different meanings for decision recipi-
ents (i.e., litigants) than for decision makers (i.e., judges), and among other
things they indicate how these differences might cause reform problems in the
justice system. Bornstein and Dietrich summarize a complementary litera-
ture—distributive justice studies—and counsel that courts pay attention to
outcomes as well as procedures. Finally, Wexler points to another comple-
mentary area—therapeutic jurisprudence—and argues desirable outcomes are
even more likely to occur by heeding the lessons of the therapeutic jurispru-
dence framework. – Alan Tomkins
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During this year as your AJA president, my appreciation and
respect for the role that we play in our courtrooms has ampli-
fied.  I have been afforded numerous opportunities to speak
with other judges and various community and civic groups to
gauge their concerns about our judicial system. Members of the
judiciary and the community alike share a common concern for
what is viewed as increasingly eroding societal values, as evi-
denced in courtrooms everywhere.  Most conversations even-
tually evolve to discussions about prevention strategies. How
did this happen? What needs to be done?  I am convinced that,
as judges, we  must actively seek to answer these questions and
embrace an obligation to offer solutions.  Many of our nation’s
societal challenges are disguised as legal issues on court dock-
ets; far too many severely impact our children.  
As a juvenile and domestic relations court
judge for more than 13 years, it should be no sur-
prise that this is a subject near and dear to my
heart; and one that must be closely examined. It
is abundantly clear that there is a proliferation of
social problems affecting today’s children and
their families.  Of all the advances the judiciary
has made in courtroom technology, docket man-
agement, courtroom construction, specialized
and problem-solving courts, etc., there is one area that remains
constant—overrepresentation of minorities and disadvantaged
youth in our criminal justice system. As judges, I believe that
we have a responsibility to lend ourselves as participants in the
solution.  We are the gatekeepers. We are uniquely poised and
equipped not only to tackle and to improve the administration
of justice, but also to be more mindful of the social ills that
cripple our nation today.
I recently sat in an audience with a group of judges as we
heard a presentation on the laudable efforts of the Children’s
Defense Fund (“CDF”). CDF is a nonprofit organization deter-
mined to ensure a successful passage from childhood to adult-
hood.  Its goal is to offer preventive support to poor and minor-
ity children before they encounter family dissonance or educa-
tional failure.   A core belief maintained by the CDF is that
without practical early intervention, incarceration is inevitable
for many of America’s children.
CDF’s Cradle to Prison Pipeline® research identified a grave
crisis affecting many minority children.  They are abused, aban-
doned, and impoverished at greater rates than the general pop-
ulation.   They are born to teen parents, born underweight, and
medically uninsured.  They languish in poverty, foster care, and
drug houses.  Disadvantaged at birth, these neglected children
will most likely become America’s future prisoners.  According
to statistics provided by the CDF, African-American boys born
in 2001 have a one in three likelihood of becoming incarcer-
ated.  Latino boys have a one in six chance of imprisonment.  
Underprivileged children are enmeshed in family unreadi-
ness.  The majority, rather than being raised by responsible par-
ents or positive role models, are negatively influenced by tele-
vision images, peers, and gang members.  As a result, it
becomes increasingly difficult to break free from
their hampered environment.  Economic dispari-
ties, the lack of quality living standards, health
care, and education create a divide.  Success for
these bruised youths is obstructed and replaced
with learning impediments.  The numbers of
those impacted are staggering, and unless this
national crisis is remedied, America’s Cradle to
Prison Pipeline® will continue.  (You can read 
the full CDF report online at http://www.
childrensdefense.org/site/PageServer?pagename=c2pp.) 
The judges’ acknowledgement is therefore a necessary com-
ponent to bring awareness and attention to contributing factors
that bring juveniles before the court.  While we must speak
with clarity and authority to those before the court, we also
have the responsibility to promote innovative approaches to
address the underlying inequities.
Radical actions produce extreme changes.  I am confident
that the cradle-to-prison pipeline can be derailed and that some
of these sociological ills can be healed.  I urge your support in
actively participating and working together with policy makers,
parents, community leaders, and others to identify viable solu-
tions.  We are in an undeniable position of relevance to these
issues. Through effective partnerships we can unite offering
hope, new chances, and a better life for our children.  Together
we can create opportunities for new beginnings—untainted
beginnings that outshine past negative experiences and
destructive influences.
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President’s Column
Eileen Olds
© 2007 by Kevin Burke and Steve Leben.  The authors grant you 
permission to reprint this article for any educational purpose.
Footnotes
1. Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and
Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 513, 517 (2003). 
2. Robert J. MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-
Edged Sword of Procedural Fairness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171
(2005).
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Americans are highly sensitive to the processes of procedural fairness.  It is no sur-prise, then, that the perception of unfair or unequal treatment “is the single mostimportant source of popular dissatisfaction with the American legal system.”1
Even first-graders react negatively to a situation where a mother punishes her child for a
broken vase without consulting a witness first.  This negative reaction signifies power-
fully that children are already sensitive to the principles of procedural fairness.2 If chil-
dren in early elementary school already react negatively to perceived violations of proce-
dural fairness, it is only that much more imperative to address the needs of the adults who
appear in the courts to fight for custody of their children, file bankruptcy, contest a speed-
ing ticket, or respond to allegations of felonious criminal behavior.  
Judges can alleviate much of the public dissatisfaction with the judicial branch by paying
critical attention to the key elements of procedural fairness:  voice, neutrality, respectful
treatment, and engendering trust in authorities.  Judges must be aware of the dissonance
that exists between how they view the legal process and how the public before them views
it.  While judges should definitely continue to pay attention to creating fair outcomes,
they should also tailor their actions, language, and responses to the public’s expectations
of procedural fairness.  By doing so, these judges will establish themselves as legitimate
authorities; substantial research suggests that increased compliance with court orders and
decreased recidivism by criminal offenders will result.  Procedural fairness also will lessen
the difference in how minority populations perceive and react to the courts.   
Many people have little contact with the court system in their daily life, so it is under-
standable that they feel overwhelmed and lost when they are confronted with an unfa-
miliar legal system.  This lack of knowledge about the court has resulted in a state of
ambivalence—accentuated by the lack of depth to most news coverage of the courts and
the misinformation of entertainment television.  In many ways, procedural fairness
bridges the gap that exists between familiarity and unfamiliarity and the differences
between each person regardless of their gender, race, age, or economic status.  It is a value
that the American public expects and demands from judges, and many judges have
embodied the concepts of procedural fairness in their everyday lives.  While the American
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Judges Association recognizes the achievements of these individuals and many courts
already intent on promoting procedural fairness, the purpose of this white paper is to
identify and advocate for more changes that will improve the daily work of the courts and
its judges.
This paper addresses research on courts within the United States and makes recommen-
dations for the judiciary there.  In addition to our 2,500 member judges in the United
States, however, the American Judges Association also has about 150 members in Canada.
Although we make no recommendations regarding the courts in Canada, we believe that
the baseline social-science research upon which this paper is based would also be applic-
able there, given the similarities between the legal systems of these two countries.
Most people care more about procedural fairness—the kind of treatment theyreceive in court—than they do about “distributive justice,” i.e., winning or los-ing the particular case.3 This discovery has been called “counterintuitive”4 and
even “wrong-headed,”5 but researcher after researcher has demonstrated that this phe-
3. TOM. R. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY (1997);
Jonathan D. Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 483 (1988); Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The
Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support
for Policing, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513 (2003).
4. M. Somjen Frazer, THE IMPACT OF THE COMMUNITY COURT MODEL
ON DEFENDANT PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS: A CASE STUDY AT THE RED
HOOK COMMUNITY JUSTICE CENTER, Center for Court Innovation 3
(2006), available at http://courtinnovation.org/_uploads/
documents/ Procedural_Fairness.pdf.  
5. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 22 (2006) [hereinafter
WHY PEOPLE OBEY].
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AND SATISFACTION WITH THE COURT SYSTEM.
6. E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, (1988); JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER,
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975); Jerald
Greenburg, Determinants of Perceived Fairness of Performance
Evaluations, 71 J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 340 (1986); Jerald Greenberg,
Looking Fair Versus Being Fair: Managing Impressions of
Organizational Justice, 12 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR
111 (Barry M. Staw & Larry L. Cummings eds. 1990); Jerald
Greenberg & Robert Folger, Procedural Justice, Participation, and
the Fair Process Effect in Groups and Organizations, in BASIC GROUP
PROCESSES 235 (Paul B. Paulus ed. 1983); Larry Heuer et al., The
Generality of Procedural Justice Concerns:  A Deservedness Model of
Group Value and Self-interest Based Fairness Concerns, 25 PERS. SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1279 (1999); Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Models of
the Justice Motive:  Antecedents of Distributive and Procedural Justice,
67 J. PERS. SOC. PSYCHOL. 850 (1994); Tom R. Tyler, The Relationship
of the Outcome and Procedural Fairness: How Does Knowing the
Outcome Influence Judgments about the Procedure?, 9 SOC. JUSTICE
RES. 311 (1996); Kees Van den Bos et al., Evaluating Outcomes by
Means of the Fair Process Effect: Evidence for Different Processes in
Fairness and Satisfaction Judgments, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL
PSYCHOL. 1493 (1998); Kees Van den Bos et al., Sometimes Unfair
Procedures Have Nice Aspects: On the Psychology of the Fair Process
Effect, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 324 (1999).
7. TYLER ET AL., supra note 3, at 75.
8. MacCoun, supra note 2, at 12.
9. WHY PEOPLE OBEY, supra note 5, at 23.
10. Id. at 22-23.  See also David B. Rottman, Adhere to Procedural
Fairness Principles Throughout the Justice System, 6 CRIM. & PUB.
POL’Y 835, 835 (2007).
11. WHY PEOPLE OBEY, supra note 5, at 23. 
nomenon exists.6 Thus, procedural fairness is a critical part of understanding how the
public interprets their experience with the court system and translates that experience
into a subjective valuation of the court system as whole.  
Citizens have high expectations for how they will be treated during their encounters with
the judicial system.  In particular, they focus on the principles of procedural fairness
because “people view fair procedures as a mechanism through which to obtain equitable
outcomes—which is the goal in cases of conflict of interest.”7 People value fair proce-
dures because they are perceived to “produce fair outcomes.”8
Psychology professor Tom Tyler, a leading researcher in this area, suggests that there are
four basic expectations9 that encompass procedural fairness: 
• Voice:  the ability to participate in the case by expressing their viewpoint;
• Neutrality:  consistently applied legal principles, unbiased decision makers,
and a “transparency” about how decisions are made; 
• Respectful treatment:  individuals are treated with dignity and their rights are
obviously protected;
• Trustworthy authorities:  authorities are benevolent, caring, and sincerely try-
ing to help the litigants—this trust is garnered by listening to individuals and by
explaining or justifying decisions that address the litigants’ needs.10
Procedural fairness matters to every litigant who appears before a judge, but “[w]hat is
striking about procedural justice judgments is that they also shape the reactions of those
who are on the losing side.”11 People are in fact more willing to accept a negative out-
come in their case if they feel that the decision was arrived at through a fair method.
Significantly, even a judge who scrupulously respects the rights of litigants may nonethe-
less be perceived as unfair if he or she does not meet these expectations for procedural
fairness.
Of course, this does not mean that people are happy if they lose their case and fail to
obtain the outcomes they desire.  It does mean, however, that they are more willing to
accept and abide by the decisions of judges when those decisions seem to have been made
fairly.  And their views of judges, the court system, and the law are more favorable fol-
lowing an experience in which their case is handled via a fair procedure.
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12. Tom R. Tyler, Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL.
375 (2006).
13. Raymond Paternoster et al.,  Do Fair Procedures Matter?  The Effect
of Procedural Justice on Spouse Assault,  31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 169
(1997); Tom R. Tyler et al., Reintegrative Shaming, Procedural
Justice, and Recidivism: The Engagement of Offenders’ Psychological
Mechanisms in the Canberra RISE Drinking-and-Driving
Experiment, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 553 (2007).
14. Paternoster, supra note 13, at 169.
15. Id. at 192.
16. Id. at 163.
17. DEBORAH A. ECKBERG & MARCY R. PODKOPACZ, FAMILY COURT
FAIRNESS STUDY (Fourth Jud. District Res. Division, Hennepin Co.,
MN.) 34-35 (2004), available at http://www .mncourts.gov/docu-
ments/4/Public/Research/Family_Court_Fairness_Report_Final.d
oc.
18. Id. at 34-35.
19. FRAZER, supra note 4, at 5.
20. Id. at 8.
Procedural fairness reduces recidivism because fair procedures cultivate the impres-sion that authorities are both legitimate and moral. 12 Further, “[o]nce the percep-tion that legal authorities are legitimate has been shaped, compliance with the law
is enhanced, even when it conflicts with one’s immediate self-interest.”13 Legitimacy is
created by respectful treatment, and legitimacy affects compliance.  This is not to say that
judges are unable to sanction defendants, but “sanctions, when imposed in such a man-
ner as to insult the dignity of persons, can also function to increase rather than reduce
future offending.”14 Judges are responsible for upholding the law and that requires pun-
ishing defendants when they have broken the law, but judges also have the further
responsibility of protecting the rights and human dignity of the defendant whom they
have sentenced.  
Policies of procedural fairness can have widespread application and impact.  For example,
there is “at least moderate support” 15 for the assertion that batterers who are treated accord-
ing to the precepts of procedural fairness are less likely to recidivate “even in the face of
adverse outcomes,”16 such as arrest.  However, “those who felt they were treated less fairly,
were less satisfied with the court process, and were less likely to view the court as legitimate
were more likely to have new criminal cases.” 17 Batterers are even less likely to violate an
order for protection if they feel that their cases were handled in a fair manner.18
There have been many innovative approaches to implementing procedural fairness poli-
cies in order to raise perceptions of legitimacy and in turn compliance rates.  The Red
Hook Community Justice Center in Brooklyn, New York, was established as an experi-
ment in order to focus on these precise types of issues:  “[Community courts] address
concerns that courts have become revolving doors in which ‘the process is the punish-
ment’—all too many defendants leave court following a brief but unpleasant experience
only to return on similar charges with no effort having been made to address either their
underlying problems or the effects of their anti-social behavior on the community.”19 Red
Hook’s goal as a community-court model was to focus both on procedural fairness and on
helping litigants address the problems behind their criminal behavior with more drug
treatment options, job placement, and educational programs.  Red Hook’s ability to pro-
vide individualized treatment to their defendants through different sentencing criteria
and more one-on-one interaction with the judge has transformed the community.  After
two years in operation, “the public’s fear of crime dropped and public confidence in local
justice system agencies more than doubled, suggesting that the community court has had
positive effects on neighborhood perceptions of the legitimacy of the court system.”20
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS INCREASES COMPLIANCE WITH COURT ORDERS
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The judicial branch does not escape the general dissatisfaction Americans have withthe legislative and executive branches of government.  Perceptions of the court sys-tem have been “more stable” than the other governmental branches since the 1970s
and 1980s,21 but public confidence in the judicial branch is still quite low when it is com-
pared with many other institutions.22
One of the major factors behind the general ambivalence is widespread misinformation
about the judicial branch.  The public has a tendency to see the judicial branch as inti-
mately connected with other groups that help constitute the legal process, from the leg-
islators who draft laws to the police who enforce them.  The actions of these other insti-
tutions tend to “spill over onto defendant evaluations of their experience with courtroom
personnel and their general sense of fair treatment.”23 While it may not be feasible for
judges to tackle widespread public education, it is especially important for judges to real-
ize that “people’s experience with any one part of the criminal justice system affects the
views of all the others, any contact with the courts, including everything from official
notifications to the condition of the courthouse itself, can affect public trust and confi-
dence.”24 Security guards and even janitors affect the public’s experience in the court-
house, but judges uniquely shape public perceptions because of their position in the
courts.
When California citizens were surveyed in 2005 about their perceptions of their state
courts, 30% believed that the state courts were doing “excellent” or “very good” whereas
33% thought they were only “fair” or “poor.”25 The dichotomous split of approval for the
court system is not only in California.  The State of Minnesota conducted a study with
similar results in 2006.26 In Brooklyn, New York, 57% of people reported a generally
“positive” outlook towards the courts before the 2002 opening of the Red Hook
Community Justice Center. 27 After two years in operation, the public’s positive percep-
tion of the local court system in Red Hook increased to an impressive 78%.28
21. DAVID B. ROTTMAN, TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE CALIFORNIA
COURTS 10 (2005) [hereinafter ROTTMAN 2005], available at
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/4_37
pubtrust1.pdf.
22. FRAZER, supra note 4, at 1.  
23. Casper et al., supra note 3, at 498.
24. PUBLIC AGENDA & DOBLE RESEARCH, TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE
CALIFORNIA COURTS, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS 10
(2006), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/docu-
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26. Minnesota has conducted a similar study:  DECISION RESOURCES,
LTD., MINNESOTA STATE COURTS: 2006 SURVEY OF MINNESOTA
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ALTHOUGH THE PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF THE COURTS IN RECENT YEARS 
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People can increase their approval of the courts by interacting directly with the courtsystem as jurors, witnesses, victims, and litigants.  A person who has served on ajury is more likely to give the court system a higher overall approval rating than
someone who has not. 29 After jury duty ends, approximately 55% of jurors reported
being “somewhat more” or “much more” confident in the court system.30 But direct
experience does not always lead to an increase in approval, especially in high-volume
courts like family or traffic court.31 Importantly, litigants in family or traffic court—areas
large segments of the population experience personally—are significantly less likely to
approve of the court system because of the perception that they are less procedurally
fair.32
Direct interaction with the courts is a way to gain knowledge about the courts, but most
members of the public receive information about the courts indirectly through various
media outlets.  Approximately 69% of surveyed Californians said that they “often” or
“sometimes” receive information about the courts from TV news programs and 59% gain
knowledge about the courts from newspapers or magazines.33 These forms of media are
all legitimate avenues for understanding court decisions, but TV news programming
rarely delves into the depth necessary to increase the public’s understanding of the legal
process and the courts’ responsibilities.  Media discussion of the role of the court vis-à-
vis the other branches of government is rare.
While TV news programming aims to provide information to its audience, entertainment
television, such as Law and Order or Judge Judy, is strictly for leisurely amusement.  Forty-
nine percent of people claim that they receive knowledge about courts from television
shows whose goal is to entertain rather than enlighten.  Many people will not interact
directly with the court system, but almost all Americans have some access to television.
People who get knowledge about the courts from entertainment television actually report
that they feel less familiar with how the courts operate.34 Moreover, indirect exposure to
the courts via the media often has a divisive effect.  TV news programs provide legitimate
access to the courts but no true depth to the coverage, while entertainment television pro-
vides lots of detail that is often inaccurate or misconstrued.  The best way for Americans
to glean knowledge about the court system is to interact directly with it, and the content
of that interaction certainly can affect public opinion.  
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THE PUBLIC EXPANDS THEIR KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE COURTS BOTH THROUGH 
DIRECT EXPERIENCE IN THE COURTROOMS AND THROUGH VARIOUS MEDIA SOURCES.
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People have a powerful urge and need to express their thoughts, experiences, or eventheir questions.  “[B]eing listened to is symbolically important, as it reveals thatgroup authorities value the individuals’ standing in their social group.”35 Litigants
make a strong correlation between the ability to speak and a judge’s respectful treatment
of them as individuals; it demonstrates civic competence.  After all, from a litigant’s point
of view, if the judge does not respect litigants enough to hear their side or answer their
questions, how can the judge arrive at a fair decision? The belief that one can go to legal
authorities with a problem and receive a respectful hearing in which one’s concerns are
taken seriously is central to most people’s definition of their rights as citizens in a democ-
racy.  Although many people never actually go to court, believing that they could go to
court if they needed to—and that, if they did, they would receive consideration—is a key
antecedent of trust and confidence in the legal system.36
This need for people to speak is not primarily about whether or not they believe that their
voice gives them more control of the situation.37 Amazingly, even people who are told
that their voice will have no impact on the decision will still perceive the situation as
fairer if they get to speak.  In Lind, Kanfer, and Earley’s study on voice,38 participants were
asked to rate the perceived fairness of a work interaction where the experimenter doled
out a demanding workload.  The study used three scenarios with differing levels of voice
by the participants.  In one voice condition, the experimenter only gave out the schedule
and did not allow the participants to provide any feedback.  In the “predecision voice”
condition, the experimenter handed out a tentative schedule and asked for the partici-
pants’ opinions.  After listening to them, he decreased the amount of work to more closely
resemble their requests.  In the “postdecision voice” condition, the experimenter gave out
the work schedule and said that it would not be changed, but he asked for their opinions
anyway.  After listening to the participants, he restated his initial decision.  
The researchers discovered that the predecision voice condition was perceived as the
most fair.   But even the postdecision voice was perceived as significantly fairer by the par-
ticipants than the condition where no input was solicited at all even though they were
explicitly told that what they said would have no impact on the decision.39 Although
these participants in an experiment rated the postdecision voice as fairer than having no
voice at all, we as judges cannot consider it fairer in reality to solicit an opinion from
someone who has no potential to affect the outcome.  The researchers called the postde-
cision voice “patently unfair,”40 and we agree, of course, that litigants should not be
granted an arbitrary voice in the courtroom merely to pacify this need to speak and par-
ticipate.  Judges should know, though, that voice has a positive influence on public per-
35. Larry Heuer, What’s Just about the Criminal Justice System? A
Psychological Perspective, 13 J. LAW & POL’Y 209, 211 (2005)
(emphasis added).
36. Tyler et al., supra note 3.   
37. MacCoun, supra note 2, at 23. 
38. E.Allan Lind, Ruth Kanfer & Christopher P. Early, Voice, Control
and Procedural Justice, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952
(1990).
39. MacCoun, supra note 2, at 23-44.
40. Id. at 24 (quoting Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, supra note 38).
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ception of the courts as long as people believe that the judge sincerely considered what
they said when making their decision.41
These studies demonstrate how much of an emphasis people place on the ability to speak
about their experience or opinions.  The strong desire to have a voice has a huge impli-
cation in how the public views the fairness of the courts, especially given that only 19%
of the public surveyed in California would strongly agree that the courts currently allow
people to express their views.42
The old adage that actions speak louder than words holds a powerful amount of truthfor attorneys, litigants, and judges alike.  It’s difficult to do controlled, double-blindstudies in the courtroom to get specific measurements of the effect there of nonver-
bal behavior.  But general research indicates that nonverbal cues are often more impor-
tant than verbal ones in ordinary communication.  
In interpersonal communication generally, studies indicate that nonverbal behaviors
account for 60% to 65% of the meaning conveyed.43 Significantly, when nonverbal cues
conflict with what is actually being said in words, people are more likely to believe what
is being conveyed to them nonverbally.44 And nonverbal communication is the main
means for expressing or experiencing emotion.45
In 2001, researcher Laurinda Porter conducted in-court observations of trial judges’ non-
verbal behavior in the Fourth Judicial District of Minnesota (Hennepin County).  She fol-
lowed up these observations with an attitude survey that explored how those judges felt
about nonverbal communication.  
Porter noted that “almost all the judges observed used nonverbal behaviors . . . that are
considered to be ineffective and in need of improvement.  About one-third of the judges
used these ineffective behaviors frequently.”46 Some of these behaviors on the bench
included the more obvious concerns such as a failure to make eye contact, focusing on a
cup of coffee, and the use of a sarcastic, neutral, or exasperated tone of voice.  She also
noted actual displays of negative emotions, such as anger or disgust, sighing audibly,
kicking feet up on the table, and “using self-oriented gestures such as rubbing, scratch-
ing, picking, licking, or biting parts of the body (to excess).”47
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BODY LANGUAGE INFLUENCES HOW LITIGANTS PERCEIVE THE JUDGE AND THE JUDGE’S DECISION.
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Despite needing some improvement at effective nonverbal communication, 89% of the
surveyed judges in Hennepin County said that they believed their behavior in the court-
room affected the litigants’ satisfaction with the outcome of their case.48 As Porter notes,
“If judges do care about showing care and concern and understand that their behavior has
something to do with the parties’ satisfaction, then it follows logically that judges will
want to do something about their nonverbal communication to assure that the message
they want to send is in fact the message that is received.”49
Examples of nonverbal communication include facial expressions, the speed of speech,
the pitch and volume of the voice, the use of gap-fillers like “uh” and “umm,” gestures,
posture and body position, attire, eye contact, and the distance between speaker and lis-
tener.  Nonverbal communication cues may differ from culture to culture; some might be
offended by too much eye contact, while others would find the presentation more engag-
ing.50
Porter’s study of judges in Hennepin County, combined with general research on the
importance of nonverbal communication, suggests that this is an area of great potential
for improvement by judges.  Even without court-specific data, the available research and
common sense both tell us that many litigants are affected by the nonverbal behavior of
judges.  Porter’s in-court observations showed judges how their specific behaviors in
court might affect litigants, including by detracting from the messages the judges were
trying to convey of concern for the litigants, fairness and impartiality, and competence.  
Educators, psychologists, speech and communication researchers, and others have done
significant work to make suggestions of ways to improve nonverbal communication
skills.51 Most trial judges could benefit from objective feedback about the nonverbal cues
they are giving in the courtroom, along with specific suggestions for improvement.  
While the public emphasizes fair procedures, judges and attorneys focus on fairoutcomes, often at the expense of attention to meeting the criteria of proce-dural fairness that are so important to the public’s perception of the court.
Perhaps because of this different focus, in California, “on average, attorneys tend . . . to
view procedures in the California courts as fairer than do members of the public: an aver-
age of 3.0 for attorneys compared to 2.85 for the public.”52 Attorneys may perceive pro-
cedures to be fairer because that is not as much of a critical point of attention for them,53
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UNLIKE THE PUBLIC, JUDGES FOCUS ON THE FAIRNESS OF 
CASE OUTCOMES INSTEAD OF THE PROCESS.
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or also because they are more familiar with the court’s typical procedures and thus do not
feel as lost during the process.54
An interesting study provides some insight.  A number of federal appellate judges
reviewed police-citizen encounters raising Fourth Amendment issues.  Half the judges
read about a search that was conducted fairly, with polite police who identified them-
selves from the outset and who listened to the citizen’s side of the story; the other half
read about a search that was conducted without much procedural fairness, with rude and
hostile officers who didn’t initially identify themselves and who never gave the citizen a
chance to explain the situation.  While judges recognized differences in the police behav-
ior, those differences made no difference in the way the judges decided the cases under
the Fourth Amendment.55 Judges are trained to focus on the relevant legal issues and to
provide fair outcomes.  In the public’s eye, however, disrespect and blatant bias are cer-
tain ways to create dissatisfaction and to be perceived as procedurally unfair.  This disso-
nance between the expectations of judges and the public suggests “that the meaning of
fairness among judges is considerably different . . . [and] outcome concerns had a greater
influence among judges than the procedural criteria of trust, neutrality, and standing”
that constitute the public’s conception of procedural fairness.56
This difference may be more than just a little problematic since perceptions of procedural
fairness have a substantial impact on both satisfaction and compliance for the public.
However, this is not a difference that affects only judges and litigants; this is perhaps the
inherent dissonance that exists between all decision makers and decision recipients.
Social psychology professor Larry Heuer found generally in an experiment involving col-
lege students, who were tasked randomly either to be the decision maker or the decision
recipient, that “decision recipients [were] oriented primarily to procedural information,
while decision makers [were] oriented primarily to societal benefits,”57 which are gener-
ally the outcomes.  Decision makers, or judges, who are aware of these differences can
better cater their remarks to the needs and expectations of litigants and the public so as
to ensure better satisfaction and compliance.
The mediation process is one attempt to bridge this expectation divide by meeting the
needs of both groups.58 Judges, who were focusing upon achieving legal solutions, his-
torically have employed a variety of types of procedures to meet those ends, including set-
tlement conferences.  But litigants were often excluded from key moments during such
conferences.  When lawyers emerged from a back room and announced to their clients
that they had achieved a good outcome, the lawyers were surprised to find that their
clients were often angry instead of pleased.  From a traditional point of view, lawyers and
judges were confused.  They had come upon a legally appropriate outcome and thought
that they had done their job.  But the parties had no voice and could not see that the pro-
cedures were neutral because there was no transparency in the process.  They did not see
any evidence that their concerns were being taken seriously because they had minimal
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contact with the judge.  As a result, public dissatisfaction could be high, and the parties
might not abide by the agreement.
Mediation, or court-annexed arbitration, was initiated to give people a forum that was
more consistent with what they were expecting out of their involvement with the court.
Mediation leads to greater satisfaction and compliance with the agreements.  People are
directly involved in a mediation session; they get to have a voice and see evidence that
the authority figure is listening to and addressing their concerns.
All judges face real-world pressures.  For many judges, volume creates pressure tomove cases in assembly-line fashion—a method that obviously lacks in opportu-nities for the people involved in that proceeding to feel that they were listened to
and treated with respect.  
The vast majority of cases do not go to trial.  Judges cannot rely then on the safeguards
attendant to trial to provide litigants and others with a feeling of respect, voice, and inclu-
sion.  Their impressions of judges and our justice system—for better or worse—largely
will be formed by their participation in mass-docket arraignments, probation revocations,
calendar calls, and other settings, not trials.  
Due process is a legal term, and judges are trained to provide due process.  Litigants,
jurors, witnesses, and courtroom observers are not trained in due process, but they do
form opinions of us based on their observations.   Even if minimum standards of proce-
dural due process are met at all times, damage may be done to the court system in mass-
docket proceedings that leave large segments of the public feeling that the courts were not
fair.  This may be reflected in the results of a California survey that found significantly
greater dissatisfaction with the courts by respondents who had court experience in traf-
fic or family-law cases, which often are handled in high-volume dockets.59
Everyone who comes through the court system has a right to be treated with respect
100% of the time, a right to be listened to during the process, and a right to have key rul-
ings in the proceeding explained in terms that they can understand.  Sufficient judicial
officers need to be provided so that every docket in the courthouse can be handled in a
manner that respects these rights, and in turn enhances public respect for the judicial sys-
tem and its judges.
CASE VOLUME OF COURTS IS A MANAGEMENT CHALLENGE FOR JUDGES, 
NOT AN EXCUSE FOR DEEMPHASIZING PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS.
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Awide division exists among different minority populations in the frequency withwhich people express approval of the court system.  Asian populations generallyhold significantly higher approval ratings for the judicial branch than do
Hispanics, African-Americans, or even Caucasians.60 However, when asked about the
probability of fair outcomes in court, all of these major ethnic groups “… perceive ‘worse
results’ in outcomes for African-Americans, low-income people, and non-English speak-
ers.”61 It is troubling that a wide consensus believes these groups consistently receive less
fair outcomes.
As a group, African-Americans feel that they receive less fair outcomes in their cases.
When compared to Hispanics and Caucasians, 70% of African Americans believe that they
are treated “somewhat” or “far” worse.  African-Americans are also two times more likely
to believe that a court’s outcome will “seldom” or “never” be fair as they would believe that
the outcome will “always” or “usually” be fair.62 Further, African-American defendants
who enter the courtroom  “report worse treatment, more negative outcomes, lower per-
ceptions of the quality of the court’s decision-making process, and less trust in the motives
of court actors.  After the case is decided, these negative perceptions translate into less sat-
isfaction with the court overall and less acceptance of the court’s decision, all of which in
turn lower compliance”63 It’s little wonder that these attitudes negatively impact recidi-
vism.  And these perceptions may well be reality-based:  though true apple-to-apple case
comparisons are difficult to make, African-Americans are 4.8 times more likely to be incar-
cerated and are generally given much harsher sentences than white defendants.64
While people with different ethnic and racial backgrounds differ in the degree to which
they have trust and confidence in the legal system, people are concerned about fair pro-
cedures irrespective of their ethnicity and economic status and are willing to defer to a
court’s judgment if procedural fairness exists.65 Procedural fairness is the primary factor
that shapes perceptions of the judicial system.66 However, since African-Americans per-
ceive less fairness, it is critical to focus on what alleviates or aggravates that difference.
Interestingly, “[d]efendants at Red Hook were not only more generally satisfied than
those at the traditional court, but there was less variation by race and socioeconomic sta-
tus.”67 The Red Hook Community Court in Brooklyn seems to have eliminated the dis-
tinctions between perceived levels of fairness among economic and ethnic divisions. This
is of paramount importance because of the demonstrated and pervasive level of distrust
of the judicial system among African-Americans; “[i]f community courts neutralize this
effect, they make an important contribution to improving the legitimacy of the court in
the eyes of a population disproportionately affected by the criminal justice system.” 68
PERCEPTIONS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS DIFFER DRAMATICALLY 
AMONG MINORITY AND MAJORITY POPULATIONS.
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WHAT CAN AN INDIVIDUAL JUDGE DO?
1. As a matter of practice, explain in understandable language what is about to go on to litigants, wit-
nesses, and jurors.  The more they know what to expect, the more likely they will be able to com-
prehend.  Judges need to accept that it is their ultimate responsibility to ensure people understand
their processes and orders.
2. Learn how to listen better.  Listening is not the absence of talking.  There are some excellent books
about improving listening.  The first step is good self-analysis.  Each of us has different strengths and
weaknesses.  All of the literature concludes that you can become a better listener.  The local acade-
mic community might be a good repository of advice.
3. While it is understandable to believe that a lawyer will explain judicial orders, not every litigant has
a lawyer who will ensure an order is understood.  It’s your order.  You have a responsibility to explain
it in understandable terms.
4. Put something on the bench as a mental reminder that patience is a virtue not always easily practiced.
5. At the start of a docket, explain the ground rules for what will happen.  For example, explain why
certain cases will be heard first or why what litigants or defendants can say is limited in time or scope.
6. Share and discuss this paper with the courtroom staff.  They can play a critical role in giving a judge
feedback, reminders, and support.
7. Arrange to have yourself videotaped, particularly when you preside in heavy calendars.  Ideally,
review the tape with a professional or colleagues who will aid your analysis, but even if no one sees
it except you (and perhaps a partner or spouse), you can still learn a lot about how you are perceived
by the people before you.
8. Enlist the local academic community.  Professors who specialize in communication and nonverbal
behavior can offer great insight.
9. Thank people for their patience.
WHAT CAN YOUR COURT DO?
1. Adopt the National Center for State Courts’ CourTools, a set of ten trial-court-performance measures
that offer perspective on court operations.  If all ten are more than is feasible, start with number one:
Access and Fairness. 
2. Examine how your court deals with the three most troubling areas courts have in affording a high
degree of procedural fairness:  self-represented people, family law, and traffic offenses.
a. There is increasing understanding that a good trial judge must change not only the processes that lead
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE
up to the courtroom, but also the way the courtroom itself is conducted.  Judicial officers and those
who work with them are beginning to think of ways to manage the courtroom so that neutrality is
enhanced by making the systems work for all, regardless of whether they have a lawyer. People who
appear pro se are more likely to be poor, a minority, and overwhelmed by the legal process.  
b. Some fear that changing court procedures to be friendly to the self-represented undercuts judicial
neutrality.  The American Judges Association is a member of the Self-Represented Litigant
Network, which has resources.  
c. Courtroom procedures as a whole must be designed to support the type of relaxed neutral com-
munications between judges and self-represented litigants that is optimal for obtaining the facts
necessary on which to base high-quality decision making.
3. Use the research cited in this paper to demand adequate numbers of judicial officers to be able to han-
dle high-volume dockets in ways that both move the cases toward a timely disposition and allow those
coming through the court to feel that they have been respected and listened to.
4. Consider how procedures may affect perceptions of fairness.  For example, providing a small-claims
litigant a written explanation, even consisting of a few sentences, may be preferable to using a check-
the-box form judgment.  Or it may be that providing an oral decision from the bench will be seen as
fairer than a cursory decision that arrives in the mail.  
WHAT CAN COURT ADMINISTRATORS DO?
1.  Share this paper with court employees.  Engage them in a discussion of the importance of fairness in
our courts.  As important as the judge may be in the process, the judge is just one piece of the puz-
zle when it comes to the public’s interaction with the court system.  Conduct courtwide training so
that all employees understand the important role they play in providing procedural fairness.  How 
litigants are treated by court employees from the moment they enter the courthouse door—or the
moment they encounter security personnel at a metal detector—sets the tone.  
2.  Make it a major project for 2008 to analyze the tone of public interaction that is set in your court-
house.  Does it convey respect and care for the people who, often in stress, come there?  Could it be
improved?  Many courthouses have child-care facilities, adequate handicapped-accessible areas (now
required by the ADA), and domestic-violence waiting rooms.  Are there improvements that should be
made at your courthouse?  Involve all stakeholders (judges, staff, attorneys, litigants, and the general
public) in this process.
3.  Treat employees fairly.  If court employees do not feel that they are fairly treated in their jobs by court
leaders, it is unlikely that they will treat the public any better.  The National Center for State Courts’
CourTools has a specific measurement tool for employee satisfaction.  Court administrators need to
strive to create a courthouse work environment that doesn’t breed cynicism.
4. Work to provide sufficient support staff so that judges are not distracted by activities that may inter-
fere with their perceived attention to the presentation of cases in the courtroom.  For example, if a
judge is fiddling with tape recorders and making constant notes of tape counter numbers, that judge
is not going to be looking at the litigants and attorneys and is not going to be perceived as having paid
careful attention to the parties’ dispute.  There are many roles that judges take on in understaffed
courts and courtrooms.  Those roles should be carefully monitored for possible interference with the
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judge’s primary role—hearing and deciding the matter at hand in a way that clearly adheres to the
requirements for a high public perception of procedural fairness.  Having judges perform duties that
might more appropriately be done by a clerk should especially be avoided in high-volume dockets.
5. Provide opportunities for courthouse visitors to evaluate their experience before they leave the cour-
thouse.  Doing so communicates respect and gives an opportunity for voice.
WHAT CAN RESEARCHERS DO?
1. For more than thirty years, the social-science academic community has learned a great deal about fair-
ness in our courts.  The knowledge that they have gained, however, has too often remained within
the confines of academia.  The truth is that most judges don’t know about the journals the research
appears in and often don’t easily understand the jargon. The National Science Foundation and others
who fund social-justice research need to reach out to judges to develop strategies to ensure that sound
academic social-science research is shared in forms that are likely to produce change within the
courts—journals like Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American Judges Association, and
judicial-education conferences are key venues for the dissemination of this information.     
2. While there is a lot of research at the trial-court level on the issue of procedural fairness, there is lit-
tle research about how the concept applies at the appellate level.  This could be an important area for
additional thought and research.
3. The American Judges Association encourages the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to fund
research specifically targeted to improving the procedural fairness of courts dealing with traffic cases.
4. Substantial research documents the need to have a voice in the proceedings.  Usually, litigants express
themselves in court through their attorneys.  Researchers could attempt to determine whether it is
always sufficient for the litigant to be represented by an attorney in a forum in which the litigant is
present, or whether litigant satisfaction would be substantially improved by having some time in
which the litigant is heard from directly.  This sort of research could be done in a variety of contexts,
civil and criminal.
5. Help to evaluate the potential consequences on perceptions of procedural fairness through pilot pro-
jects on changes in court procedure.  At a minimum, changes in procedure should not reduce the
sense of procedural fairness by people who come to court.
WHAT CAN JUDICIAL EDUCATORS DO?
1. The American Judges Association encourages judicial educators to simply distribute this paper as a
start.  (We’ll happily provide it in electronic form.)  Judicial education is driven by advocacy; that is,
educators try to get judges to do something by telling them about something.  If judicial educators sim-
ply make good, accessible information about procedural fairness known to judges, change will begin
to occur even without a call for specific action.
2. Judges should be formally educated on the implications of research regarding procedural issues and
action steps they might take.  Procedural Fairness might be developed as an intensive course of study
presented by the National Judicial College.  But, in addition to considering Procedural Fairness as a
stand-alone subject, it also should be integrated into virtually all judicial-education subject areas.  
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3. Judicial education must include—for lack of a better term—“leadership” development.  Programs like
the Leadership Institute in Judicial Education at the University of Memphis help participating judges
to understand themselves better, as well as how others learn and change.  Such programs teach the
role of emotions in those processes in ways that can be useful in educating others, in judging, and in
life.  Judges need honest feedback in a safe environment in order to build self-awareness and continue
to develop as leaders in their courtrooms.
4. Judicial educators need to train judicial mentors.  The habits and values judges adopt within the first
24 months are likely to be the ones they keep throughout their careers. Effective mentoring is a key
in shaping this.
WHAT CAN COURT LEADERS DO?
1. The American Judges Association encourages the Conference of Chief Justices to place the issue of
procedural fairness in state courts on their agenda during 2008.  Each state Chief Justice has enor-
mous influence on the agenda for justice in their state.  Collectively the Conference of Chief Justices
can set the agenda for our nation’s state courts.  It may at first glance seem presumptuous for the
American Judges Association to encourage the Conference to place this issue on their agenda in 2008.
Many states already are deeply committed to improving the procedural fairness of their courts, and
many individual Chief Justices are champions of this issue.  But the performance of our courts on
matters of procedural fairness has certainly not been perfected, which is why the Conference of Chief
Justices should place this issue on their agenda.
2. Similarly, the American Judges Association encourages the Conference of State Court Administrators
to place the issue of procedural fairness on their agenda during 2008.  We acknowledge the leader-
ship of COSCA in developing excellent white papers to guide future action; we have modeled our
white-paper process on COSCA’s excellent efforts.  State-court administrators have been the tradi-
tional champions of improved case management.  The new mantra of court administration should be
that effective case management that also affords procedural fairness to litigants is the essence of effec-
tive court administration.  Unless both goals are achieved, the system of justice will flounder.
3. The American Judges Association encourages courts to examine the National Center for State Courts’
CourTools.  Our goal is to have at least 100 additional courts adopt and implement the CourTool on
access and fairness in 2008.
4. The American Judges Association invites the courts community to plan for a national conference on
procedural fairness in 2009. The National Center for State Courts, the National Judicial College, the
Center for Court Innovation, the Institute for the Reform of the American Legal System, Justice at
Stake, and the American Judicature Society all have tried to improve the fairness of our courts.  If
these organizations and others were willing to partner with the American Judges Association to plan
and seek funding for a national conference on procedural fairness, the issue of fairness in our courts
could be advanced exponentially.
5. The American Judges Association encourages bar-association leaders to join with the courts to ensure
greater procedural fairness in our courts.  Lawyers need to be educated on the social-science research
described in this paper so that all of the players within the court system can work together toward a
justice system that can be respected by all.  
6. The American Judges Association encourages the Urban Court Manager Network, working with the
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Justice Management Institute and others, to examine the issue of how to improve the sense of proce-
dural fairness for racial minorities.
7.  By embracing procedural fairness, courts can embrace judicial accountability without reference to
specific decisions on the merits of individual cases.  Judges should be held accountable for running a
courtroom in which everyone is treated with respect, has the opportunity to be heard, and receives
an adequate explanation of court orders.  Judges cannot avoid controversy—we must decide the cases
before us.  But in the face of potentially unfair criticism for specific decisions, it should be an effec-
tive defense by a judge to be able to say that the people who appear in my courtroom feel they have
been treated fairly.
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People come to the courts about a wide variety of prob-lems and disputes.  Although this has always been thecase, in recent years the court system has become the
branch of government in which people deal with an ever
broader variety of issues and concerns.  And the people who
bring their problems to court have themselves become increas-
ingly diverse in terms of their ethnic and social backgrounds.
In addition, more and more of these people choose to represent
themselves, rather than acting through lawyers. Finally, these
changes are occurring in an environment in which people have
generally lower levels of trust and confidence in all forms of
governmental authority.  All of these trends pose a challenge
for the courts.
In dealing with these problems and disputes, one core goal
of the judicial system is to provide people with a forum in
which they can obtain justice as it is defined by the framework
of the law. This is the traditional concern of judges, and the
goal emphasized in legal education—the correct application of
the law to particular legal disputes.  
A second goal of the courts is to handle people’s problems
in ways that lead them to accept and be willing to abide by the
decisions made by the courts.  The effectiveness of the courts
in managing social conflicts depends upon their ability to issue
decisions that are authoritative, i.e., that shape the conduct of
the parties that come before them.  Courts want that deference
to continue over time, with people adhering to court judg-
ments long after their case, so that the parties are not continu-
ally bringing the issues back into the courts for re-litigation.
Finally, the courts want to retain and even enhance public trust
and confidence in the courts, judges, and the law.  Such public
trust is the key to maintaining the legitimacy of the legal sys-
tem.
THE IDEA OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
The concepts behind procedural justice have developed
from research showing that the manner in which disputes are
handled by the courts has an important influence upon peo-
ple’s evaluations of their experiences in the court system.1 The
key finding of that research is that how people and their prob-
lems are managed when they are dealing with the courts has
more influence than the outcome of their case on the issues
noted above.  Judgments about how cases are handled are gen-
erally referred to as assessments of procedural justice to dis-
tinguish them from assessments of the favorability or the fair-
ness of the outcomes that people received.  Studies suggest first
that procedural justice has an impact on whether people accept
and abide by the decisions made by the courts, both immedi-
ately and over time.  Second, procedural justice influences how
people evaluate the judges and other court personnel they deal
with, as well as the court system and the law.
Problems with noncompliance with the decisions of judges
are long-standing. 
One major motivation for the alternative dispute resolution
movement, which seeks alternative forums to traditional
courtrooms, is the effort to find a way to increase the willing-
ness to accept the decisions made by third-party authorities.
In family court, for example, judges have struggled to find
ways to make decisions about child custody and child support
that would be willingly followed by both fathers and mothers
and that would, to the degree possible, create positive post-
separation dynamics in which both parents took responsibility
for supporting their children financially and emotionally.  And,
procedural justice is found to be effective in both creating 
positive dynamics within families and in facilitating long-term
adherence to agreements.2 In other words, the use of fair pro-
cedures encourages a positive climate among the parties,
which is more likely to promote both a long-term relationship
and adherence to the agreements made about how to handle
issues, such as child custody, that are related to that relation-
ship.
MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
Before discussing the implications of the procedural justice
approach, let me comment on a common misconception about
this perspective.  That is that it suggests that people are happy
when they lose.  On the contrary, no one likes to lose.
However, people recognize that they cannot always win when
they have conflicts with others.  They accept “losing” more
willingly if the court procedures used to handle their case are
fair.  This is true both for formal procedures such as trials and
for informal procedures, including settlement conferences,
mediation sessions, and arbitration hearings.
One reason the procedural justice approach results in “los-
ing” being more acceptable to litigants is that it minimizes the
degree to which problems are framed in terms of winning and
losing, as well as generally shifting the focus of attention away
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from outcomes and toward the procedures through which the
dispute is being resolved.  As a consequence, fair procedures
lead to a concern about delivering gains to all parties rather
than winning over others.3 For example, all parties have the
opportunity to present their story and to have it considered by
the relevant authorities.  Further, all parties have their right to
seek justice from the courts, recognized and acknowledged by
the courts.  
Because it provides all parties with desirable experiences
with the courts, procedural justice is a key to the development
of stable and lasting solutions to conflicts.  The beginning
point of such solutions is a better and generally less conflictual
relationship among the parties to a case.  When people have
settled their conflict in a less adversarial way, they have better
feelings toward one another.  For example, as previously
noted, in child custody hearings both parents are likely to be
involved in their children’s lives a year or even several years
after the hearing if they view the hearing as fair.  And this is
true irrespective of the outcome.  Fathers, who typically lose
such hearings, are more likely to have contact with their chil-
dren in the future if the hearing is one they evaluate as being
fair.  In addition, having a fair hearing encourages people to
view the authority involved and their decision as more legiti-
mate.  Consequently, people feel more obligation to accept and
obey the decision.  This leads to long-term rule following.
One example of this long-term effect is provided by a study
of adult rule following conducted in Australia.  Adults who
were arrested for driving while drunk had their case disposed
through different legal procedures, including traditional
courts.  After their case was disposed each person was inter-
viewed.  As expected, the fairness of the legal procedure was
related to the legitimacy of the legal system.  Two years later,
those involved were reinterviewed and it was found their views
about the legitimacy of the law were related to their initial per-
ceptions of the fairness of their cases.  Peoples’ obedience to
the law was then tracked for the two years following this sec-
ond interview, and it was found that people who experienced
their hearing as fairer, and therefore viewed the law as more
legitimate two years later, reoffended at around 25% the rate of
those who viewed the law as less legitimate during the two
years following their second interview.  In other words, the
reduction in reoffending caused by experiencing a hearing as
fairer extended to at least four years after the hearing.4 It is
striking that people’s experiences in a courtroom or at a con-
ference with legal authorities, something that lasts at best a few
hours, can be strongly affecting their behavior several years
later.
THE INFLUENCE OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
As the findings outlined suggest, judges and court personnel
should be interested in procedural justice because studies indi-
cate that it encourages decision acceptance and leads to positive
views about the legal system.  A particularly telling example
comes from a study of willingness to accept decisions made by
police officers and judges in two California communities—
Oakland and Los Angeles.5 This study considered both those
who came to these authorities seeking help, and those being
regulated by the authorities.  It also considered a diverse sam-
ple of White, African-American, and Hispanic residents.  The
sample included 1,656 people in Los Angeles and Oakland with
a recent personal experience with the police or the courts.
Fourteen percent (239 people) had contact with a court.
Why did people accept court decisions?  The study asked
participants about their willingness to accept such decisions.
In particular, it focused upon willing acceptance, rather than
mere compliance.  It also asked about overall evaluations of the
law, the courts, and the legal system.  
Reactions to the court could potentially be linked to three
judgments: whether the procedures used by the court were
just; whether the outcome was just; and/or whether the out-
come was favorable or unfavorable.  In addition, the study
measured and controlled for other potentially important fac-
tors, including the person’s ideology, their age, their level of
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TABLE 1. THE INFLUENCE OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
Willingness
to accept the
decision
Evaluation
of the courts
and the law
Experience-based judgements
Procedural justice .68*** .36***
Distributive justice .20** .15^
Outcome favorability -.11* -.11
Background factors
Ideology .08 .07
Age -.06 .02
Education -.12 .05
Income .13* .07
Gender .02 .00
African-American -.03 -.17^
Hispanic -.10 .07
City of residence -.06 .04
Was contact voluntary? -.04 .02
Adjusted R2 58%*** 21%***
^p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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education, their income, their
gender, the city they lived in,
their ethnicity (African-
American, Hispanic, white);
and whether they appeared in
court voluntarily.
Regression analysis was
used to explore the influence
of these various factors on the
willingness to accept deci-
sions made by the court.  The
results of that analysis are
shown in Table 1.  The num-
bers shown are standardized
regression coefficients, which indicate the relative influence of
different factors.  As expected, the primary factor shaping the
willingness to accept decisions was the fairness of court proce-
dures (standardized regression coefficient, r = .68, p < .001).
Procedural justice was also the primary factor shaping the
influence of personal experience upon overall views about the
court system (standardized regression coefficient, r = .36, p <
.001).  
The findings noted above are especially important because
they are true of people irrespective of their social or economic
background.  The California study was designed to compare
the experiences of white, Hispanic, and African-American
members of Los Angeles and Oakland.  The members of all
three groups reacted in basically the same ways to their expe-
riences.  The same is true of those who were economically
advantaged and disadvantaged, men and women, and those
high and low in education.  It was also true of plaintiffs and
defendants, and of people who dealt with the police or the
courts.  In other words, people generally reacted to their expe-
rience in terms of procedural justice whatever their back-
ground, suggesting that focusing on procedural justice is a
very good way to build trust and encourage compliance irre-
spective of who the people using the courts are.
These findings are typical of studies of the courts.  Early
experimental research on trials by John Thibaut (a psycholo-
gist) and Laurens Walker (a lawyer) demonstrated that, irre-
spective of the outcome of a trial, the participants were more
willing to accept the decisions of the judge if the trial proce-
dure was fair.6 In particular, they argued that disputants
viewed adversary procedures as fair because they allowed peo-
ple the opportunity to tell their side of the story before deci-
sions were made by the authority managing the trial.  Such an
opportunity is often described as having voice in the proceed-
ings.  This early experimental research has been subsequently
supported by a number of laboratory and field studies of trials
and other legal procedures.7 At this point the influence of pro-
cedural justice is widely supported by both experimental and
field research.  
As I have noted, an especially important finding of studies
on procedural justice is that people are more likely to continue
to abide by a decision if that decision is made through a fair
procedure.  The process legitimates the decision and creates
commitment to obeying it that is found to persist into the
future.   In addition, studies find that people’s general commit-
ment to obeying the law is heightened when they experience
fair procedures in legal settings.
A common misconception about regulatory procedures is
that you cannot deliver undesirable outcomes without being
unpopular.  This suggests that the police and courts are
inevitably unpopular.  The study of people dealing with legal
authorities that I have just described indicates that as long as
people view the procedures they experience as fair, they are
largely unaffected by their outcomes, even when those out-
comes are negative.8 In addition, studies that interview people
both before and after their personal experiences with legal
authorities show that trust and confidence in legal authorities
increases when people experience procedural justice, even in
situations in which they receive a negative outcome.9 It might
seem paradoxical but people are found to feel more trust in
authorities after receiving a negative outcome than they did
before receiving that outcome, as long as the authority
involved behaves in a fair way.  So, legal authorities can act in
ways that are necessary to be effective in their regulatory role
and simultaneously build confidence among the public.
Finally, people often suggest that procedures do not matter
when the stakes are high.  In fact, studies suggest that people
continue to care about the fairness of procedures when the
outcomes involved are substantial and important to them.
This includes when the monetary stakes are high, as is true in
civil cases;10 when people are very invested in the issues, for
example in child custody hearings;11 when their liberty is at
stake, as is true in felony cases;12 when people are incarcer-
ated;13 and when important public policy issues are being
decided.14
These same procedural justice judgments are also a key fac-
tor in the evaluations made by the general public of the courts
as institutions.15 National surveys of public trust and confi-
dence in state courts show that public evaluations of state
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courts are based heavily upon evaluations of the fairness of
court procedures.16 In particular, people are found to be sen-
sitive to whether the courts protect their rights and to whether
they think that judges are honest.  While these procedural jus-
tice judgments are the most important factor shaping trust and
confidence in the courts, those interviewed are also sensitive to
whether the courts treated the members of different groups
equally, as well as to other structural issues about the courts,
such as cost and delay.  But, their primary basis for evaluation
is procedural justice.
The strong linkage between procedural justice and evalua-
tions of the courts was recently affirmed by a study conducted
within the State Courts of California.  The Administrative
Office of the Courts undertook a study in 2005 in which a ran-
dom sample of the residents of the state were interviewed
about their trust and confidence in the California courts.  An
analysis of that information17 suggests that “[h]aving a sense
that court decisions are made through processes that are fair is
the strongest predictor by far of whether members of the pub-
lic approve of or have confidence in the California courts.”18
The California courts are rated as being very fair in terms of
treating people with dignity and respect, but as not particularly
fair in terms of allowing them to participate in decisions that
affect them.   The report argues that “[p]olicies that promote
procedural fairness offer the vehicle with the greatest potential
for changing how the public views the state courts.”19
Interestingly, the report points to experiences with low-
stakes courts, such as traffic court, as a particular source of dis-
satisfaction, and argues that all experiences with legal author-
ities, even relatively trivial interactions, are important to mem-
bers of the public and need to be the focus of court design
efforts.  Finally, the report argues that there need to be mecha-
nisms for the ongoing evaluation of people’s experiences with
the courts, mechanisms institutionalized through periodic sur-
veys of members of the public, especially those who have had
experiences with the courts.  
One reason that these findings are particularly important is
that they provide an independent confirmation that issues of
procedural justice matter in real court settings.  This study was
not conducted or evaluated by the academic researchers who
have been responsible for many of the early studies of proce-
dural justice.  Instead, the
need for this study arose
within the framework of court
concerns in California; the
study was designed and con-
ducted within the framework
of the administrative offices of
the courts; and the report was
written by David Rottman, a
researcher at the National
Center for State Courts.
Hence, the confirmation of core procedural justice findings is
especially important.
Similar conclusions have also been reached by other judicial
leaders.  The White Paper on procedural fairness authored by
Judges Kevin Burke and Steve Leben, 20 presented at the annual
meeting of the American Judges Association in 2007 and
which is the focus of this special issue of Court Review, is
another example.  The White Paper reviews research on proce-
dural justice, including recent studies conducted within the
court systems of Hennepin County, Minnesota, under Judge
Burke’s direction, and in Brooklyn, New York.21 Again, these
court-designed and -sponsored evaluations point to the impor-
tance of procedural justice in encouraging satisfaction, deci-
sion acceptance, and trust and confidence in the courts.22
Finally, the findings outlined do not apply only to litigants
or other members of the public who come to court (the
“clients” of the court system).  They also apply to the people
who work within the court system.  Studies of employees in
general indicate that employees in a wide variety of types of
work organizations evaluate their own experiences on the job
in terms of the procedural fairness of their treatment by their
own authorities.  Research suggests that the degree to which
employees follow work rules, as well as doing their jobs well,
is linked to the fairness of workplace procedures.23 Similarly,
studies of agents of social control, for example police officers,
suggest that their behavior on the job is related to how fairly
they are treated by their supervisors.24 Hence, the same prin-
ciples that can be used to design efforts to deal with the public
also apply to efforts to design effective approaches to dealing
with the people working within the criminal justice system.
The procedural
justice research
findings "also
apply to the 
people who work
within the court
system."
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COURT MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES
How can we secure the gains associated with procedural
justice?  We need to design a court management framework
that treats people’s entire experience with the legal system from
a procedural justice perspective.25 Studies suggest that people
are influenced by their treatment at all stages of their experi-
ence, and by all the authorities whom they encounter.  This
includes their experiences with the police, their out-of-court
experiences with their lawyers, their treatment by jail authori-
ties, court clerks and bailiffs, and their experience in the court-
room dealing with judges and lawyers.  Consequently, we need
to emphasize procedural justice during initial contacts with
the police and jail authorities; during experiences with attor-
neys throughout the case disposition process; in contacts with
court clerks and other administrative personnel; in the con-
duct of settlement and pretrial mediation procedures; during
experiences with judges and lawyers during trials and in infor-
mal proceedings; and in posttrial experiences involving the
implementation and enforcement of orders, as well as in any
subsequent incarceration.
It is equally important to remember that everyone involved
with the courts treats their experience as a “civics lesson”
about the legal system.  This includes the parties to any case,
but also is true for their families, friends, and other observers;
witnesses; jurors; as well as all of those who hear stories about
the courts from their friends, family, neighbors, or coworkers.
And, of course, everyone is affected by the stories that appear
in the mass media.
Does everyone share these procedural justice concerns?
Studies suggest that procedural justice judgments dominate
the reactions of all of the people who deal with legal authori-
ties across ethnic/racial groups, among the rich and poor, and
for both men and women.26 Most important, they dominate
the concerns of the members of the major minority groups in
the United States, in particular African-Americans and
Hispanics.27
WHAT IS PROCEDURAL JUSTICE?
Given that procedural justice matters, what are the aspects
of the court experience that should be emphasized by legal
authorities?  There are four key procedural justice principles:
voice, neutrality, respect, and trust.  
Voice.  People want to have the opportunity to tell their side
of the story in their own words before decisions are made
about how to handle the dispute or problem.  Having an
opportunity to voice their perspective has a positive effect
upon people’s experience with the legal system irrespective of
their outcome, as long as they feel that the authority sincerely
considered their arguments before making their decision.  This
desire for voice is found to be one of the reasons that informal
legal procedures such as mediation are very popular.  People
value the chance to communicate with the mediator, indicat-
ing what they view the problem as being and making sugges-
tions concerning how it should be handled.
Neutrality. People bring their disputes to the court because
they view judges as neutral, principled decision makers who
make decisions based upon rules and not personal opinions,
and who apply legal rules consistently across people and over
cases.  To emphasize this aspect of the court experience, judges
should be transparent and open about how the rules are being
applied and how decisions are being made.  Explanations
emphasizing how the relevant rules are being applied are help-
ful.
Respect. Legal authorities, whether police officers, court
clerks, or judges, represent the state and communicate impor-
tant messages to people about their status in society.  Respect
for people and their rights affirm to people that they are viewed
as important and valuable, and are included within the rights
and protections that form one aspect of the connection that
people have to government and law.  People want to feel that
when they have concerns and problems both they and their
problems will be taken seriously by the legal system.  
Respect matters at all stages, and involves police officers
and court clerks as well as judges.  It includes both treating
people well, that is, with courtesy and politeness, and showing
respect for people’s rights.  For example, when people come to
court they are often confused about how cases are handled.
TABLE 2. TOTAL INFLUENCES ON PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
Overall 
procedural justice
Voice .55***
Neutrality .49***
Respect .28***
Trust .30***
***p < .001 
FIGURE 1: DIRECT AND INDIRECT INFLUENCES 
ON PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
Providing people with information about what to do, where to
go, and when to appear, all demonstrate respect both for those
people and for their right to have their problems handled fairly
by the courts.   Brochures or websites explaining court proce-
dures, as well as aids such as help desks, are found to be valu-
able.  
Trust. Studies of legal and political authorities consistently
show that the central attribute that influences public evalua-
tions of legal authorities is an assessment of the character of
the decision maker.  The key elements in this evaluation
involve issues of sincerity and caring.  People infer whether
they feel that court personnel, such as judges, are listening to
and considering their views; are being honest and open about
the basis for their actions; are trying to do what is right for
everyone involved; and are acting in the interests of the parties,
not out of personal prejudices.  
THE INFLUENCE OF PROCEDURAL CONCERNS
Using the data collected in the study of personal experi-
ences with the courts discussed above, it is possible to exam-
ine the influence of the four antecedents of procedural justice
that have just been outlined.  An analysis of the four factors
considered at the same time suggests that neutrality, trust, and
respect directly shape overall evaluations of procedural justice,
but that voice does not. However, an analysis that allows both
direct and indirect influences, shown in Figure 1, indicates
that voice is indirectly important because it shapes neutrality,
trust, and respect.  An analysis that considers both direct and
indirect influences at the same time, shown in Table 2, indi-
cates that all four factors matter.  Interestingly, neither out-
come favorability nor outcome fairness directly influences
overall procedural justice judgments.  The willingness to
accept court decisions, in other words, was about the proce-
dures used to reach those decisions, not the decisions them-
selves.
DESIGN IMPLICATIONS
The courts are not a store, so “customer satisfaction” is not
their primary goal.  Their goal is to fairly resolve conflicts and
accurately administer the law.  However, the courts need to
take people’s concerns seriously, since the courts have the task
of conflict resolution, and whether people will accept their
decisions matters.  Further, whether people feel that justice has
been achieved is central to their trust and confidence in the
court system.
A beginning point for dealing with people’s concerns is the
recognition that people come to court about issues that are
important to them, irrespective of the strength of their legal
case.  Legal authorities can communicate that their decisions
reflect a sincere effort to reasonably apply the law to these
problems and therefore ought to be accepted and followed in a
variety of ways.  Authorities can provide evidence that they are
listening to people and considering their arguments by giving
people a reasonable chance to state their case, by paying atten-
tion when people are making that presentation, and by
acknowledging and taking account of people’s needs and con-
cerns when explaining their decisions. This is true even if the
authorities cannot accept those arguments and give people
what they feel they deserve.   
SUMMARY
We live in an era of scarce resources and high levels of mis-
trust.  Procedural justice approaches provide a mechanism for
managing conflicts that produces authoritative decisions while
sustaining, and even building, trust and confidence in the
courts and the law.
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This essay reflects on the ways in which procedural fair-ness can provide the direction for a revived court reformagenda. All previous eras of court reform were guided by
a theory drawn either from academia or the field of manage-
ment. Procedural fairness, in my view, is the organizing theory
for which 21st-century court reform has been waiting. 
Past eras of court reform accomplished a great deal. In 1950,
there were 826 trial courts in California. Today, 58 trial
courts—one per county—hear all manners of cases.1
Management theories drawn from the business field provided
the blueprint for court reform by (a) simplifying trial court
structure though consolidation, (b) centralizing management,
(c) replacing local court funding with state funding under a
centralized budget, and (d) centralizing rulemaking. 
By the 1970s, a more flexible approach to reform emerged,
one that sought to optimize court performance by matching a
court’s organization with the broader socio-political context in
which it operates. The inspiration was new developments in the
sociology and social psychology of organizations. “Contingency
Theory” views organizations as open systems responding to
specific environments. This was translated by judges, court
administrators, and consultants into a reform program seeking
“decentralized coordination” that encouraged innovation.
Subsequent theory-driven influences on court reform included
“Total Quality Management,” expressed as court performance
standards adopted for both trial and appellate courts by
national court leadership organizations in the 1990s.  
THE LIMITS OF TRADITIONAL COURT REFORM
A 1977 national survey was designed to confirm that court
reform had increased public trust in and support for the state
courts. The Public Image of the Courts Survey oversampled
residents of three states regarded by experts as having under-
taken significant court reforms in recent decades, and three
that had not. The results were disheartening: People in the
reforming states were no more likely to be aware of recent
changes in the court system than were people in the non-
reforming states; they also were no more supportive of their
courts.2 Consolidating courts, centralizing court management,
and implementing state funding did not resonate with the pub-
lic or even penetrate their awareness. 
The State of Utah in the early 1990s carried out a fascinat-
ing experiment. The backdrop to the effort was a solid 20 years
of court reform in Utah that brought about significant unifica-
tion of the state’s courts and heightened the authority of the
chief justice, and established a judicial council through a con-
stitutional amendment. A justice system reporter from a major
newspaper took a leave of absence to write a series of in-depth
articles on issues relating to the courts. Over a one-year period,
television and radio stations aired stories and public-service
announcements relating to the courts, including four docu-
mentaries. An opinion survey was conducted in 1990 and
repeated in 1991. There was no detectable change in the pub-
lic’s opinion of the state court system.3
More generally, 33 state-specific surveys and six national sur-
veys on public opinion on the courts since 1977 do not record a
significant change in how the public views the state courts. The
expected payoff of higher levels of public trust and support for
the state courts never really materialized from these reform pro-
grams. Courts became more businesslike and efficient, and more
adaptable, but reform failed to address the core concerns of liti-
gants, jurors, and others who enter the courthouse. 
Procedural fairness, in contrast, offers the judiciary a reform
program that strengthens the connection between the judiciary
and the public. The promise of that program is that it will orga-
nize the work of the courts in a way that generates satisfaction,
trust, and compliance with court orders. That goal takes on
particular importance as efforts are made to politicize the state
judiciary. 
A NEW REFORM AGENDA
Where did court reformers go astray? Procedural fairness
research offers a convincing answer. While court reformers
focused on “instrumental factors” such as time to disposition
and costs associated with structural and procedural changes,
the public was, and is, focused on the quality of their interac-
tion with judges and experiences within the court system.4
Procedural fairness can also explain why some court
reforms proved successful. Problem-solving courts, of which
some 3,200 now populate the court landscape,5 have been
shown in rigorous evaluations to reduce recidivism levels in
drug and mental-health cases significantly compared to tradi-
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tional court processing. For example, a 2007 evaluation report
on the Portland, Oregon, drug court reduced re-arrests
between 17 and 26 percent over a 10-year period.6 What
explains this advantage for the new type of forum? Procedural
justice is the answer, or rather: “the DTC [Drug Treatment
Court] program, especially the judicial hearing, contributes to
an offender’s perception of fairness and due process, thereby
increasing his or her willingness to fulfill his or her part of the
negotiated DCT agreement.”7
There is solid evidence that the general public also perceives
the key elements of problem-solving courts as desirable. In a
2000 national survey, 1,500 adults were asked if they agreed or
disagreed with four such elements: (1) courts hiring drug
treatment counselors and social workers, (2) ordering people
to go back to court and talk to the judge about their treatment
progress, (3) solving problems by coordinating the work of
local agencies, and (4) considering what psychologists and
medical doctors know about the causes of emotional problems
when adjudicating cases. The response was overwhelmingly
positive. Enthusiasm was greatest among members of minority
groups who tend to be the most critical of the traditional court
system.8
If the goal of court reform is to improve the quality of out-
comes rather than their speed or cost, procedural fairness can
lead the way. 
SOME PRECEPTS TO GUIDE SPECIFIC REFORMS
Procedural fairness research and the experience of those
courts that have embraced procedural fairness offer lessons as
to where and how court reform needs to refocus. 
Recognize that courts have two publics
Trial-court judges and courts have two publics. One public
consists of the 50 percent of all adults who have had one or
more direct experiences with the courts as a litigant, defen-
dant, juror, or witness. Members of that public remember the
details of their encounter decades later, even if the stakes in
their case were low and the time involved short.9 A negative or
positive experience will linger for many years in a person’s
mind. It becomes the per-
son’s point of reference
when expressing their
views on the judiciary or
court system. 
Procedural justice offers
a template on how to
increase the proportion of
people entering their court-
rooms who will leave satis-
fied with their day in court.
Procedural fairness teaches
us that it is not inevitable
that 50 percent of litigants
who lose their case will leave feeling that they did not receive
their day in court and believe the outcome to be unfair.10
This public is expanding rapidly. The proportion of the pub-
lic with court experience has grown as jury service has
expanded from 6% to 25% of adults in recent decades in
response to a reduction in exemptions from jury service and
reform of jury source lists. In recent years, about 1.5 million
Americans annually are impaneled as jurors (nearly 1% of the
adult population) and another 32 million receive a jury sum-
mons.11
The other public lacks direct experience on which to base
opinions about courts. Instead, their perceptions of the court-
room experience are shaped by popular perceptions that
judges are too lenient when sentencing, the antics of fictional
representations of judges on television and the movies, and
“reality” TV judges. A lack of experience makes a person’s
political orientation a significant predictor of their beliefs
about the judiciary and court system.12 Overall, their frame of
reference about the courts is national, not local. In contrast,
people with direct court experience are little influenced by fac-
tors over which the judiciary has no control. 
Focus civic education efforts on court users
Gatherings of the state court community and its supporters
almost invariably prescribe civic education as a way to increase
Procedural fairness
research and 
the experience of
those courts that
have embraced 
procedural fairness
offer lessons as to
where and how
court reform needs
to refocus.
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trust and support for judges
and counteract negative mes-
sages stemming from groups
that wish to politicize the
bench. 
In the “two-public” sce-
nario, the prospect for success
of such ventures is doubtful.
Public opinion surveys dating
back to 1977 reveal a public
that is inattentive to news
about the courts. There is even
evidence that the public is less concerned than in the past
about sentencing. Attempts to provide more information about
how judges make decisions, and the good that they are accom-
plishing, often fall on deaf ears if communicated through the
mass media or court press releases.13
It follows that the most promising form of civic education is
based on targeting those people with actual court experience.
As Tyler observes, “each encounter people have with criminal
justice authorities is an instance of civic education.”14 In par-
ticular, efforts at civic education should be concentrated on
jurors. We know that jurors tend to leave the courthouse with
more positive feelings about judges than when they arrived. It
is reasonable to assume that they are an attentive audience,
interested in understanding what is going on around them. It
seems difficult to imagine another group more receptive to
receiving a civics lesson on the role of the courts. As former
jurors share their experiences and new knowledge, the impact
of the educational effort will radiate through communities. 
Be guided by procedural fairness when drafting orders and
opinions
Orders and opinions have a life beyond the moment they are
issued in the courtroom. If crafted according to the elements of
procedural fairness, they influence the likelihood that the par-
ties will comply with the decision and the manner in which the
broader public reacts to the decision. The National Center for
State Courts collaborated with the Missouri judiciary to pro-
duce a Web course on “Writing Opinions and Orders in
Controversial Cases.” The course materials, prepared by a
retired Washington State trial judge, Robert Alsdorf, and a law
professor who teaches opinion writing, draw heavily on the ele-
ments of procedural fairness to offer guidance on how to rule
from the bench or write opinions in ways that will satisfy the
parties, build trust in the judiciary, and enhance compliance.15
Remember that you are a boss as well as a judge
Procedural fairness applies wherever there is a superior-to-
subordinate relationship. Judges should bear in mind that the
elements of procedural fairness will govern the results when-
ever judges interact with and set policies for their courtroom
staff and court staff generally. This applies to counter clerks,
bailiffs, cleaners, and all other employees who make the court-
house function. Judges should also monitor the degree to
which probation officers are adhering to the principles of pro-
cedural fairness. The officers, and thus the court, will be more
effective at reducing recidivism if they are practicing proce-
dural fairness.16
The same advice applies to judges who assume managerial
roles within their courts. Presiding judges, for example, typically
have the authority to assign judges to calendars of dockets.
Some assignments are seen as more desirable than others, and
individual judges feel that their strengths are best utilized in spe-
cific kinds of dockets. Administrative judges are likely to find
that the response that they receive from the bench to case assign-
ments and other decisions affecting their judges will depend, in
large part, on the extent to which the decision-making process
is perceived as fair. In unified state court systems, decisions sent
down to local trial courts from on high also will be received in a
manner dependant on whether the decision-makers are per-
ceived to have manifested respect, neutrality, participation, and
trustworthiness. There is no escape from the role procedural
fairness plays in shaping the responses people, whether judges
or not, make to evaluate the fairness of decisions.  
A partial exception should be noted. Attorneys, and perhaps
judges in particular, attach more importance than the general
public to considerations of outcome fairness (distributive fair-
ness) in evaluating decisions or decision makers.17 So judges
are not exactly like ordinary employees when responding to
those above them in the organizational hierarchy that makes
decisions affecting their quality of life. The exception is only
partial because, nonetheless, perceptions of procedural fairness
will influence the legitimacy of decisions. It is a difference in
degree, not in kind. Following procedural fairness precepts
will translate into a court system that tends to generate better
outcomes than one that is not so oriented. 
Procedural fairness is the key to increasing minority group
trust in the courts
Opinion surveys consistently find that members of minority
groups, and especially African-Americans, have less trust and
confidence in judges than do whites.18
Minority distrust of the courts is undoubtedly linked to a
more general level of distrust and dissatisfaction with the main
institutions of American society. Procedural fairness allows us
to locate the root source of that dissatisfaction and point to a
way in which courts can respond, especially for people who
appear in court as litigants, jurors, or witnesses. When
researchers test a model of what influences people’s views on
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judges, if procedural fairness is entered into the equation, then
factors such as race, ethnicity, and gender become statistically
insignificant. People share a common basis for deciding on
what is fair. If minority group members report less trust and
confidence in the courts than do whites, it is because they
believe the procedures courts follow are not fair.  
Designing new court forums 
Procedural fairness has especially strong implications for
the design of forums that supplement traditional court pro-
ceedings. Problem-solving courts are one example of how this
works. Mediation and arbitration programs offer other models
of how adjudication can be designed in ways that enhance sat-
isfaction, trust, and compliance. 
THE BIG PICTURE: PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AS THE
TOUCHSTONE FOR COURT REFORM
The lessons just offered are specific examples of how adher-
ing to the principles of procedural fairness can guide court
reform. A more ambitious agenda of reform uses the demon-
strated power of procedural fairness as one of the key objec-
tives of court reform. Some forms of court organization, some
policies, and some rules are more conducive to perceptions of
fairness than are others. 
An example is the design of programs to assist self-repre-
sented litigants. Assistance that is provided swiftly and in a
style comprehensible to the non-lawyer will contribute to the
quality of justice administered by our courts. But to be truly
effective, the program needs to meet the expectations of pro-
cedural fairness for the quality of treatment that participants
experience. The extent to which the program is used and the
satisfaction of those who do use it will depend in large measure
on whether people perceive that they are being treated in a pro-
cedurally fair manner. That applies whether the help is being
offered by a person or an automated system. 
There is a model for how a state can treat procedural fair-
ness as the touchstone for court management and court
reform. California is pointing the way in demonstrating how a
focus on procedural fairness can lead the process of court
reform. The full story is provided by Douglas Denton in his
article in this issue of Court Review.19 Some aspects of that
experience are summarized here for purposes of illustration. 
The California Judicial Council sponsored a public opinion
survey in 2005, that was discussed extensively within the
branch. The report emphasized the critical role of perceptions
of procedural fairness in establishing trust and confidence in
the courts. In 2006, the survey themes were pursued in a pro-
gram of focus group research. One series of focus groups
included court participants who had recently been involved in
the kinds of cases found by the survey to be associated with the
lowest levels of perceived procedural fairness. Groups of
judges and court administrators were convened to explore pro-
cedural justice issues through the lenses of their experiences.
In 2007, the California courts embarked on a three-year pro-
19. Douglas Denton, Procedural Fairness in the California Courts, 44
CT. REV. 44 (this issue).
cedural fairness initiative woven into their strategic planning
process. “Work to achieve procedural fairness in all types of
cases” is a goal of the 2006-2012 Plan. Seventeen committees
and other advisory groups were charged with identifying ways
in which court rules and procedures could be changed to pro-
mote procedural fairness. 
CONCLUSION
Every era of court reform has been inspired by theories of
organization that were applied to the court context by judges,
court administrators, and supporters of the courts. 
Previous initiatives made the court systems more efficient
organizations offering enhanced customer service. Yet some-
thing was missing. Court reform that realizes its promise needs
to connect with the core concerns of respect, neutrality, 
participation, and trustworthiness—principles that encourage
people to support and comply with court decisions. Adhering
to procedural fairness throughout the court system is a pro-
gram for reform capable of addressing the problems judges face
in the 21st century.   
Procedural fairness applies to all organizations, but it has
particular relevance to judges and court administrators
because it so clearly influences the effectiveness of court deci-
sions. Protection orders are more likely to be followed, civil 
litigants are more likely to pay damages, and probationers are
more likely to desist from crime. Procedural fairness can even
guide the judiciary as it fends off efforts to politicize their
work. Judges should respond with arguments that demonstrate
how courts embody the elements of procedural fairness and
how those attacking the courts would harm those same ele-
ments. 
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The American Judges Association’s White Paper that formsthe centerpiece of this issue begins with the recognitionthat even first graders have an understanding of proce-
dural fairness.1 Developmental research has indeed estab-
lished that young children are able to evaluate the fairness of
activities and that they have a more positive perception of
activities they deem to be more fair.2 Until recently, however,
there has been little concern in the U.S. regarding children’s
experiences of legal processes and procedures. In fact, children
were not generally expected or encouraged to directly partici-
pate in most legal processes, even those where they were a
main party to the proceedings, such as cases involving
abuse/neglect and foster care.  In the last several years in the
U.S.,3 there have been arguments made to increase children’s
participation in legal processes that affect them and to increase
children’s knowledge of legal processes.4 These arguments for
increased participation are generally couched in the language
of procedural justice—children desire and deserve a voice in
legal proceedings that affect them. For example, a recent pub-
lication for and by foster youth, provided by the nonpartisan
Pew Commission on Children in Foster Care, is titled My
Voice, My Life, My Future.5 Similarly, efforts at increasing chil-
dren’s knowledge of legal processes are attempts to empower
them in their dealings with the legal system by increasing their
understanding of the players and the process.
Despite recent trends in expanding children’s participation
in legal and quasi-legal proceedings, there is little empirical
data that can provide guidance to courts. Many questions are
unanswered. Do factors that contribute to perceptions of pro-
cedural fairness for adults also contribute to perceptions of
procedural fairness for children and youth?  Are children and
youth similar to adults in valuing procedural fairness more
than distributive justice in their general satisfaction regarding
decision outcomes? Does knowledge about the legal system
impact children’s perceptions of fairness? Do children’s experi-
ences with the legal system impact their perceptions of and
respect for the legal system?  Are there judicial practices that
might increase children’s sense of judicial fairness and perhaps
increase the development of general trust and confidence in
the judiciary?
In this article, we describe recent national trends in enhanc-
ing children’s experience of justice in the court and provide an
overview of the relevant empirical research regarding children
and procedural justice. The article focuses on children’s 
participation in legal proceedings and children’s legal knowl-
edge drawing upon the literature in the predominate types of
cases that involve or impact children: civil abuse/neglect and
foster care, delinquency and status offenses, custody disputes
in divorce proceedings, and victim-witnesses in criminal pro-
ceedings of child sexual abuse. We conclude with a summary
of the current state of knowledge regarding children and pro-
cedural justice and with implications for court practice.
NATIONAL TRENDS
The U.S. has come relatively late to the idea that children
should be allowed and encouraged to participate in legal pro-
ceedings that affect them.  A number of other countries had ear-
lier endorsed this principle influenced in part by Article 12 of
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child6 that establishes
the right of capable children to directly express their views and
to be provided the opportunity to be heard in judicial and
administrative proceedings either directly or indirectly. 
Still, considerable support has grown over the past several
years in the U.S. for directly involving children in their
abuse/neglect/foster-care court proceedings and giving them
voice in the proceedings.7 The prestigious nonpartisan Pew
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Commission on Children in Foster Care made a number of rec-
ommendations to Congress to strengthen the Court’s effective-
ness in child welfare cases, including that, “Courts should be
organized to enable children and parents to participate in a
meaningful way in their own court proceedings.”8 Advocates
have begun providing practical advice for including children in
proceedings including specific suggestions to prepare children
for their court involvement, to make the courtroom process
more comfortable for children, and to assist attorneys and
judges in their ability to ask age-appropriate questions.9
A recent review of state statutes shows that children have a
right to be present at abuse/neglect proceedings in 18 out of 51
states (including the District of Columbia), they are considered
a party in 38 out of 51 states, and they are required to be given
notice in 14 out of 51 states (with age requirements in most
with this requirement).10 Additionally, recent federal legisla-
tion sets forth a requirement that “the court or administrative
body conducting the hearing consults, in an age-appropriate
manner, with the child regarding the proposed permanency or
transition plan for the child.”11
Along with the growing impetus for children’s increased
participation has been a growth in efforts to increase children’s
knowledge of the judicial process and their rights in the legal
system.   Many states have developed guidebooks or other
materials to inform about and prepare them for a court experi-
ence. 12 A number of jurisdictions provide child-victim-
witness-preparation programs.  The most formal of these pro-
grams include educational interventions to improve children’s
knowledge of courtroom actors and procedures and typically
include pretrial tours and role-playing exercises.13 These inter-
ventions are all intended to increase children’s understanding
of the legal system so that they can best benefit from or be
most effective in their partici-
pation.
RESEARCH ON CHILDREN’S
PARTICIPATION 
General Background
Adults who have the oppor-
tunity to participate in deci-
sion-making proceedings and
express their perspectives per-
ceive the process and outcome
as more fair.14 The reasons for
the relationship between par-
ticipation and fairness judgments are not clear. Some
researchers have argued people value participation in the legal
process because it provides opportunity to influence the deci-
sion.15 Others argue participation indicates the person’s value
in the process and this recognition of individual standing is the
main contribution to the person’s assessment of fairness.16
A few studies have applied procedural justice theories to
children or youth and demonstrated that children and youth
also value fairness in procedures. The earliest studies explored
procedural justice as a specific aspect of moral development in
children.17 More recently, Hicks and Lawrence assessed adoles-
cents’ judgments of procedural justice in hypothetical scenar-
ios involving a young thief.18 They found that, like adults,
teens consider procedural justice factors in assessments of
overall satisfaction with case outcomes and processes. 
Procedural justice has also been explored within the family
context. Fondacaro and his colleagues asked 240 college stu-
dents to recall a recent family dispute and rate how their par-
ents handled it along various dimensions.19 Overall judgments
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21. One must be cautious, however, in assuming that this means that
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general desire for participation by foster youth, one also cannot
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22. These preliminary findings include data from 30 children (16
attenders, 14 non-attenders). The study will eventually include
100 children.
of procedural fairness were posi-
tively related with family cohesion
and psychological well-being.
Disrespectful treatment was the
best predictor of deviant behavior. 
In Fagan and Tyler’s study
exploring connections between
procedural justice attributions and
legal socialization, adolescent
judgments of procedural fairness
in their interactions with legal
actors, including police, school
security officers, and store security
staff, were assessed along with a variety of measures of attitudes
toward the legal system and with self-reported legal compli-
ance.20 The researchers found that children’s interactions with
legal actors shaped their views about the legitimacy of the law
and its institutions. Further, more positive perceptions about the
legitimacy of the legal system were associated with lower rates of
self-reported delinquency behaviors. Thus, Fagan and Tyler’s
research suggests a link between children’s judgments about the
procedural fairness of legal activities they experience, their devel-
oping conceptions of the legitimacy of our legal system, and their
delinquent behaviors.
PARTICIPATION IN CHILD-PROTECTION/
FOSTER-CARE PROCEEDINGS
As discussed earlier, there has been considerable recent
attention placed on increasing children’s participation in their
foster-care court hearings by national legal advocacy groups.
Foster youth and former foster youth who are active in support
and advocacy organizations have strongly voiced their desires
for participation.21 The trend for more participation by chil-
dren has been met with considerable resistance in some quar-
ters, primarily because of concerns that court participation
may be harmful to children by exposing them to painful infor-
mation or forcing them to talk about sensitive matters in a
public or quasi-public setting.  
A current study by the authors is designed to investigate
these matters in a general population of children in foster care.
We are assessing the perceptions of children who participate in
their foster-care hearings as compared to children in foster care
who do not attend their hearings. We are specifically exploring
the children’s interests in participating, their stress regarding
participation, and their perceptions of the fairness of the legal
process and players. Children under eight are not included in
this study.
Preliminary findings22 suggest that children who attended
their hearings strongly felt that they were given a chance to tell
their side of things, the judge listened to them when they
talked in court, they were treated fairly during the hearings,
and their attorney guardian ad litem and their case worker did
a good job telling the judge about their situation. Children
who did not attend their hearings reported comparatively
lower ratings about whether they were given a chance to tell
their attorney guardian ad litem about their situation.
Children who had never attended a hearing had less positive
perceptions, when compared to children who had attended
their hearings, about whether the judge knew enough to make
a fair decision for them. Of particular interest is the perception
of the children who had never attended a hearing who dis-
agreed with the statement that “Someone at the hearing told
the judge what I think.”  Finally, children who attended their
hearings had very high agreement (and slightly higher than the
non-attenders) with the statement “I trust the judge to do what
is best for me.”  These preliminary findings are strongly sug-
gestive that children who attended their court hearings have
more positive feelings about the fairness and benevolence of
their legal proceedings than do children who did not attend
their hearings. Children who attended their hearings believe
they had an opportunity to provide their perspective and the
judge listened to them. Children who never attended court
believe that no one tells the judge what they think.
Because of concerns that court attendance would be stress-
ful for children, we asked children about some emotional
aspects of the experience. Children who attended court
reported some agreement with being nervous before going to
court but reported they did not feel upset while in court, they
felt comfortable answering the judge’s questions, and it was not
hard to talk to the judge in front of everyone. Children who
attended court reported strong feelings they were glad they
went to court and thought kids should be able to go to court.
Children who had never attended a hearing also reported they
thought kids should be able to go to court. 
When the children were asked open-ended questions about
whether they thought going to court was a good idea, the chil-
dren who had been to court had much more to say than the
children who had never been. Most of the children who had
been to court indicated their preference to go to court both to
articulate their opinions to the judge as well as to obtain infor-
mation about their situation. One child, age 15, indicated it
was a good idea for kids to go to court because “if I hear things
from other people, they might not be the truth.” Another child
said she wanted to go because she “wanted to know what hap-
pened.” Some children reported concerns their guardian ad
litem or caseworker might not effectively advocate for their
best interest. A foster parent reported two young adolescents in
her care had recently attended a hearing and had both been
quite eloquent in discussing their placement desires and con-
cerns with the judge.
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Several of the court attenders expressed concerns about
how to appropriately integrate children into hearings. One
child, age 14, reported difficulty understanding what was hap-
pening during the hearing. She said “they should simplify it for
kids because a lot of the words were very technical.” That same
child also expressed concerns about being upset by having to
see other members of her family at court. In fact, she had not
attended the hearing in question because she had heard her
mother was going to be there, though she had attended previ-
ous hearings. Similarly, another child expressed concerns she
was not able to tell the judge what she really thought because
she did not want to upset her mother, who was also present at
the hearing.  It is interesting to note that the same children
who expressed these concerns also expressed positive attitudes
about the value of attending court and their perceptions of fair-
ness of the court procedure. The children who felt concerns
about family members actively made decisions to protect
themselves from situations they found stressful or painful (not
attending a hearing; not being forthcoming in front of the
mother). These comments suggest that if children are to bene-
fit from the court participation, including feeling their per-
spective is important and the process is fair, it may be impor-
tant to give children the option to choose not to attend their
hearing.  The comments also suggest attorneys or guardians ad
litem have a role to play in “translating” the technical language
of the courtroom.
This project builds on a small, but growing body of research
about children’s perceptions regarding their participation in
legal and quasi-legal proceedings.  Surveys of children who are
in or who were in the foster-care system have generally found
these children want more participation in the decision making
about their lives. 23 Foster children have reported they wished
they were asked their opinions about decisions that affected
them, and a major concern of theirs was their perception that
they lacked control over decisions being made about them.24
In England and Wales, The Children’s Act of 1989 requires
courts and local authorities to obtain “looked after” (i.e., foster)
children’s views and to take those views into consideration
when making decisions regarding their care.  Several studies
have explored children’s perceptions of their required participa-
tion in review meetings, which are formal reviews that include
representatives of various agencies, parents, and foster parents.
The studies typically involve self-reports of small numbers of
children that are convenience samples.  The largest study
involved interviews with 47 children between the age of 8 and
12.25 Most of the children wanted more preparation before the
meetings to learn what the meeting would be like, who would
be there, and what would be discussed.  Most of the children
felt satisfied with the amount
of support they received at the
meetings.  A quarter of the
children felt that they spoke “a
lot” at the meetings, the rest
felt they spoke “some” or “a lit-
tle.”  Most of the children who
spoke felt they were listened to
“a lot” by the adults.  In con-
trast, few of the children felt
they had “a lot” of influence
over decisions that were made.
Surprisingly, half the children
reported they liked the meetings only “a little,” describing them
as boring, scary, upsetting, or embarrassing.  Some children
expressed the views that they didn’t like being put on the spot
or having their lives discussed by strangers. 
PARTICIPATION AS VICTIM-WITNESSES
Another focus of research regarding children’s participation
in legal proceedings involves child witnesses testifying about
their allegations of sex-abuse victimization in criminal court.
The seminal work in this area was a study by Goodman and
her associates that followed children through the criminal-
court process, including the experience of testifying for those
children whose cases went to trial. Sixty children who went on
to testify were compared to 75 control children whose cases
did not go to trial.26 The study’s main findings were that the
“testifiers” exhibited more behavioral disturbance than the
“non-testifiers” seven months following their testimony, espe-
cially if they had to take the stand numerous times, did not
have maternal support, and did not have their statements cor-
roborated. The adverse effects diminished after the prosecu-
tion was complete. A long-term follow up of these children
(average elapsed time of over 12 years from trial) by Quas and
her colleagues found victim-witnesses who had testified per-
ceived the legal system as fairer than those victim-witnesses
who had not had their day in court.27 The researchers surmised
those children who more fully participated were more satisfied
with the legal system, but they also could not rule out the pos-
sibility that the children who did not end up testifying had
their cases resolved through plea bargains and that there may
have been less severe sentences for the alleged perpetrators in
those cases.
PARTICIPATION IN CHILD-CUSTODY DECISION MAKING
Another major trend in increasing children’s participation in
legal proceedings involves custody determinations in divorces.
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Again, there has been a push
by legal advocacy groups for
more participation by chil-
dren and a push-back from
some professionals about
potential harms to children
in being drawn into loyalty
conflicts between their par-
ents.  Again, there is little
empirical research that has
addressed the impact on chil-
dren regarding participation
in custody determinations. 
A recent study by the authors explored young adults’ per-
ceptions of their experiences going through parental divorce
when they were children.28 Approximately half of the study
participants reported that they had participated in the custody
decision making. In general, all respondents perceived the cus-
tody decision making process as fair and their treatment as
benevolent and respectful. They generally felt they had some
influence over the custody decision, and they were generally
satisfied with the decision. Respondents who directly partici-
pated in the custody decision, either informally with their par-
ents or more formally in mediation or with a judge, perceived
the process as fairer than those who had not participated.
However, participation did not influence whether they thought
the outcome was fairer or whether they were more satisfied
with the decision. 
The study revealed an interesting pattern regarding the age
of the child during the divorce. For the respondents who were
younger when their parents divorced, if they thought they
were treated fairly, they were more satisfied with the decision.
In contrast, for those who were older, their perceptions of the
fairness of the custody decision itself, not the fairness of their
treatment, was related to their satisfaction with the decision. 
Participants in the study were asked an open-ended ques-
tion about whether they thought it was beneficial or harmful
to have been asked about their custody preferences. There
were more responses that expressed a benefit for participation,
but there were some mixed responses and a few that suggested
more harm than benefit. Examples of positive assessments
include: “It was beneficial that my parents talked to me
because it showed that they cared about my feelings in the
divorce, not solely their own,” and “It was beneficial because I
was caught in the middle of a dispute and making a preference
helped me through the situation better.” Mixed comments
included, “I think that it was a little of both. It was beneficial
in the fact that I was allowed input, but harmful that I had to
tell my dad I would rather live with my mom,” and “Beneficial,
I feel that it gave me a voice, but it also may have given me too
much freedom.” One individual expressed a largely negative
experience: “Harmful. It put me under a lot of stress, and I
always felt guilty. I felt I shouldn’t have to choose between par-
ents. That is unfair for a child to do.” Despite some reports of
negative consequences, there was almost universal opinion by
these young adults who had experienced parental divorce as
children that children should be involved in custody decisions.
There have been relatively few other studies on children’s
desires to participate in decision making regarding custody
decisions or on the impact of their participation.  It should be
noted there has been more international policy focus on includ-
ing children in legal decision making than there has been in the
U.S. Also, none of the following studies looked at children’s
feelings about participating in the legal hearings themselves. 
New Zealand researchers Smith and Gollop asked 107 chil-
dren whose parents had divorced several years earlier about
what advice they would give to parents who were separating.29
The children recommended parents should keep children
informed, should listen to them, should respect their views,
and take their views into account in decision making.
Kaltenborn interviewed 62 children who had custody evalua-
tions at the time of their parent’s divorce where the children’s
custody preferences had been explored.30 Children who did
not have their wishes followed were less likely to comply with
the court-ordered custody arrangement (by running away or
living with the non-custodial parent) than were the children
(the vast majority) whose wishes were followed. Kaltenborn
attributed this to children’s general ability to know what they
needed and desire to create their own paths. 
Thus, the few studies on children’s participation in custody
decision making provide mixed results about children’s general
desires to be involved and the impact of involvement.
However, there appears to be stronger support for giving chil-
dren the opportunity for involvement.
RESEARCH ON CHILDREN’S LEGAL KNOWLEDGE
Children’s perceptions of the fairness of their experiences
with the legal system would seem to require a basic under-
standing of the roles of the legal actors and of the processes
that transpire. The primary research focused on the legal
knowledge of children and youth has centered on law violators
because having “a rational as well as factual understanding of
the proceedings against him”31 is a key component of a youth’s
competence to assist in his or her defense. 32 There have been
relatively consistent findings that children under the age of 13
or 14 appear to have substantially less basic knowledge about
the trial process and players than do older adolescents and
adults.33 Studies have provided mixed results as to whether
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prior experience with the legal system is associated with more
knowledgeable youth, but there appears to be more support for
the conclusion that prior experience does not relate to better
understanding of the system.34
Given the poor knowledge performance of many youth in
the juvenile justice system, researchers have explored whether
educational interventions can improve youth’s knowledge and
understanding. Teaching of legal information improved legal
understanding, especially for older adolescents (over age 13),
ethnic minorities, and youth with higher IQs.35 However,
efforts at increasing youth’s understanding and competencies
have not proved to be very successful with younger children
and children or youth with developmental or other cognitive
deficits. 36
Unlike children facing delinquency charges, children par-
ticipating in foster-care hearings are not legally required to
meet competency standards. Nonetheless, it does seem that
greater understanding of the process might allow children to
better place their participation in context and draw conclu-
sions about fairness. A recent study by Quas and her colleagues
explored the relationship between maltreated children’s under-
standing of their dependency-court involvement and their
emotional reactions to that involvement.37 While not assessing
children’s perceptions of fairness, the study’s focus on the rela-
tionship between children’s knowledge and their comfort in
the proceedings is instructive.  As would be expected, the
study found that as children got older (the sample included
children age 4-15), they were able to demonstrate more general
legal knowledge and more knowledge about the dependency-
court system. Even many older children, however, lacked a full
understanding of the outcome of their hearing, leading the
authors to conclude “[b]oth older and younger children need
assistance understanding the legal system generally and inter-
preting what is happening in their own case, particularly the
decisions made in court on their behalf.”38 The findings sug-
gested that children with more general legal knowledge were
less distressed about their hearings, leading the authors to con-
clude that greater general legal understanding was useful for
children in both helping them feel less distress and also help-
ing them better make sense of their own participation experi-
ence. 
It should be noted that despite the relationship between
children’s knowledge and distress, Quas et al.’s study found
low levels of distress among most children who participated in
their hearings. Children, on average, reported positive general
feelings and positive feelings about the court process both
before and after their hearings. Their feelings about the judge’s
decision were also both on average positive, and they improved
from before the hearing
(anticipating the decision) to
after the hearing (recalling the
decision). Thus, this research
suggests that most children do
not experience negative emo-
tional reactions to court par-
ticipation and prior knowl-
edge about the court process
may make the experience
even more positive.
CONCLUSIONS
Research regarding children
and procedural justice in the courts is in its infancy and is con-
sequently far from conclusive. Nonetheless there are some find-
ings that suggest that, like adults, children view their participa-
tion in legal proceedings that affect them as an important com-
ponent of their judgment of procedural fairness.  Children and
adolescents appear to desire participation in legal proceedings
that affect them both because they want to have a voice in deci-
sions and because they want to have accurate information
about the proceedings and their outcomes. It is not clear, how-
ever, whether children are similar to adults in valuing fairness
in procedures more than they value fairness in outcomes. The
study examining young adults looking back on to custody deci-
sions that were made when their parents divorced suggests that
there may be an important developmental component to these
judgments, with younger children placing a greater value on
procedural justice and adolescents placing a greater value on
distributive justice.39 Although there has not been sufficient
research to know whether particular theoretical models of pro-
cedural justice that predict adult judgments also apply to chil-
dren’s experiences, the fundamental value of participation as a
component of procedural justice determinations appears to
reflect children’s experiences as well as adults.
It seems as if children would need to have a basic under-
standing of the legal system to be able to place their participa-
tion in context and make judgments about the fairness of pro-
ceedings. They need to know the basic roles of the profession-
als. They also may need to know the sources of information the
judge relies on to make decisions (e.g., written reports as well
as courtroom testimony and argument). There is no research
that explores the relationship between children’s knowledge
about the legal system and assessments of procedural justice.
The recent study of children in dependency court did find a
positive relationship between children’s knowledge of the legal
system and their comfort with the proceedings.40 Further
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research exploring a link
between knowledge and per-
ceptions of fairness would be
useful. Many jurisdictions are
utilizing educational materials
and interventions to children
and youth to improve their
knowledge of the legal system.
Research from the juvenile jus-
tice system has indicated that
these efforts may not be as suc-
cessful as hoped, especially
with younger children or youth with developmental or other
cognitive deficits.41 It may be important to clarify the purpose
of educational interventions (e.g., to reduce stress, to increase
experience of fairness, etc.) and then conduct research to
determine if children in the various populations of interest
(e.g., foster care) show improvements in knowledge following
the interventions, and equally important, if increase in knowl-
edge is associated with the intended purpose (e.g., less stress,
increased judgments of fairness).
Research on the legal socialization of children and youth
indicates that children’s experiences with the legal system
impacts their perceptions of and respect for the system,
although the part of the legal system thus far explored has
focused on law-enforcement experiences, not court experi-
ences.42 Nonetheless, this research produced important
research findings suggesting a link between children’s assess-
ments of how fairly and respectfully they were treated by legal
actors and their judgments of the legitimacy of legal authority
and, finally, to reductions in their illegal behavior. If children’s
interactions with police and security personnel contribute to
their sense of the legitimacy of the legal system, one might
expect their interactions with judges and attorneys would do
so as well.
Child maltreatment is a risk factor for later delinquency
and a return to court as a law violator. 43 Consequently, the
court system has an opportunity with maltreated children and
youth to provide them with experiences through their partici-
pation that seem, from the little research that is available, to
increase their perceptions of the responsiveness, fairness and
benevolence of the system and that may also increase their
sense of the legitimacy of the authority of the system and their
trust and confidence in the courts.  Alternately, some of the
early findings reported previously in this article from our chil-
dren-in-court study suggest children who do not participate in
their hearings might presume that their perspectives are not
valued and that the judge may not have adequate information
to make a fair decision. Thus, court procedures not allowing or
discouraging children’s participation may contribute to chil-
dren having negative perceptions about the legitimacy of the
system and less trust and confidence in it. Further research is
needed to both confirm the findings of these small early stud-
ies and also to explore whether increases in perceptions of pro-
cedural justice for children relate to better compliance with
court orders and with reduced risk for later delinquency.
There does not appear to be a basis for concerns about
undue stress for children who attend their hearings and or
speak in front of others in a courtroom setting. Children who
attended hearings reported fairly low base rates of stress or
discomfort.44 The possibility was raised in the comments of
some children that coerced participation may not have posi-
tive benefits for children; however there is no research that
has directly addressed the issue.  Also, some of the findings
from the studies on custody decision making in divorce sug-
gest some children may be negatively affected by being drawn
into the dispute.
Some children indicated they found some of their hearings
confusing, and they would like to understand more of what
was happening. This would suggest a value in some interven-
tion directed at improving knowledge and understanding of
the process. Research from the juvenile justice field suggests
educational interventions may not always be effective, so the
impact of such efforts should be evaluated. Furthermore, even
with increased general knowledge children may still not
understand the particulars of their own case.45 The child’s
attorney or guardian ad litem should take some responsibility
to prepare children ahead of time and provide explanations
after hearings. Nonetheless, even in imperfect situations where
preparation and debriefing does not occur, children’s stress lev-
els appeared quite low, and their belief that children should be
able to attend their hearings appeared quite high.
There is a clear need for more social scientific research in
this area. Nonetheless, the little research that exists suggests
three conclusions. First, children’s participation in legal pro-
ceedings increases their perception of procedural justice in the
court system. Second, most children do not appear to experi-
ence significant stress through participation. Third, many chil-
dren desire to participate so they can have a voice in the pro-
ceedings that affect them and so that they can know about
what happens in those proceedings. In this general sense, chil-
dren appear to be similar to adults. Judges have an opportunity
to positively affect the development of children’s trust and con-
fidence in the legal system by giving them the opportunity, but
not coercing them, to participate in the legal proceedings that
affect their lives.
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I just want to be treated the same, like you treat any-
body else that has money. . . . You got a tie, I don’t. I’m
still a man, a human being.
— 2006 focus group participant
Ensure that all court users are treated with dignity,
respect, and concern for their rights and cultural back-
grounds, without bias or appearance of bias, and are
given an opportunity to be heard.
— Operational Plan for California’s 
Judicial Branch, 2008–2011
In 2005, California’s judicial branch embarked on a two-partassessment to determine current levels of trust-and-confi-dence in the state courts and to obtain information con-
cerning expectations and performance of the state courts. The
findings were revealing—they highlighted good news for the
courts and identified considerable challenges. The trust-and-
confidence study not only informed the subsequent strategic
and operational planning processes, it also spurred a large-
scale initiative focused on one particularly compelling aspect
of the public-trust-and-confidence assessment: the significant
and important role that perceptions of procedural fairness play
in determining court users’ trust and confidence in the
California courts.
“Procedural Fairness in the California Courts” is a statewide
initiative aimed at ensuring fair process for and quality treat-
ment of court users, resulting in higher trust and confidence in
California’s courts. It focuses on strategies to ensure the public
perceives the highest standards of fairness and quality treat-
ment in every interaction with the court. 
Procedural fairness, as defined here, incorporates four ele-
ments:
Respect—People react positively when they feel they are
treated with politeness, dignity, and respect and that their
rights are respected. In addition, helping people understand
how things work and what they must do is strongly associated
with respect and court user satisfaction.
Voice—People want the opportunity to tell their side of the
story, to explain their situation and views to an authority who
listens carefully.
Neutrality—People are more likely to accept court deci-
sions when those in authority act with fairness and neutrality
(i.e., court users have been treated equally, and legal principles
and assistance from court personnel were consistent). Court
users also respond more positively to court decisions when the
importance of facts are emphasized and the reasons for a deci-
sion have been clearly explained.
Trust—People observe behavior or look for actions to indi-
cate that they can trust the character and sincerity of those in
authority and that those in authority are aware of and sincerely
concerned with their needs (e.g., they look for conduct that is
benevolent and caring).
The California initiative was officially launched in
September 2007, incorporating input and feedback from court
users, court administrators, and judicial officers. Previous judi-
cial efforts focused on achieving procedural fairness have been
directed in other states within an entire court district (most
notably, Minnesota’s Fourth Judicial District, the largest state
trial court in Minnesota, serving Hennepin County), but
California’s initiative is a statewide, multiyear effort through
which the judicial branch will:
• Identify procedural fairness best practices and model
programs;
• Study and evaluate efforts that have the potential to
achieve procedural fairness for court users; 
• Develop procedural fairness guidelines, tools, and
resources for judicial officers and judicial branch per-
sonnel;
• Recommend educational programs and objectives to
help judicial officers and court personnel achieve proce-
dural fairness; and
• Make periodic recommendations to the Judicial Council
regarding a variety of strategies and means to help the
courts achieve procedural fairness.
The goal is to create a model court program to help achieve
procedural fairness that also highlights the innovative and cre-
ative projects that currently exist in the California courts. The
initiative also provides an opportunity and a forum to high-
light areas where procedural fairness has been noted as an area
of concern, for example, the handling of juvenile delinquency
matters.
During visits to the courts (described below), judicial
branch leaders in California remarked that procedural fairness
impacts everything that they do in the courthouse. The innov-
ative application of procedural fairness concepts has become
an important tool in California to enhance public trust and
confidence, improve court user satisfaction, and increase court
efficiency and effectiveness. Before delving into current activ-
ity in California regarding procedural fairness, reviewing the
findings from the two-part public-trust-and-confidence assess-
ment will provide some context. 
TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE CALIFORNIA COURTS:
METHODOLOGY, FINDINGS, AND THE IMPACT ON
PERCEPTIONS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
The trust-and-confidence assessment began with a 2005
statewide survey in which procedural fairness—having a sense
that court decisions are made through processes that are fair—
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California Courts
Douglas Denton
44 Court Review - Volume 44 
Footnotes
1. The Judicial Council’s 2005–2006 public-trust-and-confidence
assessment led to the publication of two reports: DAVID B.
ROTTMAN, TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE CALIFORNIA COURTS: A
SURVEY OF THE PUBLIC AND ATTORNEYS (2005), available at
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/4_37
pubtrust1.pdf, and PUBLIC AGENDA & DOBLE RESEARCH ASSOCIATES,
TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE CALIFORNIA COURTS: PUBLIC COURT
USERS AND JUDICIAL BRANCH MEMBERS TALK ABOUT THE CALIFORNIA
COURTS (2006), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/
reference/documents/Calif_Courts_Book_rev6.pdf. These and
other reports are available on the California Courts Website at
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/4_37pubtrust.htm.
2. The 2005 survey found that 67 percent of the public had a posi-
tive attitude about the courts, compared to less than 50 percent in
1992.
emerged as the strongest predictor by far of public approval
and confidence in the California courts.1 For members of the
public, procedural fairness concerns outweighed winning or
losing a case. This was a significant finding for the California
judicial branch that continues to dramatically affect policy
direction and program development for the state’s courts.
The 2005 survey reached more than 2,400 members of a
diverse public—including a broad range of minority and non-
English-speaking residents—and more than 500 practicing
attorneys. Survey respondents were questioned on a broad
range of perceptions and experiences, including their:
• Knowledge about the courts and the sources of that
knowledge;
• Perceived and real-life experiences with barriers to court
access;
• Experiences as jurors, litigants, or consumers of court
information; 
• Expectations for what the courts should be doing; and
• Sense of the accessibility, fairness, and efficiency of the
courts.
The survey process found that procedural fairness is a key
determinant of public trust and confidence and revealed impor-
tant common perceptions among court users: a lack of under-
standing regarding court processes, an unease about going to
court, and a lack of certainty about what to do (or even what
occurred) while navigating the court process, particularly if
someone is self-represented. Thus, the findings had the poten-
tial to allow the branch in California to leverage or initiate pro-
cedural fairness efforts where attention is needed most (e.g.,
family and juvenile, traffic, and small-claims cases). 
Following the survey, a second in-depth, qualitative study
was conducted to ascertain the views of California court users.
Focus groups were conducted with a demographic cross-sec-
tion of people who had direct court experience, either through
jury service or as witnesses, plaintiffs, or defendants in a high-
volume court venue such as family, juvenile, traffic, or small
claims. Focus group discussions centered on the entire court
experience—from getting initial information to appearing
before a judge to the conclusion of a matter. A trained profes-
sional moderator guided discussions to elicit opinions from
more than 160 Californians in Fresno, Los Angeles, Oakland,
Riverside, Sacramento, San Diego, and San Francisco. A total
of 15 focus groups were conducted, 8 with a demographic
cross-section of court users and 7 with various minority
groups to mirror the survey participants and reflect the diverse
nature of the state (3 focus groups directly engaged Latino
court users; 2 were conducted with African-American court
users; and 2 were held with Chinese-American court users, 1
conducted in Mandarin and 1
in Cantonese).
To complement the court
user focus groups, seven sepa-
rate focus groups were con-
ducted with judicial officers
and court administrators who
were randomly selected from
across the state. In addition to
engaging in a similar moder-
ated discussion about the challenges facing the California
court system, these focus group participants also viewed and
commented on videotaped excerpts from the court user
groups.
A key finding from the survey and the focus groups was that
a high degree of trust and confidence exists toward the
California state courts.2 Court users, court administrators, and
judicial officers all expressed this opinion, especially concern-
ing their high regard for the integrity of the judges they
encountered in their court experience. As will be discussed
later, perceptions regarding the fairness of court outcomes var-
ied by ethnic group. However, most court users expressed a
substantial level of trust and confidence in the courts of
California.
Regarding seeking and receiving information about the
courts, self-rated familiarity with the California courts was low
for the public, unchanged since 1992. Court users in focus
groups were concerned about the shortage of information
available in multiple languages, the usability and clarity of
available information, and why legal advice could not be pro-
vided by court staff (findings showed that balancing permissi-
ble information without providing legal advice is a challenge
for court administrators). 
Court users repeatedly stated that courtroom experiences
leave an indelible memory. People could recall exact details of
court experiences from years ago. Many of those experiences
were frustrating or stressful, including the long delays and
crowded dockets of high-volume courts, like traffic court, or
circumstances that brought people into family court. On the
other hand, jury service—often the only courtroom experience
someone may ever have—generated the most positive feed-
back. Many respondents commented the experience of jury
service was contrasted (positively) with their expectation
before serving; jury service was educational and strengthened
their confidence in the justice system. 
A powerful finding in the research was that the single
greatest barrier to taking a case to court was finding a quali-
fied, affordable attorney. In California this barrier has caused
a significant rise in the number of self-represented litigants,
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PLAN FOR CALIFORNIA’S JUDICIAL BRANCH, 2006–2012 (2006), avail-
able at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/
strategic_plan_2006-2012.pdf. 
making issues of procedural
fairness even more pressing
to ensure quality treatment
as well as trust and confi-
dence in the court system. 
Court users had positive
comments about the concept
of self-help centers inside
the courthouse or mobile
units outside the courthouse
at key community sites.
However, there was only
nominal experience by court
users of self-help centers and
minimal awareness of family law facilitators, alternative dis-
pute resolution concepts like mediation and arbitration, low-
cost legal services, or other potential ways to reduce access
barriers. 
California’s diverse population creates a complex set of
challenges for the judicial branch in meeting the needs of
court users. Every year more than 100 languages are spoken
in California’s courts, sometimes interpreted by the young
children of non-English-speaking parties. Thus, cultural com-
petency and language emerged as large concerns for the focus
group participants, who felt that there are not enough inter-
preters and also perceived issues with the quality of interpre-
tation. Court users who were fluent in more than one lan-
guage stated they could tell that translations were not always
accurate, and this affected their confidence in the court out-
come. 
To tease out the key finding from the trust-and-confidence
survey regarding the importance of procedural fairness, focus
group moderators discussed the four essential elements of pro-
cedural fairness (respect, voice, neutrality, and trust) with
court users. Mirroring the survey, most respondents said the
courts do an outstanding job regarding three of the four ele-
ments: respect, trust, and neutrality. However, regarding the
fourth element—voice or participation, the sense that court
authorities listen carefully to the people involved in a court
case—people were less likely to be satisfied that the courts are
doing a good job. A common sentiment heard in the focus
groups over and over again was a strong desire to “tell my story
directly to the judge.” There was a fair amount of frustration
expressed over feeling constrained by court procedures, lan-
guage, and practices. In addition, Latinos and African-
Americans expressed more concern than Caucasians and
Asians about people receiving fair results in the courtroom.
These perceptions included differing views of fair legal out-
comes and equal treatment by court personnel throughout the
courthouse. 
The focus groups confirmed the survey finding that confi-
dence among court users depends more on the perception of
fairness in court procedures and quality of treatment than on
the actual legal outcome of an individual’s case. Those court
users who had positive views of the courts after losing their
case seemed to understand why a ruling went against them and
felt they were treated fairly. Judicial branch members were
likely to discount this finding somewhat and stress that the
outcome of a case was an important contributor to the percep-
tions of fairness (a common sentiment heard from judicial
members in focus groups was that half the population will go
home unhappy because they lost).
JUSTICE IN FOCUS CREATES A FRAMEWORK FOR
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
The 2005–2006 public-trust-and-confidence assessment
was the major public stakeholder vehicle used to integrate
Californians’ views into a new strategic plan for the state’s
courts. Justice in Focus: the Strategic Plan for California’s Judicial
Branch, 2006–2012 builds on past successes to meet the chal-
lenges of delivering quality justice.3 Informed by a wide, rep-
resentative array of judges and branch stakeholders, including
members of the public, community leaders, and other justice
system partners, the plan renews and amplifies a branchwide
commitment to ensuring access and quality services for all
Californians, including court procedures that are fair and
understandable to court users. The plan affirms the impor-
tance of listening to the public, effective information sharing,
and outreach and education in improving public understand-
ing of the courts.
Most procedural fairness initiative activity will be designed
to help the courts respond to policy directions in Justice in
Focus that directly relate to procedural fairness. These excerpts
show some examples:
• “California’s courts will treat everyone in a fair and just
manner.”
• “Members of the judicial branch community will strive
to understand and be responsive to the needs of court
users from diverse cultural backgrounds.”
• “Work to prevent bias, and the appearance of bias, in all
parts of the judicial branch.”
• “Work to achieve procedural fairness in all types of
cases.”
• “Ensure that statewide policies, rules of court, standards
of judicial administration, and court forms promote the
fair, timely, effective, and efficient processing of cases
and make court procedures easier to understand.”
• “Provide services that meet the needs of all court users
and that promote cultural sensitivity and a better under-
standing of court orders, procedures, and processes.”
• “Provide necessary resources to all courts—particularly
high-volume courts such as traffic, small claims, juvenile
dependency, and family courts—and support the branch-
wide implementation of effective practices to enhance
procedural fairness…”
With the adoption of a strategic plan containing a strong
focus on elements of procedural fairness, the time was right to
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In Support of AJA White Paper on Procedural Fairness  
WHEREAS, the perception of unfair or unequal treatment is the single most important
source of popular dissatisfaction with the American legal system; and
WHEREAS, judges can alleviate much of the public dissatisfaction with the judicial
branch by paying critical attention to the key elements of procedural fair-
ness: voice, neutrality, respectful treatment, and engendering trust in
authorities; and
WHEREAS, judges should pay attention to creating fair outcomes, they should also tai-
lor their actions, language, and responses to the public’s expectations of
procedural fairness; and
WHEREAS, procedural fairness lessens the difference in how minority populations per-
ceive and react to the courts; and 
WHEREAS, the America Judges Association (AJA) drafted a white paper, Procedural
Fairness: A Key Ingredient to Public Satisfaction, to examine research on
courts within the United States and make recommendations for the judi-
ciary; and
WHEREAS, the AJA white paper identified and advocated for more changes to improve
the daily work of the courts and its judges. 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Conference of State Court
Administrators endorses the AJA white paper and encourages state
court leaders, trial court judges, court administrations, and judicial
educators to consider implementation of the recommendations out-
lined in the white paper.
Adopted at the Conference of State Court Administrators (COSCA) 2008 Annual Meeting on
July 30, 2008.  COSCA’s membership consists of the top court administrator in each of the
50 states of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, American Somoa,
Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands.
CONFERENCE OF STATE 
COURT ADMINSTRATORS
RESOLUTION 6
speak directly with the courts to gauge their views on the con-
cept. In spring 2007, staff from the Administrative Office of the
Courts (AOC) and Dr. David B. Rottman, principal researcher
at the National Center for State Courts and author of the 2005
Trust and Confidence in the California Courts survey findings
report, visited various courts, small and large, in urban and
rural areas around the state. The goals of these visits were to: 
• Learn about existing court programs and solicit ideas
and suggestions from court leadership regarding strate-
gies and priorities for California to enhance public trust
and confidence by emphasizing procedural fairness;
• Briefly discuss enhancing public trust and confidence
through a procedural fairness focus in the California
courts and compare the experiences of other state courts;
• Prompt court leaders to express what the concept of pro-
cedural fairness means to them, its benefits, and any
reservations they may have; and
• Identify potential topic areas and focuses for branch
efforts.
Visits to the courts revealed a wide array of innovative pro-
grams already in place to help court users understand pro-
ceedings and navigate the court process. These programs show
how courts in California have intuitively and creatively begun
to address concerns of procedural fairness even before the
launch of the initiative. This article concludes with illustra-
tions of two of these programs—one that assists court users at
the beginning of the court process, and another that helps
court users at the end of the process.
In our visits, we found robust activity within the courts to
enhance public trust and confidence and to reach out to local
communities to improve service delivery. Court leaders do not
share a common approach or opinion regarding what efforts
might help the courts realize the branch’s procedural fairness
goals. Some courts suggested that educational efforts be tar-
geted directly toward new judges or commissioners who often
are often given family, small-claims, or traffic assignments
where they will handle a high volume of matters or cases.
Other courts suggested that resource allocations affect the suc-
cess of procedural fairness efforts. For example, having a suffi-
cient number of judges allows judges time to focus on proce-
dural fairness practices, for example, to fully explain a decision
to parties or to ensure that litigants have more of a voice in
court proceedings. 
Visits to a small sample of courts confirmed that California
is a large and diverse state, and the complexity is enhanced by
a variety of court cultures, constituent needs, judicial staffing,
internal communications, and available resources. California
has 58 trial courts, one in each county; the California courts
serve nearly 34 million people. During 2005–2006, 9.2 mil-
lion cases were filed in these courts. Rather than trying to
come up with a one-size-fits-all approach to procedural fair-
ness, we determined that in order for procedural fairness
efforts to have the most impact, they would best be focused
on:
• Information and awareness for judicial officers;
• Branch awareness to understand the value and benefits
of procedural fairness for the courts (e.g., order compli-
ance, enhanced trust and confidence by the public);
• Highlighting the need
for improved court user
satisfaction in underre-
sourced courts (e.g.,
family court); and
• Ensuring that improve-
ment is measurable and
demonstrating account-
ability to the public.
The procedural fairness initiative is particularly timely with
the adoption in April 2008 of the Operational Plan for
California’s Judicial Branch, 2008–2011. The operational plan
represents a concerted effort by the council and many other
judicial branch stakeholders to establish clear objectives and
outcomes for accomplishing the long-term goals and policies
of the branch. For example:
• Practices, procedures, and service programs to improve
timeliness, quality of service, customer satisfaction, and
procedural fairness in all courts—particularly high-
volume courts.
• Curriculum and associated training programs and other
professional development opportunities addressing cul-
tural competency, ethics, procedural fairness, public
trust and confidence, and public service for judges and
court staff.
As noted below, realization of the strategic plan goals and
operational plan objectives will necessitate a concerted effort
by the branch to create tools for the courts and strong educa-
tional programs.
ANNOUNCING AND IMPLEMENTING THE INITIATIVE
Taking into account feedback from the court visits and
input from the Judicial Council and Administrative Director of
the Courts William C. Vickrey, it was determined that a long-
term, multifaceted branch initiative was necessary to help
achieve procedural fairness.
Presentations at the California Bench Bar Biannual
Conference. The California Bench Bar Biannual Conference
in September 2007 was an ideal forum to present the effort to
an audience of more than 850 judicial branch leaders, judicial
officers, and court professionals. Cohosted by the Judicial
Council, the California Judges Association, and the State Bar
of California, the conference explored procedural fairness in
the courts and offered collaborative courses planned by the
bench and the bar. The opening plenary session afforded an
opportunity for Chief Justice Ronald M. George to announce
the launch of the procedural fairness initiative and to encour-
age judicial members to reassess a commonly held view in the
courts:
I often have repeated good advice I was given as
a novice judge 35 years ago by an experienced col-
league: every time you make a decision as a judge,
you make one permanent enemy and one tempo-
rary friend. That precept may need to be
amended—instead of settling for making one
enemy, perhaps we should focus on creating one
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"[E]very time you
make a decision as
a judge, you make
one permanent
enemy and one
temporary friend."
individual unhappy with
the outcome, but two
who felt that they were
given a fair shake by the
system.4
The conference also
marked the release of a publi-
cation for members of the
branch that describes the
goals of the initiative and
defines procedural fairness
within the context of the
California court system:
Procedural fairness refers to court users’ percep-
tions regarding the fairness and the transparency of
the processes by which their disputes are considered
and resolved, as distinguished from the outcome of
their cases. Perceptions of procedural fairness are
also significantly affected by the quality of treatment
they receive during every interaction with the court.
The perceived fairness of court outcomes is also
important but is consistently secondary to how
court users perceive their cases to have been han-
dled and the quality of treatment they received.
Court users’ perceptions of procedural fairness are
most significantly influenced by four key elements:
respect, voice, neutrality, and trust.5
The subject of procedural fairness set the tone for the con-
ference through an opening plenary session that featured a
lively Fred Friendly Seminars© Socratic dialogue on procedural
fairness and its impact on public trust and confidence in the
California courts. In addition to video vignettes that depicted
the complexities of achieving elements of procedural fairness
in a court setting, the Fred Friendly Seminars dialogue also
employed fictional judicial characters to represent different
voices and approaches that exist within the branch. Arthur R.
Miller, a professor at the New York University School of Law,
moderated and led a diverse panel through a hypothetical sce-
nario in which three fictional trial judges in a California court
reflected differing views regarding procedural fairness.
Both the plenary and a follow-up, targeted course on proce-
dural fairness designed for court leadership by Professor Tom
R. Tyler (New York University) focused on how judicial offi-
cers and attorneys can foster public understanding and trust in
the courts and also explored how the values associated with
procedural fairness support judicial branch independence and
impartiality. 
Resource Guide for the Courts on Procedural Fairness.
Following the Bench Bar Conference, initiative lead staff deter-
mined that a resource guide on procedural fairness would best
serve the courts in accomplishing branch goals. Programs and
policies that explicitly reference procedural fairness concepts
are relatively new for many courts, and a comprehensive
toolkit would provide both a better understanding of proce-
dural fairness and applicable best practices for the courts.
Through a competitive bidding process, the Center for Court
Innovation (New York City) was chosen to work with the AOC
on the development of the resource guide. Founded as a pub-
lic/private partnership between the New York State Unified
Court System and the Fund for the City of New York, the
Center for Court Innovation is a nonprofit think tank that helps
courts and criminal justice agencies aid victims, reduce crime,
and improve public trust in justice. In New York, the center
functions as the court system’s independent research and devel-
opment arm, creating demonstration projects that test new
ideas. The center has collaborated on a number of other pro-
jects with the California judicial branch, and we look forward
to working with their researchers in this endeavor.
The resource guide, which is currently in the initial stages
of development, will contain effective techniques, tools for
judges and court staff, best practices, and model court pro-
grams—contents that are readily adaptable to court, education,
and interactive Web environments. Ultimately, the guide will
highlight a variety of strategies and programs that support the
branch policy to achieve procedural fairness in all types of
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ELEMENT COMMON
CHALLENGE
RECOMMENDATION
Respect Court users may expe-
rience a lack of
respect because of cul-
tural differences
Educational programs
that reflect specific cul-
tural differences or that
enhance court knowl-
edge about cultural mis-
communications
Voice Court users may be
disappointed about
the length of time
they are able to speak
to a judge
Tools for court staff to
help manage expecta-
tions and to educate the
public about what to
expect in the courtroom
Neutrality Court users may be
confused regarding
different outcomes
that may emerge from
family court
Guides for court staff to
explain what occurs in
family court and what
options exist to help
individuals resolve their
matter
Trust Court users may have
a hard time develop-
ing trust if they try to
avoid the legal system
altogether
Resources to help make
court less intimidating
and to explain the
impartial role of the
courts and judges
The resource
guide... will 
contain effective
techniques, tools
for judges and
court staff, best
practices, and
model court 
programs....
CALIFORNIA COURTS 2 (2007), available at http://www.courtinfo.
ca.gov/programs/profair/documents/profair_brochure_092507
.pdf.
4. Chief Justice Ronald M. George, Plenary Address to the Bench Bar
Conference (Sept. 26, 2007).
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cases. On its completion in 2009, the guide will be distributed
to every court in the state, will be available on the Web and in
print, and will further serve as a resource to develop educa-
tional courses and to identify best practices for trial and appel-
late courts.
Following the model used for the public-trust-and-confi-
dence assessment, which included surveys, interviews, and
focus groups, development of the resource guide on procedural
fairness will be an iterative process that solicits input from
court leadership, branch members, and the public (e.g., court
users). An informal working group on procedural fairness has
been established at the AOC with a variety of representatives,
and this group will work closely with the courts, consultants,
and an editorial board composed of national experts and lead-
ers from the California courts. 
Educating Stakeholders About Procedural Fairness. The
initiative includes an important educational component, and a
variety of activities have taken place to expand outreach and
education on procedural fairness. The educational sessions,
originally designed by Professor Tyler and presented at the
Bench Bar Conference, have been repurposed for stakeholders.
These educational sessions present an opportunity to dispel
common misconceptions regarding procedural fairness (e.g.,
procedural fairness does not suggest that people are happy if
they lose; however, using fair procedures makes it more likely
that a losing party will be willing to accept an adverse deci-
sion) and benefits (e.g., increased order compliance, accep-
tance of the court as a legitimate authority, and improved con-
fidence in the process by litigants).
In particular, focusing on the elements of procedural fair-
ness—respect, voice, neutrality, and trust—has been an impor-
tant tool in educational settings for members of the branch.
The elements of procedural fairness are interdependent and
interrelated. However, it has been helpful to have workshop
participants break into groups and discuss each element at
length, identify common challenges that exist for realizing the
element, and suggest solutions for meeting challenges. The
table on the preceding page gives some examples.
The workshops offer judges, commissioners, mediators, and
court staff a unique opportunity to identify common court user
misperceptions, highlight areas of confusion and breakdowns
in communication between court staff and court users, and
develop tools and strategies to meet public expectations and
achieve procedural fairness. Course attendees may not have an
initial deep understanding of procedural fairness; however,
most quickly and readily identify with procedural fairness in
the court setting once the elements are explained in depth. The
discussions have allowed the concept of procedural fairness to
become more tangible to court staff and help them identify
what may be needed to improve court interactions and the ulti-
mate experience of court users.
Presentations to various advisory committees of the Judicial
Council—composed of judicial officers, court staff, and justice
system partners—have been helpful to forge further collabora-
tion. A number of advisory committees (e.g., Access and
Fairness Advisory Committee, Collaborative Justice Courts
Advisory Committee) see a natural alignment between their
goals for improved access and fairness in the courts, or prob-
lem-solving courts where liti-
gants would have more inter-
action with a judge, with the
goals of the procedural fair-
ness initiative. The commit-
tees have expressed interest in
developing a formalized edu-
cational module for new
judges and commissioners on
the importance of procedural
fairness. This will be espe-
cially valuable for bench offi-
cers who work in high-vol-
ume case venues such as fam-
ily and juvenile, small claims, and traffic. Assistant Presiding
Judge Charles W. McCoy, Jr., Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, has been particularly active in leading efforts to famil-
iarize the court’s new bench officers regarding the importance
and benefits of procedural fairness.
Court administrative staff also supported development of an
interactive program on procedural fairness at the request of the
bench of the Superior Court of Santa Clara County. Judge Kevin
Burke (Hennepin County, Minnesota, Fourth Judicial District)
and Dr. R. Dale Lefever (Emeritus Faculty, University of
Michigan, Department of Family Medicine) worked closely
with Presiding Judge Catherine A. Gallagher and Assistant
Presiding Judge Jamie A. Jacobs-May (Superior Court of Santa
Clara County) and presented the course in fall 2007. Judge
Burke and Dr. Lefever drew on their expertise in procedural
fairness and nonverbal communication to help the attending
judges review their demeanor and style of interaction from the
bench. They did this by using videotape and feedback. A num-
ber of Santa Clara judicial officers volunteered to be videotaped
while they performed normal duties on the bench. It was made
clear to the participants that the workshop was not perfor-
mance related but was designed simply as a developmental pro-
gram to help the Santa Clara bench increase public trust and
confidence. One-on-one review and discussion was followed by
a group evening session where a large number of the court’s
bench officers discussed the video and how the public might
interpret and receive a variety of approaches from the bench.
Additional bench officers expressed interest after attending the
group session, and they also volunteered to later be videotaped
and participate in one-on-one review and discussion sessions
with the consultants. In program evaluations, 84 percent of the
participating officers recommended that it be repeated in their
court at a future date. The AOC is considering repeating the
bench officer program in another volunteer court.
In addition, a number of courts within the state have
requested funding for one-day programs for judges and court
staff to help increase internal understanding and discussion of
procedural fairness and improve public trust and confidence
among their court users. To ensure cost efficiency, consistency,
and effective delivery of these programs, the AOC will work
with the courts and educational consultants so that such pro-
grams can be repurposed and replicated in other courts.
Measuring Procedural Fairness. Increased use of the
National Center for State Courts (NCSC) CourTools© account-
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6. Information about innovative programs and initiatives that help
the California courts continue to improve access to justice,
including the JusticeCorps and ACTION programs described
here, is drawn from JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, INNOVATIONS
IN THE CALIFORNIA COURTS: STRENGTHENING THE JUDICIAL BRANCH
(2007), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/
innovations.
ability instruments is cur-
rently being linked with
improving public trust and
confidence. Although not for-
mally included in the proce-
dural fairness initiative at this
time, these tools are helping
measure the achievement of
procedural fairness and are
demonstrating branch
accountability. Measure 1,
Access and Fairness, uses a survey to measure individual satis-
faction with the ability to make use of the court’s dispute reso-
lution services (access) and how the legal process dealt with
their issue, interest, or case (fairness). Survey content for court
users in Measure 1 reflects elements of procedural fairness and
relates to the goals of the initiative. For example:
• The way my case was handled was fair.
• The judge listened to my side of the story before he or
she made a decision.
• The judge had the information necessary to make good
decisions about my case.
• I was treated the same as everyone else.
• As I leave the court, I know what to do next about my
case.
Measure 1 has been tested in four courts around the state,
and the number of participating courts is expected to grow.
Current plans are under way for several California courts to
pilot the Measure 1 survey to gauge court user satisfaction with
their court experience and solicit suggestions for service
improvements. The AOC is working closely with the NCSC to
reduce the resources needed to implement the surveys. By
bringing the survey instrument and the collection process to
scale across multiple jurisdictions using the same data-collec-
tion tool, the AOC will be better able to identify the effects of
best practices or process changes that are driving the results. 
After three years of conducting the Measure 1 survey, the
Superior Court of Santa Mateo County is considering making
public the results on its Web page to increase public trust and
confidence, demonstrate accountability to the public, and
make the survey process and results transparent. As the initia-
tive develops, we will be looking to this and other methods to
evaluate the success of procedural fairness efforts taking place
in the California courts.
Current Court Programs Highlighting Procedural
Fairness. In addition to increasing the use of accountability
instruments to help meet public expectations regarding the
reporting of court performance, other innovations are already
taking place within the California courts. Both of the court
programs highlighted below received the 2006–2007 Ralph N.
Kleps Award for Improvement in the Administration of the
Courts, established in 1991 in honor of the first
Administrative Director of the Courts in California.6 The
Kleps Awards recognize individual court innovations that
improve the administration of justice. The award-winning
programs address important public needs and help demon-
strate procedural fairness in action.
Recruiting Students to Help Court Users. The JusticeCorps
program is an innovative approach to addressing the needs of
a key court user group highlighted in the trust and confidence
survey: self-represented litigants. JusticeCorps recruits and
trains 275 diverse university students annually to augment
overburdened court and legal-aid staff who assist self-repre-
sented litigants in court-based self-help programs in select
locations throughout California. 
In response to the flood of self-represented litigants access-
ing the self-help programs of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, the court, in partnership with the AOC, con-
ceived JusticeCorps, which trains and provides an educational
stipend for university students who commit to a full academic
year of service in court-based self-help centers. These highly
motivated and well-trained students provide in-depth and
individualized services to self-represented litigants, often in
their native languages. 
For the pilot project in 2004, the court initially partnered
with four universities—the University of California at Los
Angeles and California State Universities at Northridge,
Dominguez Hills, and Pomona—four nonprofit legal-aid agen-
cies, and the Los Angeles County Small Claims Advisor. With
the help of AOC staff, the court obtained funding from
AmeriCorps for JusticeCorps.
Each year, the Los Angeles program places 150 students in
eight court-based self-help centers throughout Los Angeles
County. Students agree to serve at least 300 hours in a year,
during which they: 
• Triage long lines at court-based self-help centers to
determine each litigant’s need and degree of urgency and
help litigants complete the proper forms;
• Make referrals to other court services;
• Teach people to use self-help computer resources; and
• Provide services to litigants after hearings.
Parties are given clear information and options and then
connected quickly to the right resources. Litigants are assisted
in completing appropriate and accurate pleadings, written
orders, and judgments under attorney supervision and, in the
process, provided with a better understanding of the court sys-
tem. Many of these litigants have low literacy skills, which
hampers their ability to fill out forms, participate in self-help
workshops, or use computerized resources. 
In short, the volunteers enhance the quality and the quan-
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of best practices or
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that are driving 
the results.
tity of self-help services to those who most need it.
The students also benefit. The experience of helping liti-
gants is rewarding, and the students often feel that they are
making an important difference for the litigants they serve.
After the students fulfill their service commitment, they
receive a $1,000 award to be used for tuition or student loans.
They also participate in JusticeCorps Shadow Day, which part-
ners them with mentor judges and attorneys for a view of other
aspects of the judicial system and the value of public service.
To evaluate the effectiveness of JusticeCorps, program staff
members track the number of self-represented litigants assisted
by JusticeCorps members and measure the accuracy of docu-
ments prepared and referrals made. The program has, to date,
far exceeded its target measures.
The JusticeCorps program expanded to the Bay Area in
2006—with participation from the Superior Courts of
Alameda, Contra Costa, San Francisco, San Mateo, and Santa
Clara Counties. In 2007, the Superior Court of San Diego
county launched its JusticeCorps program. Currently, 150 stu-
dents serve self-represented litigants in Los Angeles, 100 stu-
dents work with the Bay Area program, and the court in San
Diego County is supported by 22 students.
Impacts of the program have been significant:
• Self-help programs supplemented by JusticeCorps mem-
bers increased by 11 percent the number of self-repre-
sented litigants assisted in the program’s first year.
• Evaluations showed that litigants got appropriate refer-
rals 98 percent of the time when JusticeCorps members
referred them to other legal resources.
• Legal forms prepared by self-represented litigants with
JusticeCorps assistance showed a 94 percent accuracy
rate.
• Focus groups of litigants reported a high level of satis-
faction with the JusticeCorps program and the services
they received.
• On average, each class of JusticeCorps volunteers has
been collectively fluent in more than 20 languages.
In the current program year, AOC staff will be looking to
more thoroughly track the more than 400 alumni from the
JusticeCorps program (to date) across California to determine
how many went on to law school and careers in law-related
fields. From what staff know anecdotally, many of the alumni
do apply and go on to law school or to careers in the courts,
such as clerk-training programs. Many of the students come
from ethnically diverse backgrounds. Given that the trust and
confidence survey showed that equal treatment and the ability
to be heard are important concerns among minorities, the
JusticeCorps program’s ability to infuse the court system with
more minority representation may significantly increase diver-
sity within the branch.
Helping Offenders Navigate the Legal System. The After
Criminal Traffic Infraction One-Stop Network (ACTION)
Center was designed by the Superior Court of Fresno County
to enhance the delivery of court services and increase public
access to the courts by having everything for these cases avail-
able in one location. Fresno County is one of the most diverse
in the state, with Latinos making up 47 percent of the popula-
tion. The county is also home
to the second-largest Hmong
community in the United
States. In all, nearly half of the
county population speaks a
language other than English at
home. 
From 2000 through 2005,
the population in Fresno
County grew by more than 7
percent, almost twice as
quickly as the overall state
rate. Over that same period, the court saw a 55 percent
increase in criminal case filings for that fiscal year. Thus, the
court calendars are packed—especially in high-volume traffic
and misdemeanor courts—and courtroom action is swift. The
process was leaving too many offenders overwhelmed, espe-
cially those whose sentences involved more than one program
or remediation.
The court found that a lack of understanding could lead to
a lack of offender compliance, which undermined public con-
fidence. And an offender’s noncompliance generally resulted in
additional court appearances.
In July 2000, the court collaborated with the Probation
Department and the Auditor-Controller’s Office to develop an
innovative program that would: 
• Increase an offender’s accountability to the court;
• Make it easier for an offender to comply with court
orders and get connected to court-mandated programs;
and
• Restore and promote the public’s trust and confidence in
the judicial system.
Located in Fresno’s downtown courthouse, the ACTION
Center enables offenders to:
• Ask questions about court orders in the disposition of
their cases;
• Obtain information necessary to fulfill their sentence;
• Pay fees and fines or set up a schedule for restitution;
and
• Get referrals (and often initial appointments) to court-
ordered services, such as work furlough, anger manage-
ment, batterer intervention, traffic school, and probation
instructions.
Many court users in the Fresno community have low
incomes, limited literacy, and no Web access. But at the center,
each court user gets one-on-one assistance until the assigned
staff worker is certain that the court user understands the case
disposition and has the tools to help ensure compliance.
Two judicial assistants and one Probation Department
employee staff the center. The court and Probation Department
cover operating costs from their budgets and also contribute
supplies and equipment. Most important, they have cross-
trained their staffs in each other’s procedures and have given
each other access to their respective information systems, a
collaboration unique in the state. To guarantee fair administra-
tion of justice to all residents, the ACTION Center staff pro-
vides assistance in English, Spanish, and Hmong.
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Impacts of the ACTION program:
• Offenders find it easier to follow court orders; 90 percent
reported that the ACTION Center information increased
their ability to comply with their case disposition.
• Compared with 2003, the number of services provided
by the center in 2005 increased by 72 percent; the
amount of revenue collected increased by 87 percent.
• In 2006, the staff serviced more than 25,000 court users
and collected more than $1.5 million in fees and fines.
• Freed from having to manage service delivery, the court
can now process cases more efficiently: in fiscal year
2005–2006, the court disposed of 40 percent more cases
than in the year before the center opened.
CONCLUSION
California is the largest court system in the nation and one
of the most innovative. The two programs highlighted above
are just samples of ongoing endeavors in the state designed to
meet court user needs and address procedural fairness con-
cerns. 
As we move forward with the procedural fairness initiative
in California, we will not only continue to build tools for judi-
cial officers and court staff to better understand and implement
the elements of procedural fairness, but will also highlight and
leverage the good work that is currently taking place within
the branch. There is a possibility for collaboration with other
states that also are looking for the best way to implement pro-
cedural fairness concepts to benefit the public and the courts. 
“I just want to be treated the same, like you treat anybody
else that has money. . . . You got a tie, I don’t. I’m still a man, a
human being.” The court user in a focus group who said this
was responding to a question presented at the conclusion of
each court user focus group: “Before we adjourn, is there any-
thing else you’d like to say about how the California courts
might be improved?” His answer—a clear and simple request
to be treated as an equal within the courts no matter his
income or appearance—resonates with procedural fairness
concerns and reflects the goals of the initiative. Indeed, the
courts of California are listening to the public. The branch is
working to ensure that everyone who enters our courts is
treated with dignity and respect and that all members of the
public are given a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
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Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American Judges
Association, invites the submission of unsolicited, original articles,
essays, and book reviews.  Court Review seeks to provide practical,
useful information to the working judges of the United States and
Canada.  In each issue, we hope to provide information that will be
of use to judges in their everyday work, whether in highlighting new
procedures or methods of trial, court, or case management, provid-
ing substantive information regarding an area of law likely to
encountered by many judges, or by providing background informa-
tion (such as psychology or other social science research) that can be
used by judges in their work.
Court Review is received by the 2,500 members of the American
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judges.  Another 40 percent are limited-jurisdiction judges, includ-
ing municipal court and other specialized court judges.  The remain-
der include federal trial judges, state and federal appellate judges,
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is between 18 and 36 pages of double-spaced text (including the
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This study examines the impact of the Harlem CommunityJustice Center, a community-based housing court thatattempts to achieve speedier and more durable outcomes
in landlord-tenant disputes. However, it may be particularly
beneficial to pro se litigants (i.e., those who represent them-
selves without an attorney). In New York City, most landlords
are represented, while the vast majority of tenants are not. In
fact, one report notes that only 12% of tenants are able to
afford counsel while 98% of landlords are represented.1
The primary objective of this study was to examine the
experiences of pro se tenants whose cases are heard in Harlem,
surveying their perceptions of the fairness, accessibility, time-
liness, respectfulness, and comprehensibility of the court
process. We conducted a survey of pro se tenants both in
Harlem and in New York City’s centralized housing court
located in southern Manhattan (hereinafter referred to as
“downtown housing court”). Survey results were supple-
mented with structured court observations, also conducted at
both locations.
BACKGROUND
The vast majority of housing-court cases in New York City
are filed by landlords to evict tenants for nonpayment of rent.
These tenants are often hampered by their inability to navi-
gate the complexities of the legal system. Unable to afford
legal representation, often unaware of their rights and
responsibilities, and afraid of losing their apartments, many
tenants must file their own pleadings and responses to plead-
ings in court—an intimidating and complex process. These
problems are compounded by the high-volume of housing-
court cases such as New York City’s, which hears more than
300,000 cases annually.2 According to one description:
“housing court, with its unruly atmosphere of lawyers and
tenants negotiating in the hallways or yelling into cell
phones, can be overwhelming . . . the hearings before some
of the most overworked judges in the system are usually
brief, so litigants often have but a few minutes to recount
their emotional slide into debt.”3
Recently, community-based models have emerged, which
offer alternative approaches to resolving housing cases in New
York City, as well as the possibility of enhanced access to jus-
tice for pro se litigants. Community courts hearing housing
cases were opened in Harlem and Red Hook, Brooklyn. 
Opened in May 2001, the Harlem Community Justice
Center is located in East Harlem and handles all housing-court
cases from two Harlem zip codes (10035 and 10037). All other
housing cases in Manhattan are heard at the centralized hous-
ing court. 
The Harlem Community Justice Center seeks to address
many of the underlying problems that give rise to housing
cases. The court is staffed by a single judge and handles cases
only from a limited geographic area. It also seeks to provide
the judge with access to comprehensive and up-to-date infor-
mation. The court works closely with an on-site housing
resource center that is staffed by case managers, a pro se attor-
ney, and personnel from partner city agencies. The resource
center seeks to link clients to services, including mediation,
benefits assistance, budget counseling, and loan-assistance
programs.
Aspects of the Harlem Community Justice Center—its
neighborhood location, smaller caseload, single judge and
courtroom, on-site services—might be expected to improve the
court experience for tenants in terms of both perceptions and
outcomes. The importance of enhanced tenant perceptions
should not be underestimated. Studies show that litigants place
great weight on having their problems settled in a way they
view as fair.4 To date, there has been no systematic evaluation of
the impact of a community-based housing court. By drawing on
the perspectives of unrepresented tenants appearing in both the
Harlem and downtown housing courts, our study provides the
first indications of the comparative advantages (and/or disad-
vantages) of a community-based housing court. 
Between January and May 2007, a total of 343 tenants were
interviewed: 196 in the Harlem Housing Court and 147 in the
downtown housing court. The survey measures tenant percep-
tions about, and satisfaction with, their court experience.
Tenants were asked to assess their experience in a variety of
procedural fairness domains, including:
The Perceptions of 
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5. Data was collected via in-person interviews which took approxi-
mately five minutes to administer. The survey relied on a conve-
nience sample, with litigants approached by research staff or court
personnel to participate in the survey. Tenants were assured that
participation was strictly voluntary, would in no way affect their
court cases, and that their responses would be kept confidential
and reported in the aggregate only. 
6. A holdover case is brought to evict a tenant or person in the apart-
ment who is not a tenant for reasons other than the nonpayment
of rent—for example, violating a lease provision, illegally putting
others in the apartment, being a nuisance to other tenants.
• Opportunity to participate in the process;
• Clarity of the process;
• Polite and fair treatment from the judge and court staff;
• Fairness of the outcome; and
• Satisfaction with the outcome.
Tenants were also asked to rate their preparation for court,
difficulties faced in preparing for the appearance, awareness
and use of available services, and suggestions for improve-
ment.5
To complement the survey, research staff conducted struc-
tured court observations in the Harlem and downtown hous-
ing courts. Using court observation instruments, we formally
assessed tenant court appearances in terms of preparation,
behavior during the appearance, treatment by other parties
(judge, court clerks, attorneys, etc.), and case outcomes. In
total, 406 court appearances were observed: 109 in the Harlem
housing court, and 297 in various downtown court parts.
II. DESCRIPTION OF SURVEY SAMPLE
Overall, survey respondents appear to be generally repre-
sentative of housing-court tenants. Most of those interviewed
were racial/ethnic minorities—half African-American and
another quarter Hispanic. Two in three (67%) were female. The
majority had at least one indicator of low socioeconomic sta-
tus: 59% reported being unemployed, receiving Section 8
rental assistance, or living in public housing (Table 1).
Those interviewed in the Harlem and at the downtown
housing courts were similar in many, but not all, respects.
There were no significant differences across sites in gender,
education level, and employment status. However, those inter-
viewed in Harlem were more likely to identify themselves as
African-American (63% compared to 36% downtown) and less
likely as white (4% compared to 16% downtown). 
CASE CHARACTERISTICS
Not surprisingly, more than 8 in 10 (85%) of those sur-
veyed were involved in a nonpayment of rent case. A larger
percentage of downtown litigants were in court on a holdover
case (19% vs. 7% downtown).6 Also not surprisingly, the over-
whelming majority of tenants, both downtown (87%) and
particularly in Harlem (97%), appeared pro se. By contrast,
very few tenants reported that their landlord was pro se (5% in
Harlem; 6% downtown). The majority of tenants (53%) also
reported that they are facing eviction as a result of their cur-
rent court case. Importantly, despite the fact that public-hous-
ing (NYCHA) cases comprise a larger percentage of Harlem’s
than downtown’s caseload, the Harlem tenants interviewed for
this study were not significantly more likely to be public-
housing residents than were those downtown (29% vs. 25%,
respectively).
APPEARANCE OUTCOME
Harlem tenants are much more likely to report having
agreed to a stipulation or stipulation with final judgment (75%
compared to 53% downtown). While stipulations do not nec-
essarily result in a final case resolution, often they do. Note too
TABLE 1: CHARACTERISTICS OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS
HARLEM DOWN-
TOWN
TOTAL
RACE
Black***
Latino†
White
Other
63%
21%
4%
12%
36%
31%
16%
18%
51%
25%
9%
15%
GENDER
Female** 70% 63% 67%
HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA/GED 86% 86% 86%
EMPLOYED***
Part-time
Full-time
68%
11%
57%
59%
17%
42%
64%
14%
50%
RECEIVE SECTION 8 RENTAL
ASSISTANCE***
21% 13% 17%
LIVE IN PUBLIC HOUSING** 29% 25% 28%
†p<.10 **p<.01 ***p<.001
TABLE 2: CASE CHARACTERISTICS
HARLEM DOWN-
TOWN
TOTAL
CASE TYPE
Nonpayment***
Holdover***
Other***
92%
7%
2%
76%
19%
4%
85%
13%
3%
TENENT IN PUBLIC HOUSING
(NY CHA) 29% 25% 28%
FIRST APPEARANCE IN
COURT CASE†
26% 19% 23%
TENANT PRO SE* 97% 87% 93%
LANDLORD PRO SE 5% 6% 5%
TENANT FACING EVICTION* 45% 62% 53%
†p<.10 **p<.01 ***p<.001
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that Harlem litigants are far less likely to have reported an
adjournment (8% vs. 24% downtown), suggesting less delay in
case processing. Harlem tenants are much more likely to report
having agreed to pay money to their landlord (69% vs. 46%
downtown).
III. HOUSING RESOURCE CENTER
Both the Harlem and downtown courts feature housing
resource centers, which attempt to link clients to needed
resources, including mediation, entitlement-assistance, bud-
get-counseling, and loan-assistance programs. The majority of
tenants interviewed at both sites (57% in Harlem, 59% down-
town) report being knowledgeable about the housing resource
center (Table 4).
Most of those (56% overall) who know about the resource
centers report having visited them for assistance related to
their current court case. Those at the downtown housing
court, however, were more likely than those in Harlem to
report having visited the resource center (64% downtown vs.
51% in Harlem). Note too that downtown tenants are far more
likely than those in Harlem (57% vs. 29%, respectively) to say
they intend to visit the resource center in the future. 
Why Harlem tenants are less likely to have visited the hous-
ing resource center, or to intend to visit the center, is unclear.
It might suggest that previous experiences with the resource
center among tenants in Harlem were less likely to live up to
their expectations than among those downtown. Alternatively,
it may be that Harlem tenants were linked to services the day
of the court appearance in which they were interviewed, thus
precluding the need to return to the resource center. Once
again, however, the survey findings provide no conclusive evi-
dence as to why tenants in Harlem have less contact with the
resource center. 
IV. COURT EXPERIENCE
Survey respondents were asked about their preparedness for
and understanding of the court process, their views about the
judge and other court actors, and their overall satisfaction with
the court process (Table 5).
TENANT PREPAREDNESS
The vast majority (83%) of tenants “strongly agree” or
“agree” that they felt prepared for their court appearance, with
tenants in Harlem more likely to feel prepared (90% in Harlem
vs. 73% downtown). These percentages, which may appear
high at first glance, are likely due in part to some survey
respondents’ inclination to provide socially desirable
responses, particularly when compared to the fact that less
than half report having received any information about the
housing court process. Indeed, research staff conducting struc-
tured court observation reported that the tenant appeared to
understand what happened in court (i.e., did not appear con-
fused or unable to follow the proceedings) in only 47% of the
observed appearances. Note that those who reported having
received information or materials about the housing-court
process are slightly more likely to “strongly agree” that they
understood what happened in court (22% vs. 14% for those
who did not receive materials). 
V. PERCEPTION OF THE JUDGE AND COURT 
Tenant perceptions of the judge were overwhelmingly favor-
able in both the Harlem and downtown housing courts,
although on most measures those in Harlem tended to view the
judge somewhat more favorably than those downtown (Table
6). Specifically, Harlem tenants were more likely to “strongly
agree” or “agree” that the judge:
• treated them with respect (99% vs. 87% downtown);
• carefully considered their input in making a decision
(92% vs. 72% downtown);
• listened to them (99% vs. 83% downtown);
• treated them fairly (98% vs. 85% downtown); and
• understood the facts of the case (99% vs. 81% down-
town).
TABLE 3: APPEARANCE OUTCOME
HARLEM DOWN-
TOWN
TOTAL
APPEARANCE OUTCOME
Stipulation*
Stipulation with final 
judgment*
Order to show cause granted
Order to show cause denied
Adjourned***
Discontinued
Set for trial
Unsure
49%
26%
7%
1%
8%
8%
2%
0%
36%
17%
12%
2%
24%
4%
1%
2%
43%
22%
9%
2%
15%
6%
2%
1%
AGREED TO PAY MONEY TO
LANDLORD*** 69% 46% 59%
*p<.05 ***p<.001
TABLE 4: KNOWLEDGE AND USE OF 
HOUSING RESOURCE CENTER
HARLEM DOWN-
TOWN
TOTAL
KNOWLEDGE OF RESOURCE
CENTER 57% 59% 58%
HOW FOUND OUT ABOUT
RESOURCE CENTERa
Referred
On own
61%
39%
56%
44%
59%
42%
REFERRAL SOURCEb
Judge
Court clerk
Court attorney
Housing resource center 
coordinator
Other/Not sure***
31%
32%
9%
7%
21%
22%
26%
7%
2%
44%
27%
30%
8%
5%
30%
VISITED RESOURCE CENTER
FOR CURRENT CASE*a
51% 64% 56%
INTEND TO VISIT RESOURCE
CENTER*** a
29% 57% 41%
aAsked only of those who have knowledge of the Resource Center (n=198).
bAsked only of those referred to the Resource Center (n=114).
* p<.05 ***p<.001
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7. These findings may not at first appear consistent with the findings
from the survey that about 3 in 10 of those referred to the hous-
ing resource center were referred by the judge (see Table 4). The
apparent discrepancy is due to the fact that the research staff
administering the survey asked about referral source only to ten-
ants who indicated that they both had knowledge about the
resource center and had been referred to the center. While 27% of
this subset of tenants report having been referred by the judge, this
constitutes only 9% of the entire sample of surveyed litigants.
When looking only at the “strongly agree” responses, the
cross-site differences are starker. For example, Harlem tenants
are much more likely than those downtown to “strongly agree”
that the judge treated them with respect (38% vs. 19% down-
town), listened to them (30% vs. 16% downtown) and treated
them fairly (30% vs. 17% downtown). In sum, tenant percep-
tions of the judge, while positive in both sites, are significantly
more favorable in Harlem.
OBSERVED INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE 
JUDGE AND TENANT LITIGANT
Structured court observation noted characteristic interac-
tions between litigants and the judge (Table 7). On some mea-
sures, no differences emerge between Harlem and downtown.
Of note is that at both sites, the judge asked if the tenant
understood what was occurring in the court proceeding in
fewer than half the observed appearances.
On other measures, differences across sites do emerge. The
observations indicate that tenants in Harlem were much more
likely to have been directly greeted by the judge at the begin-
ning of the court appearance (90% vs. 56% downtown). The
judge in Harlem was also observed more often to explain the
case to the tenant (i.e., summarizing the case history and cur-
rent case status, describing resolution options available to the
tenant, describing court procedures, etc.). By contrast, down-
town judges were more likely to have made eye contact with
the tenant (80% downtown vs. 67% in Harlem).  
Note that both in Harlem (7%) and downtown (11%), the
judges were seldom observed to have mentioned the housing
resource center and available services. These findings do raise
concern about how consistently tenants learn about the hous-
ing resource center (both in Harlem and downtown) from the
judge, and perhaps suggest a need for housing-court judges to
be more proactive.7
OTHER ATTITUDES
Court officers and court attorneys were rated favorably both
in the Harlem and downtown courts. More than 9 in 10 at both
courts “strongly agree” or “agree” that the court officers were
respectful. Most at both sites believed court attorneys’ expla-
nation of the stipulation was sufficient, although again, those
in Harlem were more likely to believe so (84% compared to
73% at downtown court). 
TABLE 5: TENANT PREPAREDNESS FOR AND 
UNDERSTANDING OF THE COURT EXPERIENCE
+
HARLEM DOWN-
TOWN
TOTAL
FELT PREPARED FOR COURT
APPEARANCE*** 90% 73% 83%
UNDERSTOOD WHAT
HAPPENED IN COURT*** 99% 90% 95%
RECEIVED MATERIALS ABOUT
THE HOUSING COURT
PROCESS
43% 47% 45%
+ Percentages refer to the percent “strongly agree” and “agree.” Other
choices given were “neither agree not disagree,” “disagree,” and “strongly
disagree.”
*** p<.001
TABLE 6: PERCEPTIONS OF JUDGEa
HARLEM DOWN-
TOWN
TOTAL
JUDGE WAS AUDIBLE*** 99% 90% 95%
JUDGE’S DECISION WAS
CLEAR TO YOU*** 99% 89% 95%
JUDGE TREATED YOU WITH
RESPECT*** 99% 87% 95%
JUDGE UNDERSTOOD THE
FACTS OF YOUR CASE*** 99% 81% 93%
JUDGE LISTENED TO
YOU*** 99% 83% 93%
JUDGE TREATED YOU
FAIRLY*** 98% 85% 93%
JUDGE EXPLAINED YOUR
CASE TO YOU*** 94% 80% 89%
JUDGE CAREFULLY 
CONSIDERED WHAT YOU
SAID WHEN MAKING 
DECISION***
92% 72% 85%
JUDGE’S INSTRUCTIONS
WERE CONFUSING 19% 16% 18%
a Percentages refer to the percent “strongly agree” and “agree.” Other
choices given were “neither agree not disagree,” “disagree,” and “strongly
disagree.”
***p<.001
TABLE 7: OBSERVATION OF JUDGES’ BEHAVIOR
HARLEM DOWN-
TOWN
TOTAL
GREETED TENANT*** 90% 56% 65%
EXPLAINED CASE 80% 72% 74%
ASKED IF TENANT
UNDERSTANDS 40% 37% 37%
MADE EYE CONTACT* 67% 80% 77%
MENTIONED HOUSING
RESOURCES/SERVICES
7% 11% 10%
*p<.05 ***p<.001
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8. As previously noted, this interpretation assumes that tenants who
agree to a stipulation are more likely to have concluded the court
process (or nearly so). This is not the case in all situations.
9. Specifically, an ordered logistic regression analysis was conducted
to identify factors predicting overall satisfaction. This is the most
appropriate method for dependent variables measured on a three-
point scale (here, the dependent variable has three response cate-
gories: “very pleased,” “somewhat pleased,” and “not very
pleased.”)
10. Other factors (for example, whether the tenant felt prepared for
the court appearance, visited the resource center, etc.) are not
included in the statistical models presented in Table 9 because
they are not significant predictors of overall satisfaction, are
highly intercorrelated with other variables included in the analy-
sis, or are measures for which there is considerable missing data.
While court personnel were rated positively at both courts,
ratings of the court atmosphere were much more positive in
Harlem. Six in 10 (58%) “strongly agree” or “agree” that the
court atmosphere in Harlem is “pleasant;” only 28% of those in
the downtown court felt the same way.
VI. OVERALL EVALUATION OF THE COURT EXPERIENCE
The majority of tenants both in Harlem and downtown pro-
vided favorable overall evaluations of their housing-court
experience, with the Harlem Housing Court receiving slightly
higher marks than downtown on all measures (Table 8).
Harlem tenants were more likely to “strongly agree” or
“agree” that their legal rights were taken into account (85% vs.
73% downtown), that the case was handled fairly (92% vs.
75% downtown), and that the case result was fair (86% vs. 66%
downtown). Harlem tenants were also more likely to say that
they were “very” or “somewhat” pleased with the outcome of
their court appearance (87% vs. 71%). Note that Harlem ten-
ants have especially favorable perceptions with respect to both
the fairness of the court procedures and the fairness of the out-
come of their court appearance. Note too that in both sites,
tenant perceptions were not significantly correlated with the
outcome of their court appearance. For example, tenants who
reported having signed a stipulation were no more likely than
those who did not to be satisfied with their court experience,
suggesting that evaluations of the court experience are not
associated with the resolution of the dispute.8
PREDICTORS OF SATISFACTION
To examine which factors are related to tenants’ satisfaction
with the outcome of their housing-court appearance, a multi-
variate regression analysis was conducted to predict variance
in respondents’ satisfaction. The purpose of a regression analy-
sis is to examine the impact of factors—demographic charac-
teristics, attitudes, etc.—that might influence an individual’s
satisfaction with their court experience while at the same time
accounting (“controlling”) for other factors that might provide
alternative explanations for satisfaction.9
Two statistical models are presented to fully illustrate which
factors most influence satisfaction (Table 9). In Model 1, the
positive coefficient for Harlem Court (.709) indicates an
increased chance that a tenant appearing in the Harlem
Housing Court (vis-à-vis downtown) will rate the court expe-
rience more highly, even after controlling for a variety of demo-
graphic factors as well as whether a stipulation was agreed to
(our proxy measure for whether the appearance may have
resulted in a resolution of the dispute). In other words, tenants
in the Harlem Housing Court were significantly more satisfied
with their court experience than those in the downtown hous-
ing court.10
Model 2 reveals why tenants in the Harlem Housing Court
had a more positive overall view of their court experience. This
model shows that the perceived fairness of court procedures
and the outcome of the court appearance are the most influen-
tial factors affecting pro se tenants’ evaluation of their housing-
court experience. The statistically significant, positive coeffi-
cients for Fair Result (1.293) and Fair Procedures (.553) indi-
cate an increased chance that individuals with more positive
TABLE 8: SATISFACTION WITH COURT EXPERIENCE
HARLEM DOWN-
TOWN
TOTAL
YOUR LEGAL RIGHTS WERE
TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT a*** 85%
(16%)
73%
(8%)
80%
(13%)
CASE HANDLED FAIRLY BY
THE COURT a ***
92%
(19%)
75%
(11%)
95%
(16%)
THE RESULT OF YOUR CASE
WAS FAIR a ***
86%
(15%)
66%
(10%)
77%
(13%)
OVERALL SATISFACTION
- VERY PLEASED***
- SOMEWHAT PLEASED*
- NOT VERY PLEASED*
63%
24%
13%
40%
31%
29%
53%
27%
20%
a Percentages refer to the percent “strongly agree” and “agree.” Percentages
in parentheses refer only to the percent “strongly agree.” Other choices
given were “neither agree not disagree,” “disagree,” and “strongly disagree.”
* p<.05 ***p<.001
TABLE 9: MULTIVARIATE MODEL MEASURING 
IMPACT ON OVERALL SATISFACTION
VARIABLES MODEL 1
COEFFICIENTS
MODEL 2
COEFFICIENTS
HARLEM COURT .709*** .278
DEMOGRAPHICS
Gender (Female)
African-American
Hispanic
.310
.583†
.246
.573*
.470
-.001
SIGNED
STIPULATION
.511† .192
FAIR RESULT 1.293***
FAIR PROCEDURES .553***
†p<.10, * p<.05, ***p<.001.
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11. E.g., Golowitz, supra note 2.
perceptions of fairness—in procedures and outcomes—will rate
their court experience more highly, even after controlling for a
variety of factors. By contrast, those with more negative per-
ceptions of fairness have an increased chance of rating their
court experience less highly. Importantly, after tenants’ percep-
tions of fairness are taken into account, tenants’ court location
(i.e., Harlem vs. downtown) is no longer a statistically signifi-
cant predictor of satisfaction. Thus, pro se tenants perceive the
court experience in Harlem more positively because they are more
likely to perceive the court process and appearance outcome as fair.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This study was designed to determine how pro se tenants
perceived their court experiences in the community-based
Harlem Housing Court and the centralized housing courts
located in southern Manhattan. The survey findings indicate
that, in most areas, Harlem tenants viewed their court experi-
ence in somewhat more positive terms. Harlem tenants give
the court higher marks with regard to taking their legal rights
into account, fairness both in court procedures and the out-
comes of the court appearance, and overall satisfaction with
the court experience.
To be sure, both the downtown and Harlem housing courts
fare very well in terms of tenant perceptions of the court expe-
rience. Contrary to some accounts,11 our findings indicate gen-
erally positive perceptions even among tenants appearing in
the high-volume downtown housing court. Across nearly all
measures, the community-based Harlem Housing Court
appears to achieve its goal of improving tenants’ comprehen-
sion of their court experience as well as their perception that
they were treated fairly, in terms of both the court process and
the outcome of that process.
Importantly, our analysis demonstrates that the more posi-
tive perceptions of the Harlem Housing Court experience are
due largely to the fact that Harlem tenants are more likely than
those downtown to feel that the court process and outcomes
are fair. While this finding is not surprising in so far as it is
consistent with a broad literature emphasizing the importance
of perceived procedural justice, its implications for housing
court are potentially far-reaching. Enhanced perceptions of
procedural fairness are not necessarily inherent to a commu-
nity-based court model—indeed, the centralized downtown
housing courts also receive high marks on procedural justice
measures. The findings suggest that steps can be taken to fur-
ther improve perceptions of procedural fairness in all court set-
tings. Educating judges and court staff about procedural fair-
ness, and identifying and implementing best practices for pro-
moting procedural fairness, are two examples of such steps.
The results do raise areas for potential follow-up by both
the Harlem and downtown housing courts. For example, court
observation indicates that the judges in both Harlem and
downtown ask if the tenant understands the proceedings and
if the tenant agrees with the stipulation (in cases where one
existed) less than half of the time. These results suggest that
judges in both sites could do more to verify and to improve
tenant understanding of the court process. 
Certainly, there are limits to what this study can tell us
about the Harlem Community Justice Center. Most important,
since we lack data about case outcomes and future tenant
appearances in housing court, we cannot evaluate whether or
to what extent the Harlem Community Justice Center has
achieved its goal of reaching speedier and more durable case
resolutions. Future research might address this issue.
Note too that other potentially confounding factors for
which we lack data may also help to shape tenant perceptions.
For example, we do not know whether tenants are of the same
race or gender as the judge before whom they appeared. It is
possible that these or other factors may affect litigant percep-
tions of the judge as well as their overall perception of how
they were treated by the court.
Nevertheless, the survey results offer encouraging news as
to the benefits of a community-based housing court. The
Harlem model does appear to enhance pro se litigants’ percep-
tions of fair treatment and their overall satisfaction with the
court process. It is hoped that the results of our research will
help court planners, both in New York City and nationwide,
when deciding whether to advocate for a greater number of
community-based housing courts and/or to apply features of
the Harlem Community Justice Center model on a broader
scale.
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Since World War II, psychologists have devoted consider-able attention to understanding the factors that shapepeople’s satisfaction with the outcomes of social or eco-
nomic exchanges—outcomes of events not unlike the encoun-
ters occurring between judges and litigants in civil and crimi-
nal courtrooms, encounters between police officers and civil-
ians, or encounters between mediators and disputants in alter-
native dispute resolution centers throughout the United States
every day. In one classic early study, it came as somewhat of a
surprise when it was discovered that satisfaction was not eas-
ily explained by economic theories of human behavior.1 This
finding launched an inquiry guided by theories and empirical
research that has continued to this day. 
In this article, we offer an overview of the major develop-
ments in these theories and the accompanying research with an
eye toward their implications for understanding the factors that
shape citizens’ satisfaction with the U.S. legal system. Then, we
note that the vast majority of this research has focused primar-
ily on only a portion of the individuals who are engaged in the
legal encounters that are taking place—the subordinates (the
litigants, civilians, and disputants whose outcomes are being
decided) rather than the authorities (the judges, police officers,
and mediators who are deciding the cases), and we describe
some recent research suggesting that the satisfaction of decision
makers might be guided by different principles than the satis-
faction of those who receive their decisions. 
DEVELOPMENT OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS RESEARCH
In an extensive body of research on the psychology of fair-
ness, psychologists have investigated factors that determine
people’s satisfaction with conflict resolution processes. Early
research on the psychology of fairness focused on distributive
fairness. These early studies examined people’s beliefs that the
outcomes of their conflicts were fair, and showed that dis-
putants’ satisfaction with conflict resolution was more strongly
influenced by the fairness than the favorability of the outcomes
they received.2 However, research on the psychology of fair-
ness shifted to a focus on procedural fairness when Thibaut and
Walker demonstrated that disputants’ satisfaction with conflict
resolution was influenced by the fairness of the conflict reso-
lution procedures, as well as the fairness of the outcomes pro-
duced by those procedures.3
Importantly, Thibaut and Walker showed that disputants
judged procedures to be fair to the extent that they felt they
were granted “voice” or input into the procedure, and influ-
ence over the process. Their theory of procedural fairness
posited that process control was a critical determinant of dis-
putants’ judgments of procedural fairness and satisfaction.
Since this research was conducted in high conflict settings
(simulated legal disputes), it was assumed that disputants val-
ued “voice” or process control because they were motivated to
obtain fair outcomes, and therefore preferred procedures that
permitted them to express their views and to be influential in
shaping those outcomes. 
Although this theory was well supported, some findings did
not fit well with Thibaut and Walker’s reasoning about why
voice was important to disputants. Their procedural justice
theory predicted that process control was important because of
its potential instrumental value—it increased the likelihood of
obtaining fair and beneficial outcomes. However, subsequent
research showed that voice enhanced fairness judgments even
when disputants did not think their voice would influence
their outcome.4 This non-instrumental voice effect led two
psychologists, Tom Tyler and E. Allan Lind, to propose a group
value theory of procedural fairness. This theory has pro-
foundly influenced subsequent research and theory on proce-
dural fairness. 
Tyler and Lind’s research was supportive of their claim that
certain non-instrumental procedural features were particularly
influential for people’s evaluations of these processes: trust-
worthy authorities, neutral procedures, and respectful treat-
ment. If disputants felt that the authority figure in a procedure
was trustworthy, the procedure was neutral, and the disputant’s
rights were generally respected in the procedure, then the dis-
putants generally judged the procedure to be fair.5
According to the group value model of procedural fairness,
this occurs because such procedural features convey to dis-
putants that they are valued and respected members of their
valued social groups. When a procedure conveys that a person
is valued by their group, and that they are held in high regard
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by the authorities representing that social group, then that per-
son will generally judge that procedure to be fair. Essentially,
the group value model posits that people do not judge proce-
dures to be fair because those procedures deliver fair or favor-
able outcomes, and people do not value procedural features
like voice or respectful treatment because they signal the like-
lihood of favorable outcomes. Rather, procedural features like
trust, neutrality, respect (and voice) convey important sym-
bolic or relational information—they convey that the individ-
ual is respected by his or her group—prompting people to
judge those procedures as fair.6 An extensive body of research
provides strong support for these central claims of the group
value model. 
Notably, the ascendancy of the group value model in the
procedural fairness literature is the culmination of a significant
shift from the parameters that defined early conflict research.
Psychologists have progressed from early economic models of
satisfaction that focused primarily on obtaining favorable out-
comes, to distributive fairness models that focused primarily on
obtaining fair outcomes, to procedural fairness models that
focused primarily on procedures as instruments for shaping fair
outcomes, to a procedural fairness model that views procedures
as an important source of largely symbolic information: infor-
mation about one’s relationship with valued social groups.
Each of these developments has moved psychologists further
away from the proposition that outcomes are critical determi-
nants of procedural fairness judgments.
Psychologists have also demonstrated that procedural fair-
ness judgments themselves have important social and legal con-
sequences. For example, Tyler conducted large-scale surveys of
Chicago, Illinois and Oakland, California residents.7 Across
four studies, Tyler showed that process concerns were more
important than instrumental concerns in shaping citizens’ eval-
uations of the police and courts. Judgments about the fairness
with which the police and courts exercised their authority pre-
dicted citizens’ confidence in and support for legal authorities,
their perceived obligation to obey the law, and their willingness
to cooperate with legal authorities and legal institutions in the
future—findings that have been replicated in numerous studies
since Lind and Tyler proposed
their group value theory.8
Procedural fairness research
has clearly demonstrated that
disputants attach a great deal of
importance to the way they are
treated by the authorities who
represent legal institutions.9
Disputants’ evaluations of the
legal system are heavily influ-
enced by their perception that
they were treated fairly in
encounters with judges, police,
and other legal authorities, and this procedural fairness effect
often trumps the effect of distributive fairness and outcome
favorability.10 When procedural features like trust, neutrality,
respectful treatment, and voice increase procedural fairness
judgments, this functions as a non-coercive means to increase
compliance with the law and cooperation with legal authorities. 
NEW FINDINGS IN PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS: DECISION
MAKERS VS. DECISION RECIPIENTS
Several studies have suggested the dominant influence of
procedural fairness on satisfaction may not apply equally to all
actors in the legal system. Some studies suggest that, among
decision makers (e.g., judges), fairness and satisfaction judg-
ments are shaped by quite different factors and are not domi-
nated by treatment and relational concerns. For example,
Lissak and Sheppard found that managers tended to emphasize
cost and efficiency more strongly than fairness as criteria for
resolving organizational conflict.11 Some early procedural fair-
ness research also suggested that when assessing their satisfac-
tion with dispute resolution procedures or outcomes, decision
makers were more influenced by instrumental criteria (such as
control over decisions and financial considerations), and less
concerned with relational criteria (such as treatment and trust-
worthiness), than were decision recipients.12
One recent paper focused directly on judgments of proce-
dural fairness by judges.13 Heuer and his colleagues point to
[F]airness and 
satisfaction 
judgments [of
decision makers
like judges may
not be] dominated
by treatment 
and relational
concerns.
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several cases in which the
Supreme Court was consider-
ing the propriety of police
search procedures and in
which the Justices appear to
have relied heavily on search
outcomes rather than proce-
dural fairness. For example,
the Supreme Court has con-
sidered whether the use of
drug courier profiles in U.S.
airports violated a passenger’s
Fourth Amendment rights.14
In these cases, the courts described their decision-making task
as a balancing of several considerations, including the risk of
false positive errors and the harms they inflict on search tar-
gets, versus the societal benefits achieved by using the profil-
ing technique.15 In other words, the Justices describe their own
decision making as a utilitarian balancing of outcome con-
cerns: societal benefits against individual harms. 
This judicial reasoning poses a challenge to the  procedural
fairness theorizing described above, which has emphasized the
dominant influence of procedures and which has gradually
moved away from characterizing procedures as instruments for
obtaining fair or beneficial outcomes, to characterizing proce-
dures as symbols—cues to social relationships and group
standing. 
The tension between these contrasting perspectives was the
starting point for the Heuer et al16 inquiry. If a decision
maker–decision recipient disparity in concerns with procedures
versus outcomes exists, it could have important ramifications:
decision makers’ best efforts to act fairly might leave decision
recipients feeling unfairly treated, with all of the attendant 
negative consequences. The findings of their four studies, sum-
marized below, suggest the presence of this disparity. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF OUTCOMES AMONG JUDGES
In the first two studies, state appellate court judges (Study 1)
and state trial court judges (Study 2) read a summary of a ficti-
tious appellate case involving a search and seizure. The appel-
lant in this case had been required to answer a series of ques-
tions before boarding a flight, and his answers were analyzed
using a technology called Voice Stress Analysis (VSA). Because
his responses indicated stress, federal agents searched his lug-
gage, and the passenger was arrested when they discovered ille-
gal materials in his possession. The summary indicated that the
defendant was convicted, and was presently appealing his con-
viction on the grounds that the interrogation procedure vio-
lated his Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
search and seizure. The case summary described the search pro-
cedure and the search outcome. However, the information that
participants received about these two factors varied depending
on their randomly assigned experimental condition.
Half of the judges read a case in which the procedure was
administered in a respectful manner: The defendant was per-
mitted to explain why he was triggering the VSA, and the
police treated him politely. The remaining judges read a case in
which the procedure was administered in a disrespectful man-
ner: The defendant was not permitted to explain why he was
triggering the VSA, and the police treated him rudely and with
some hostility.
Similarly, half of the judges read a case summary in which
the outcome of the search was of high societal benefit: Upon
searching the passenger’s luggage, the officers found a .45 cal-
iber pistol. In addition, these judges learned that there had
been 130 attempted airline hijackings in the past year, and the
state’s attorney pointed out that VSA was expected to cut the
rate of such attempts in half. The other half of judges read a
summary in which the outcome of the search was of relatively
low societal benefit: The officers’ search revealed one marijuana
cigarette (Study 1) or several stolen credit cards (Study 2).
These judges also learned that there had been four attempted
airline hijacking attempts in the past year, and the state’s attor-
ney pointed out that VSA was expected to cut the rate of such
attempts in half. 
The judges completed a questionnaire about their reactions
to this case, and their likely decisions in this appeal. They also
answered questions about the way that the defendant was
treated by the police, the costs and benefits of the search, the
fairness of the search procedure, and the outcome of the search.
Both of these studies indicated that these judges evaluated
procedures and reasoned about fairness in a different way than
typically has been reported in the procedural fairness litera-
ture. Among these judges, the (high vs. low) societal benefit
produced by the search influenced their decisions, and this
effect was completely due to the judges’ perceptions of out-
come fairness. In other words, when the benefit to society was
high (i.e., when a gun was found, as opposed to a joint of mar-
ijuana or stolen credit cards), judges considered the outcome
of the search procedure to be more fair, and this increased the
likelihood that they would uphold the appellant’s conviction.
In addition, neither of these studies found any evidence that
the description of the search procedure—the variable typically
shown to be a powerful determinant of procedural evaluations
among decision recipients—influenced these judges’ decisions
once the outcome was known.  
In short, the judges’ procedural evaluations in these experi-
mental scenarios were more heavily influenced by outcome
fairness than by procedural fairness, and both their procedural
fairness and outcome fairness judgments were largely deter-
mined by outcomes, rather than by procedural criteria. These
findings are suggestive of a decision maker-decision recipient
disparity in the criteria that shape procedural fairness and sat-
isfaction. However, they are based exclusively on fairness rea-
soning among decision makers. The claim for the existence of
a disparity that is a function of one’s role in an encounter as
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either a decision maker or a decision recipient would be more
convincing if decision makers and decision recipients were
shown to respond differently to procedures and outcomes
when confronted with a common scenario in a single experi-
mental design. This was the goal of Studies 3 and 4 and by
Heuer et al.17 In these follow-up studies, decision makers and
decision recipients evaluated procedures that were: (a) more or
less respectful responses to (b) more or less serious threats to
a social group. These studies tested the authors’ predictions
that: (1) outcome concerns would have a stronger influence on
the procedural evaluations of decision makers than decision
recipients, and (2) procedural concerns would have a stronger
influence on the procedural evaluations of decision recipients
than decision makers. 
Study 3 also addressed another important limitation of the
studies described above. Studies 1 and 2 revealed that judges
were more focused on outcome concerns than procedural
ones—however, this could be due to a number of factors. For
example, the judges surveyed in Studies 1 and 2 tended to be
older than the undergraduate populations that typically partic-
ipate in procedural fairness studies, and Finkel18 has shown
that an emphasis on outcomes in fairness judgments tends to
become more pronounced with age. Additionally, judges might
differ from other segments of the population on certain value
dimensions, such as power-distance, which refers to beliefs
about the appropriate social distance between authorities and
subordinates.19 In several studies, Tyler, Lind, and Huo have
shown that, when evaluating procedures, people high on
power-distance (who believe that there should be a greater
social distance between authorities and subordinates, and that
societies and organizations function better when there is a
more hierarchical, clearly defined power structure) place less
importance on treatment than do low power-distance people.20
If judges tend to be high on power-distance relative to other
sectors of the population, this, rather than their position of
authority, could be the reason why they placed less value on
relational concerns and more value on instrumental concerns
in Studies 1 and 2. 
In other words, judges’ focus on instrumental concerns in
Studies 1 and 2 may not be the result of a disparity between
decision makers and decision recipients in fairness reason-
ing, but may instead be the result of a disparity between older
and younger people in fairness reasoning, or a disparity
between high and low power-distance people in fairness rea-
soning. Since Studies 1 and 2 simply surveyed judges on their
reactions to the appellate case, these studies cannot rule out
the possibility that judges’ focus on outcome concerns is due
to age or power-distance, rather than their role as decision
makers. 
Study 3 addresses this concern by employing an experi-
mental design, and randomly assigning participants to take the
perspective of either a decision maker or a decision recipient
in the experiment. When ran-
dom assignment is employed,
there is no reason to believe
that the participants who are
randomly assigned to these
two roles are systematically
different in any way, other than
the role that they were
assigned in the experiment.
Study 3 therefore tests whether
the decision maker-decision
recipient disparity appears in this experimental setting, inde-
pendent of the numerous characteristics that may be con-
founded with decision-making status in natural settings. 
DECISION MAKERS AND FAIRNESS IN AN
EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
In Study 3, undergraduate participants read one of multiple
versions of a vignette describing an encounter between an
authority and a subordinate. In this fictional case, a student
resident assistant (RA) in campus housing searched a resi-
dent’s room after receiving a tip that she was violating cam-
pus-housing regulations. On discovering a violation, the RA
reported the student, who was consequently banned from
campus housing for one month. The vignette described the
student’s appeal of the sanction on the grounds that the RA’s
search procedure was inappropriate. The vignettes in this
experiment varied on three dimensions: (a) the benefit pro-
duced by the outcome of the search, (b) the respectfulness of
the RA’s search procedure, and (c) whether the participant
read the vignette from the perspective of an authority or a
subordinate. 
The outcome manipulation in this study varied whether the
search resulted in an outcome of high or low benefit to the
campus-housing community. In the high-benefit search condi-
tion the RA discovered cocaine, whereas in the low-benefit
search condition the RA discovered burning incense (both the
high- and low-benefit discoveries constituted violations of
actual campus-housing regulations). The procedure manipula-
tion varied whether the search procedure was conducted in a
more or less respectful manner. In the high-respect condition
the RA was described as treating the resident in a polite and
respectful manner, whereas in the low-respect condition the RA
was described as treating the resident in a rude and disrespect-
ful manner.
Participants were informed that appeals were heard by a
board composed of student residents, RAs, and a campus
administrator. Participants imagined themselves either in the
role of an authority or a subordinate in this story. Participants
assigned to the authority perspective responded to the case
while imagining themselves as an RA member of the appellate
board. Participants assigned to the subordinate perspective were
Studies 1 and 2
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asked to imagine the case from
the perspective of either the
student appellant, a student
representative to the appellate
board, or a student resident of
campus housing who was
learning the facts of the case
from a report in the campus
newspaper. 
All participants completed a
questionnaire that included
questions about the search
procedure, the outcome, and
their preferred decision
(regarding the propriety of the
search procedure) in this case. The findings of this study sup-
ported the prediction of an authority-subordinate disparity in
the determinants of their reactions to this case: The search out-
come had a stronger influence on the decision among partici-
pants who adopted the authority perspective, while the search
procedure had a stronger influence on the decision among par-
ticipants who adopted the subordinate perspective.
Furthermore, procedural fairness did not have a significant
influence on the decision of authorities, thus replicating this
finding from Studies 1 and 2. 
As noted above, Study 3 differs from the Studies 1 and 2 in
its use of an experimental design, and random assignment of
participants to take the perspective of either an authority or a
subordinate in the experimental scenario. Since participants in
this study were randomly assigned to take the role of either the
authority or the subordinate, we have no reason to believe that
the participants in these two roles are systematically different
in any way, other than the decision maker or decision recipient
role that they were assigned in the experiment. Therefore,
Study 3 is important because it demonstrates that the authori-
ties’ outcome focus is not a byproduct of other factors such as
age or power-distance, which were controlled for in this ran-
dom assignment study. Study 3 demonstrated that simply ask-
ing people to take the perspective of a decision maker, as
opposed to the perspective of a decision recipient, changed the
way they thought about fairness—it reduced their concern
with respectful treatment and increased their concern with
outcomes. 
DECISION MAKERS AND PREVENTIVE PROCEDURES
The studies described so far share an important feature: par-
ticipants evaluated procedures that had already been effec-
tively applied—that is, the search procedure always revealed
that the target of the procedure had violated a law or regula-
tion. Of course, judges, or other legal authorities, are also often
called upon to judge the propriety of procedures that have
been proposed, but not implemented (a recent lawsuit filed in
the Federal District Court in Honolulu has requested a
restraining order prohibiting the European Center for Nuclear
Research, or CERN, from proceeding with its work on the
Large Hadron Collider in order to prevent a considerable 
anticipated threat: that that collider could produce a tiny black
hole which could eat the Earth). With the goal of addressing
the role of fairness and outcomes for anticipated procedures as
well as procedures already implemented, in Study 4 authorities
and subordinates evaluated a procedure that had been pro-
posed to respond to a health threat to their workplace. 
Asking participants to evaluate a proposed procedure,
rather than one that has already been executed, allows one
additional limitation of Studies 1-3 to be addressed:
Participants in these first three studies read about a procedure
directed toward someone who was known to have violated a
law (Studies 1 and 2) or a community regulation (Study 3). It
is possible that the authorities in these studies were less con-
cerned with the target’s treatment because their offense ren-
dered them undeserving of respectful treatment. This deserv-
ingness view of procedural fairness has been supported in sev-
eral previous studies.21 If Study 4 were to obtain the same
authority-subordinate disparity observed in Studies 1-3, we
could be more confident that this effect is not limited to set-
tings in which someone has already committed an offense. 
Participants in Study 4 were restaurant managers and
restaurant employees in New York City. They were asked to
read a (fictitious) newspaper story, which reported on a recent
outbreak of Hepatitis A in a New York City restaurant, and
which described a procedure that had been proposed by city
health officials to minimize this threat. The newspaper stories
that participants read varied on two dimensions: (a) the
respectfulness and dignity of the proposed procedural inter-
vention, and (b) the magnitude of the threat the procedure was
intended to minimize. 
Participants in the respectful procedure condition read that
all restaurant employees would be required to sign a contract
agreeing to wash their hands after a visit to the restroom.
Participants in the disrespectful procedure condition read that a
manager or designated employee would be required to observe
all employees wash their hands after a visit to the restroom. 
Participants in the high-threat condition were told that the
disease was easily transmitted, that its symptoms were nausea
and jaundice, and that few restaurants that experienced an out-
break would be able to survive the resulting lawsuits.
Participants in the low-threat condition were told that trans-
mission was as unlikely as winning the lottery, that its symp-
toms were a mild headache and scratchy throat, and that law-
suits were unlikely to be successful. Participants then com-
pleted a questionnaire in which they indicated whether they
thought the procedure was fair and whether they approved of
its use.
The results of Study 4 again supported the prediction that
subordinates would be more influenced than authorities by
procedural concerns:  (a) perceived respectful treatment favor-
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ably influenced judgments of procedural fairness among
restaurant employees but not among restaurant managers, and
(b) perceived procedural fairness favorably influenced proce-
dural approval among restaurant employees, but not among
restaurant managers. Study 4 also supported the prediction
that authorities would be more influenced than subordinates
by outcome concerns: (c) perceived efficacy of the procedure
at reducing the Hepatitis threat had a more favorable effect on
procedural fairness among restaurant managers than among
restaurant employees, and (d) perceived efficacy of the proce-
dure had a favorable effect on procedural approval among
restaurant managers but not among restaurant employees. 
Therefore, despite numerous differences between Study 4
and the preceding studies (e.g., a shift from a legal context to
a business context, a shift from a retrospective evaluation in
which the procedure’s outcomes were known to a prospective
evaluation in which the procedure’s outcomes are unknown,
and a shift in the nature of the decision-maker and decision-
recipient roles), the findings of this study are consistent with
those of Studies 1-3. These results supported the hypothesis
that decision makers’ fairness judgments and procedural eval-
uations are shaped by outcome concerns, in contrast with deci-
sion recipients, whose fairness judgments and procedural eval-
uations are primarily influenced by treatment and relational
concerns. 
NEW DIRECTIONS IN PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
RESEARCH
In each of the studies described above, decision makers and
decision recipients adopted different criteria when judging
procedural fairness and procedural satisfaction. Decision 
recipients’ fairness judgments were driven primarily by con-
cerns about treatment—respectful treatment increased judg-
ments of procedural fairness and satisfaction—but decision
makers’ fairness judgments were driven primarily by concerns
about outcomes—effective threat reduction and beneficial out-
comes increased judgments of procedural fairness and satisfac-
tion. While these findings point to potentially important limi-
tations regarding the generalizability of some procedural fair-
ness effects, they also leave a fundamental question unan-
swered: Why does this disparity between decision makers and
decision recipients occur? In order to understand why decision
makers and decision recipients focus on different concerns
when judging procedural fairness and satisfaction, we will con-
sider the motivational assumptions of two important and influ-
ential psychological theories of fairness: the group value and
relational theories. We propose that while those motivational
assumptions are well suited to the situation confronting sub-
ordinates in their encounters with authorities, they might be
less well suited to the situation confronting authorities. 
PROTECTING THE GROUP
VS. ASCERTAINING STATUS
IN THE GROUP
According to the group
value22 and relational23 theo-
ries of procedural fairness,
respectful, trustworthy, and
unbiased procedures matter
because they communicate
information to people about
their standing in valued social
groups. These theories have
been consistently supported in studies of decision recipients
(who are highly motivated to be perceived as valued group
members) reflecting on their encounters with decision makers
(who are representatives of the group’s values). 
On the other hand, decision makers or authorities might be
less concerned with their group standing, since it is clearly
high, and instead more concerned with other issues. We sus-
pect that group authorities (including legal, as well as political
and organizational authorities) are likely to see protecting their
group’s welfare—a motivation that Stangor and Leary24 claim is
a primary human motivation—as a particularly important
responsibility. If so, when they encounter tension between pro-
tecting the group and treating group members with dignity and
respect, they might perceive a responsibility to attend to the
pragmatic rather than the relational concerns.
In one recent study, we investigated whether authorities’ 
relatively greater reliance on outcomes might be driven by
their relatively greater concern with protecting their group’s
welfare. In part because we think these processes are not lim-
ited to legal settings, and because we are interested in testing
these effects in diverse contexts, this study, like one of our
studies described above, relied on a vignette that described a
threat in an organizational context.25
Participants were instructed to imagine themselves as part
of a small company as they read a letter written by the CFO to
the company employees. The letter described a financial threat
to the company—the escalating cost of employee health insur-
ance—and indicated that the CFO was considering changes to
employees’ coverage to respond to this threat. In this experi-
ment, as in our previous ones, we systematically varied the
perspective participants adopted as they read the letter.
Participants who were randomly assigned to the decision-
maker role imagined themselves as the CFO who wrote the let-
ter, while participants who were randomly assigned to the deci-
sion-recipient role imagined themselves as a company
employee.
The letters themselves varied on two other dimensions: (a)
the magnitude of threat to the company posed by the escalating
costs, and (b) whether the CFO would permit the employee-to
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voice their opinion and con-
cerns about the proposed
changes before deciding on a
course of action (the opportu-
nity to “voice” one’s views
before a decision is made has
been clearly established as an
important procedural fairness
concern26 and has been linked
to perceptions of respectful
treatment27).
Participants in the high-
threat condition learned that
the increased costs were suffi-
ciently large to pose a threat
to the company’s survival,
whereas participants in the low-threat condition learned that
the increased costs were moderate and not a serious threat to
the company’s survival. Participants assigned to the high-voice
condition learned that that the CFO had decided to meet with
them before making his decision, whereas participants
assigned to the low-voice condition learned that the CFO had
decided not to meet with them before making his decision.
Because this study was designed to examine why these vari-
ables affect authorities and subordinates differently, our ques-
tions to participants included measures of three motives that
we expected might explain why authorities and subordinates
differ in their fairness and satisfaction judgments: protecting
the company’s welfare, demonstrating a concern for the welfare
of individual employees, and treating the employees with
respect. 
Several results of this study are noteworthy. First, the find-
ings of this study replicated those of Heuer et al.28 Among par-
ticipants who adopted the perspective of the CFO, there was
virtually no effect of voice on procedural fairness judgments,
but voice did affect the procedural fairness judgments of par-
ticipants in the role of the decision recipient, or employee.
Further, perceptions of procedural fairness more strongly
influenced the satisfaction of decision recipients than decision
makers.
Second, our prediction that a concern with protecting the
group’s welfare would be more important for decision makers
than decision recipients was supported for both procedural
fairness and satisfaction judgments. Thus, the findings of this
study extend the findings of Heuer et al29 by pointing to
authorities’ motivation to protect the group as at least one rea-
son for their greater concern with outcomes than with proce-
dures. 
Finally, two of our predictions were not supported. We pre-
dicted that the employees’ fairness and satisfaction judgments
would be more favorably influenced than the authorities’ judg-
ments by evidence that the authority had demonstrated a con-
cern for the welfare of individual employees and had been
respectful. In fact, concern for individuals’ welfare was more
important among the decision makers, and respect was equally
important for decision makers and decision recipients. While
additional research is necessary before we can speak authorita-
tively about these effects, we offer the following speculation:
We suspect that in this study, a concern for employee welfare
might have mattered more to the authorities because they do
not view this concern as a symbol of group standing (as it is
characterized by the group value theory), but rather as a prag-
matic concern for protecting the individual employee’s eco-
nomic welfare (protecting their job). We think this interpreta-
tion is consistent with the general pattern of findings through-
out our studies. Second, we propose that respect was equally
important for fairness and satisfaction among authorities and
subordinates because our analysis tested its influence while
controlling for the effect of the CFO’s course of action on the
company’s welfare. Essentially, we propose that once the
authority’s concern for protecting the group is controlled for,
there is no tension between treating employees respectfully
and protecting the group’s welfare; respectful treatment—a
communication that the subordinate is valued by the group—
is seen as desirable by both decision makers and decision
recipients. 
In sum, this study replicated and extended the findings of
Heuer et al,30 demonstrating that voice is less important for the
fairness judgments of authorities, and fairness is less important
for the satisfaction of authorities. But the findings of this study
also supported the prediction that authorities are more con-
cerned with instrumental motives related to protecting the
group and its members. It therefore appears that authorities are
focused on using procedures that they feel will protect the
group, rather than trying to communicate a relational message
to the group’s members. However, the relational message is not
unimportant to authorities—in essence, when concerns about
protecting the group are taken into account, there was no dif-
ference between authorities and subordinates in the impor-
tance they placed on respectful treatment. As long as the deci-
sion makers felt that they were protecting the decision recipi-
ents’ and the group’s welfare, they were as concerned as deci-
sion recipients were about decision recipients being treated
respectfully. 
The findings of this study indicate that increased concern
with group protection is one feature that differentiates decision
makers and decision recipients, and more strongly influences
the fairness and satisfaction judgments of decision makers.
This finding is important because it begins to illuminate why
decision makers and decision recipients reason differently
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about fairness, as they did in the Heuer et al31 studies. 
While this study has initiated an investigation of the moti-
vational underpinnings of an authority-subordinate disparity
in the role of outcomes and procedures for procedural fairness
and satisfaction, additional research on this topic is needed.
Numerous other candidates exist as causal mechanisms that
may help to account for the increased emphasis that decision
makers place on instrumental concerns, relative to decision
recipients. We briefly consider two potential candidates here. 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DECISION MAKERS AND
DECISION RECIPIENTS
Who Is Targeted by Procedures and Outcomes?
While we have focused on a distinction between authorities
and subordinates, we have so far neglected to consider the ways
in which this distinction is, in most natural settings, confounded
with several other distinctions—each of which are candidates
for explaining the phenomenon of different degrees of concern
with outcomes versus procedures. For example, in the studies
summarized above, as in much of the procedural fairness litera-
ture, the decision maker is typically the source, rather than the
target of the procedures under consideration. So when, in the
restaurant study described above, both managers and employees
evaluated a procedure targeted at the employee, the employee,
not the manager, was the one who was to be observed in the
restroom. Thus, restaurant managers evaluated a procedure tar-
geted at someone else, but employees evaluated a procedure tar-
geted at them. It is possible that people will place a greater
emphasis on respect when considering their own treatment,
rather than the treatment of someone else. This possibility
requires further investigation, so that we can establish whether
decision makers’ reduced concern with respect may result from
the fact that decision recipients are the targets of the treatment
or procedures being evaluated, whereas decision makers are not.
The studies described above do not tease apart the potentially
independent contributions of the authority-subordinate distinc-
tion from the source-target distinction.
In addition, decision recipients are also generally more
likely than decision makers to be affected by the outcome that
results from the procedure. In one study that examined peo-
ple’s reactions to a smoking ban, smokers were more sensitive
than non-smokers to the procedures that were used to imple-
ment that new policy.32 The same distinction might matter as
judges interact with litigants—by virtue of the fact that most of
the procedures employed by the court will produce outcomes
of considerably greater consequence to the litigants than the
judges, the litigants might be more sensitive to procedural sub-
tleties. For the purposes of gaining a better understanding of
the disparate reactions to procedures and outcomes we have
described above, this distinction should also be investigated
independently of the authority-subordinate distinction and the
source-target distinction. 
The Macroscopic Perspective 
So far, we have emphasized
the extent to which most of
the procedural fairness
research has focused on the
subordinates in their encoun-
ters with authorities. Recently,
other researchers have
pointed to another potentially
important variable that has
received relatively little atten-
tion, and that might also play
a role in producing some of
the effects we have obtained
in our own studies. Most of the existing fairness research asks
participants to evaluate procedures directed at individuals
(e.g., encounters between a judge and a litigant, or between a
police officer and a civilian, or a manager and an employee).
Recently, some studies have begun to investigate fairness rea-
soning in settings in which procedures are directed at groups
of people.  Tyler and colleagues33 point out that some proce-
dures can involve a macroscopic perspective, and Leung, Tong,
and Lind34 investigated whether respectful treatment, so well-
established as a critical fairness concern when procedures are
directed at individuals, holds for policy and social decisions
that are primarily concerned with collective rather than with
individual outcomes. In a series of surveys that asked partici-
pants about large-scale social issues (asylum seekers, an eco-
nomic intervention, and accountability of principal govern-
ment officials), Leung et al., showed that, contrary to findings
usually seen with individual-level decisions in procedural fair-
ness studies, collective outcome favorability was more impor-
tant than procedural fairness in influencing participants’
endorsements of policy decisions.35
In natural settings, decision makers, such as judges, admin-
ister dispute resolution procedures regularly, and may thus be
exposed to the wider implications of a procedure’s outcome for
many individuals, across many different scenarios, often across
long periods of time. It therefore appears that, in naturalistic
settings, group-level and societal-level concerns may be more
salient for decision makers, rather than decision recipients. It
is therefore plausible that decision makers and decision 
recipients differ in their focus, with decision makers taking
this macroscopic perspective, while individual concerns are
more salient for decision recipients. As noted above, decision
recipients, typically of lower or less secure status than decision
makers, are highly motivated to seek out information about
their status in social groups when interacting with authorities.
According to the group value36 and relational37 models of pro-
cedural fairness, treatment is central to fairness reasoning
because it conveys this important relational information. In
It is possible that
people will place a
greater emphasis
on respect when 
considering their
own treatment,
rather than the
treatment of 
someone else.
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addition, Fairness Heuristic Theory38 posits that fair treatment
is an indication that the authority is trustworthy and that com-
plying with their direction will not lead to exploitation. These
concerns about group status and exploitation may be ones that
are not shared by authorities or decision makers, and above,
we provide evidence that authorities are more focused on
group protection than are decision recipients when evaluating
procedures.39
In addition to affecting the information that people are
motivated to seek out, decision-making status may also change
the way that information about a scenario is processed. Smith
and Trope conducted an experiment in which they primed par-
ticipants for either high or low power, and found that those
primed for high power engaged in more abstract, less detailed
processing of stimuli than did those primed for low power, and
did so even when this resulted in worse performance on a
task.40 Their findings indicate that high power leads people to
view stimuli in a different way, focusing on gist and “big pic-
ture” trends rather than details, and categorizing events
broadly. If those with legal decision authority are more focused
on group-level and societal-level concerns than are decision
recipients, this may influence the way that they process infor-
mation, as well as the information that they attend to, when
evaluating a legal procedure. In line with the findings of Leung
et al,41 this group-level focus may result in an emphasis on col-
lective outcome favorability when evaluating procedures. 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Thus far, the research suggests that decision makers are less
affected by procedural concerns than are decision recipients.
In three of four studies conducted by Heuer et al,42 there was
no effect of respectful or dignified treatment on the procedural
fairness judgments of the authorities—this effect was observed
only among the subordinates. Recently, we have begun to
investigate why this might be the case, and findings indicate
that decision makers’ fairness judgments are shaped by con-
cern for group protection to a greater extent than are those of
decision recipients. However, there are a number of other fac-
tors that might lead to the discrepancy between decision mak-
ers and decision recipients, and further research is required to
identify the priorities that occupy the focus of decision mak-
ers, and lead them to emphasize instrumental concerns in their
fairness judgments, when decision recipients are clearly
focused on treatment. 
An important point to note in this work is its demonstration
that the applicability of procedural fairness research is more
nuanced than has previously been acknowledged. While a
number of procedural fairness theorists have argued that the
meaning of fairness changes across situations,43 and others
have suggested that outcome concerns and relational concerns
can be differentially important in different contexts,44 none of
these perspectives have explored the contrast between decision
makers and decision recipients. The recognition that decision
makers’ fairness judgments operate differently to those of deci-
sion recipients opens new avenues for inquiry in the proce-
dural fairness literature, and calls for better understanding of
the psychological underpinnings of fairness reasoning among
decision makers, including judges. 
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Burke and Leben’s1 White Paper on procedural justice andwhat judges can do to enhance it in the courtroom is animportant work for several reasons, two of which espe-
cially stand out. First, their paper illustrates how effectively
laboratory-based social-science research (often referred to as
basic research) and more naturalistic studies performed in real-
world contexts (often referred to as applied research) can be
combined in addressing public policy matters.2 Second, it con-
tains practical, feasible, and specific recommendations for
improving courtroom practice based on that research. We
believe that much goodwill come from Burke and Leben’s call-
ing judges’ attention to issues of procedural fairness. The pur-
pose of this commentary is not to dispute their claims regard-
ing procedural justice, but rather to discuss the related concept
of distributive justice and its implications for the courts.3
THE MANY FLAVORS OF JUSTICE
At times it seems like the field of justice research resembles
the ice cream market: Every vendor has an array of flavors, and
no one can agree on how many flavors there are or ought to be.
One encounters arguments for procedural justice, distributive
justice, corrective justice, interactional justice, restorative jus-
tice, therapeutic justice, and retributive justice, among others.4
They differ in terms of their antecedents, consequences, phe-
nomenological characteristics, motives, and situations in
which they arise; what they share is an emphasis on what is
more or less fair in some aspect or arena of interpersonal rela-
tions. Amidst this mélange of flavors, the ones with the great-
est staying power—to belabor the metaphor, the chocolate and
vanilla of the justice world—are procedural and distributive
justice.
As Burke and Leben describe, procedural justice concerns
whether the processes used to arrive at some outcome are fair,
whereas distributive justice concerns whether the outcome
itself is fair (i.e., the actual distribution of rewards, punish-
ments, or some resource). Due to the groundbreaking work
starting in the early 1980s by Tyler, Lind, Thibaut, Walker, and
others, procedural concerns have acquired increasing impor-
tance in both scientific investigation and practical contexts
(e.g., business, law enforcement)—and deservedly so.5 An
abundance of research has demonstrated that perceptions of
procedural and distributive justice are distinct psychological
constructs.6 It is precisely because of this separation between
them that individuals are more accepting of unfavorable out-
comes when procedural fairness is high, and conversely, that
they are relatively dissatisfied with favorable outcomes when
procedural fairness is low. From these observations flow, quite
logically, Burke and Leben’s recommendations for enhancing
procedural justice in the courtroom. The need to do so seems
obvious, given the high frequency of unfavorable outcomes for
someone involved: In civil disputes, at least one litigant (and
potentially both) is going to leave unhappy; in criminal cases,
convictions are necessarily unfavorable, and even acquittals
and relatively lenient sentences can carry unpleasant conse-
quences (e.g., the stigma of having been charged with and
prosecuted for a crime).
Thus, there is no denying the importance of procedural fair-
ness in the court system; yet the growing emphasis on proce-
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dural justice can obscure the equally important issue of dis-
tributive justice. The concern with how best to allocate
resources or outcomes has a long history, dating back at least
as far as Aristotle,7 and modern work on distributive justice—
from both theoretical and experimental perspectives—contin-
ues unabated.8 Without denying the benefits to be gained from
improving procedural justice, one could even argue that con-
cerns about distributive justice should be paramount.
Questions about process are, in a sense, contingent on ques-
tions about outcome. Unless some outcome occurs, the proce-
dures used to arrive at that outcome are moot.9 Thus, we
should not lose sight of what courts can do to enhance per-
ceptions of distributive fairness, in addition to enhancing per-
ceptions of procedural fairness.
OUTCOME VERSUS PROCESS IN THE COURTS
The outcomes that occur to citizens from actions by the jus-
tice system can be, and often are, life altering: loss of liberty,
life, or reputation; compelled or prohibited behaviors; transfer
of substantial sums of money. One can construe these out-
comes as a distribution of punishment and/or rewards to the
affected parties. Courtroom procedures, for their part, are for-
eign and time-consuming at best, and terrifying at worst. In
light of the high stakes, it would seem to be a “no-brainer” for
judges and other court personnel to make the procedures as
fair and “user-friendly” as possible, for litigants as well as other
affected parties (e.g., witnesses, jurors).10 Significantly, judges
have more leeway in the procedures they use than in the out-
comes they deliver, which are constrained by evidentiary
guidelines, legal precedent, sentencing guidelines, and the
spectre of appellate review, among other factors.
Perhaps because of these constraints, “judges focus on the
fairness of case outcomes instead of the process.”11 The prob-
lem here is not that judges focus on outcomes more than
processes, but that they focus on outcomes largely to the exclu-
sion of processes. A simple thought experiment illustrates the
desirability of focusing on outcomes more than processes.
Suppose that Defendant A and Defendant B have both been
charged with first-degree murder, a crime that they did not
commit. They are tried separately, in the same courtroom and
with the same evidence. In Defendant A’s trial, he is not
allowed to testify, the judge shows clear favoritism to the pros-
ecutor, and court personnel treat A in a rude and condescend-
ing manner. Nonetheless, the jury acquits. In Defendant B’s
trial, he is allowed to address
the court, the judge is scrupu-
lously impartial, and court per-
sonnel are extremely solicitous
and respectful. Nonetheless,
the jury convicts. Clearly, the
process in B’s trial is more fair,
and anyone would prefer the B
court’s procedures. But on the
whole (taking distributive and
procedural concerns together),
which situation is better?
Would you rather be Defendant A or Defendant B? A’s situation
seems better from a societal perspective, because the court
reached the right outcome, albeit by suboptimal procedures.
Moreover, most, if not all, people would choose to be
Defendant A rather than Defendant B. In this situation, out-
come trumps process.
Now suppose the hypothetical is the same, except that A
and B did, in fact, commit the crime. What then? Again, most,
if not all, people would choose to trade places with Defendant
A, even though, from a societal perspective, a murderer has
been set free. The manner of B’s trial might provide him some
consolation, but it is likely to offer him only small comfort. Of
course, in more ambiguous cases, outcome would not neces-
sarily trump process; and as Burke and Leben describe, a fair
process can go a long way toward softening a harsh outcome.
Similarly, an unfair process can make a positive outcome less
satisfying. But pushed to the extremes, outcome matters more
than process.
PRINCIPLES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
As mentioned above, judges’ allocation of outcomes is con-
strained by a variety of factors. Nonetheless, except where
mandatory sentencing guidelines apply, criminal judges retain
a fair degree of discretion, and civil judges also have consider-
able flexibility in fashioning a remedy, in terms of both the type
of remedy (e.g., monetary vs. other restitution) and the
amount. In allocating some resource, decision makers can rely
on several different principles of distributive justice. When
judges mete out punishment (in criminal cases) or redistribute
money (in civil cases), it behooves them to be sensitive to the
various principles that could be applied, and the different goals
that those principles serve.
The concern with
how best to 
allocate resources
or outcomes has 
a long history,
dating back at
least as far as
Aristotle....
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where less productive employees share directly in their coworkers’
increased productivity.
16. In ordinary discourse, people are often tempted to say that the
family of eight deserves more, but that conflates the principle of
need with the principle of merit, or desert (discussed infra). For
present purposes, the family of eight has done nothing to make
themselves more “deserving,” beyond having produced more
mouths in need of feeding.
17. See generally RAWLS, supra note 8, at 73-74.
18. Justice preferences can be quite different in non-capitalist soci-
eties; see, e.g., Duane F. Alwin et al., Comparative Referential
Structures, System Legitimacy, and Justice Sentiments: An
International Comparison, in SOCIAL JUSTICE AND POLITICAL CHANGE
109  (James R. Kluegel et al. eds., 1995).
19. E.g., Michelbach et al., supra note 8, Gregory Mitchell et al.,
Judgments of Social Justice: Compromises between Equality and
Efficiency, 65 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 629 (1993); Scott et al., supra
note 7.
20. Scott et al., supra note 7, at 764; see also FROHLICH & OPPENHEIMER,
supra note 8; MILLER, supra note 4; Michelbach et al., supra note
8; Mitchell et al., supra note 19.
Theoretical and experimen-
tal research on distributive jus-
tice has identified a number of
distinct principles that people
rely on in making (or in
expressing preferences for)
allocation decisions. Different
researchers use slightly differ-
ent taxonomies, but the most
commonly cited principles are
equality, efficiency, need, and
merit (also referred to as desert
or proportionality).12 Equality
dictates that all affected parties
receive the same allocation. So, for example, all workers
receive the same raise, all families on welfare receive the same
amount of food stamps, and so forth. Strict mandatory sen-
tencing is an example of the equality principle in criminal jus-
tice.13 Perhaps the best example of equality in civil contexts is
workers compensation, by which injured parties receive com-
pensation according to a predetermined schedule. In such a
system, the same injury is always worth the same amount,
regardless of individual circumstances.14
Departures from equality reflect an adherence to other jus-
tice principles. For example, a concern with efficiency means
that aggregate productivity can be increased by awarding some
individuals more of a resource than others. It might make
sense to award higher raises to more senior, more productive
employees than to less productive ones, if doing so makes
them still more productive, and the company as a whole bene-
fits.15 The goal of general deterrence in legal contexts can be
explained in terms of efficiency. One can justify punishing
some defendants—either criminally or civilly—more severely
than others, for comparable actions, if doing so would make
society as a whole function better in some way. For example, it
might make sense to force a financially robust product manu-
facturer to pay more in damages for a defective product than a
less solvent manufacturer, if requiring equal payment would
force the less solvent company out of business, thereby losing
other valuable products and services that it might provide.
Inequality can also be justified by a disparity in need. In the
food stamp example given above, one could argue that a fam-
ily of eight should receive more aid than a family of four
because the family of eight has greater needs.16 Need plays an
important role in the resolution of legal disputes, especially in
civil cases. So, for example, if the sole breadwinner in the fam-
ily of eight were incapacitated due to another’s negligence, he
or she would typically recover greater damages than the sole
breadwinner in the family of four (all else being equal).
Finally, the distribution of resources can vary according to
merit, in which some individuals deserve more/less than others.
Multifarious factors contribute to merit, subsuming things that
are both mostly innate (e.g., intelligence, beauty) and those
that are largely acquired (e.g., wealth, prestige).17 Importantly,
there is also a strong behavioral component, in terms of how
much the individual’s own actions have helped generate par-
ticular outcomes. Merit-based distribution systems are wide-
spread in capitalist societies;18 consider, for example, that most
businesses, especially in the private sector, determine salary
based primarily on an employee’s individual efforts, productiv-
ity, and success. Experimental research on distributive justice
supports the centrality of concerns about merit, especially in
terms of income distribution.19 It is also a cardinal concern in
both civil and criminal law, where it is often referred to as pro-
portionality. Thus, a civil litigant’s penalty/reward is often
explicitly tied to his or her contribution to the outcome, as in
applying comparative negligence or market share liability.
Similarly, criminal punishment is tied closely to a defendant’s
culpability (i.e., desert), and a variety of aggravating or miti-
gating factors can raise or lower the punishment.
It is clear from this brief overview that multiple distributive
justice principles are relevant to both the criminal and civil
justice systems. The choice is not simply between one or
another principle, as multiple principles can, and do, apply
simultaneously. Research on allocation preferences has shown
that individuals take a pluralistic approach and rely on multi-
ple principles in a “complex yet structured” manner.20
Although these principles lurk beneath the surface of judi-
cial decision making, they are rarely explicit. A rare instance
where a judge-like arbiter did explicitly consider which dis-
tributive norms were most appropriate occurred in the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, administered by
Special Master Kenneth Feinberg.21 The statute that enabled
the Fund22 required a calculation of each claimant’s presumed
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written from a social justice perspective. The following sources are
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2001 (2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/final_report.pdf.;
After Disaster: The September 11th Compensation Fund and the
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APPLICATIONS 259, 259-278 (Barbara A. Mellers & Jonathan Baron
eds., 1993).
25. Elster, Justice and Allocation, supra note 24, at 259.
26. See generally Michelbach et al., supra note 8; Scott et al., supra
note 7; Peter B. Wood & David C. May, Racial Differences in
Perceptions of the Severity of Sanctions: A Comparison of Prison with
Alternatives, 20 JUST. Q. 605 (2003).
27. See, e.g., David B. Rottman & Alan J. Tomkins, Public Trust and
Confidence in the Courts: What Public Opinion Surveys Mean to
Judges, 36 CT. REV. 24 (1999); DAVID B. ROTTMAN ET AL.,
PERCEPTIONS OF THE COURTS IN YOUR COMMUNITY: THE INFLUENCE OF
EXPERIENCE, RACE AND ETHNICITY: FINAL REPORT (National Center
for State Courts, 2003).
28. Wood & May, supra note 26, at 605-606.
29. M. SOMJEN FRAZER, THE IMPACT OF THE COMMUNITY COURT MODEL IN
DEFENDANT PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS: A CASE STUDY AT THE RED
HOOK COMMUNITY JUSTICE CENTER (2006), available at
http://courtinnovation.org/_uploads/documents/Procedural_Fairn
ess.pdf. 
30. John L. Miller, Peter H. Rossi & Jon E. Simpson, Perceptions of
Justice: Race and Gender Differences in Judgments of Appropriate
Prison Sentences, 20 L. & SOC’Y REV. 313 (1986).
31. Michelbach et al., supra note 8 at 530, 536.
economic loss based on a variety of factors (e.g., age, income),
thereby relying primarily on principles of efficiency and merit.
However, Feinberg implemented an equality norm for non-
economic loss, awarding $250,000 per victim and $100,000
per spouse and dependent child. Many claimants, and Special
Master Feinberg himself, thought the Fund should have
adhered to a principle of equality for all compensation.23 As we
discuss below, an awareness of these principles can inform
judicial performance.
Most experimental research has focused on the distribution
(or redistribution) of desirable resources (i.e., goods) rather
than the distribution of undesirable commodities, or bads. In
the context of the justice system, civil cases are concerned
mainly with the redistribution of a good (money), while crim-
inal cases are concerned mainly with the distribution of a bad
(punishment). This is an important distinction, as several the-
orists have argued that different distributive norms should pre-
dominate in allocating different types of goods or in allocating
the same good in different contexts.24 For example, Elster con-
tends that the principle of need should be central in allocating
organs for transplantation, whereas merit should prevail in
admitting students to college.25 Thus, the same principles
might reasonably not apply in civil versus criminal cases, or
even for different types of cases within each system (e.g.,
crimes against persons vs. crimes against property).
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN PERCEPTIONS OF
DISTRIBUTIVE FAIRNESS
The experimental literature on distributive justice shows
that people’s preferences differ depending on a number of
demographic characteristics, such as race/ethnicity, gender,
nationality, and socioeconomic status.26 As suggested by Burke
and Leben, minorities differ in their approval ratings of the
court system.27 These perceptions are based not only on the
way in which minority group members are treated by the jus-
tice system, but also the prob-
ability of an unfair outcome.
The threat of “worse results” is
most prominent for African-
Americans, who account for
almost half of the incarcerated
population and represent 41%
percent of the population on
death row.28 In general,
African-American citizens
have lower opinions of the
criminal justice system and are
less confident than others in
the neutrality and legitimacy
of the courts.29
In a study by Miller and colleagues, the researchers found
that black and white men and women differed in their recom-
mended criminal sanctions for convicted offenders.30 Whereas
blacks tended to ascribe to a justice philosophy that considered
the individual offender, whites were more likely to employ a
justice philosophy that focused on meting out punishment
that was proportionate in severity to crime seriousness. In
other words, whites’ judgments were more centered on char-
acteristics of the offense (i.e., the seriousness of the crime),
whereas blacks’ judgments were more centered on the social
characteristics of the offender. Research on justice preferences
in non-legal contexts has similarly found that individuals of
different races favor different justice principles. Specifically,
minorities are more skeptical than whites about the relation-
ship between merit and outcomes, and they are correspond-
ingly less sensitive to variations in merit.31
One’s perceptions of distributive justice outcomes will also
vary as a function of socioeconomic status, which is correlated
with race in the U.S. As blacks are considered, on average, to
be closer to crime than whites (i.e., more likely to be victim-
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ized, arrested, and incarcer-
ated), one’s proximity to the
criminal justice system clearly
influences an individual’s view
of appropriate penal sanc-
tion.32 Research shows a dif-
ference in the fairness of out-
come ratings between whites
and affluent blacks33 and also
between whites and low-
income blacks.34 As one might
conclude, race and socioeco-
nomic status are intimately
tied and pose a “double threat”
for minority offenders. 
Race is not the only demographic variable that influences
attitudes toward the criminal justice system. Men and women
have also been found to vary in their views toward crime and
correctional policies.35 Whereas men are more likely to sup-
port capital punishment as a means for corrective action,
women tend to focus more on the individual and show greater
support for rehabilitative efforts for criminal offenders. Both
agree that the government should punish and hold convicted
criminals accountable, but women favor a standard of care that
provides assistance to meet the needs of offenders, suggesting
that their goals in distributing penalties are different from
men’s.36
This attitudinal difference between men and women in rec-
ommendations for legal outcomes is also prominent in other
domains. For example, Sweeney and McFarlin found gender
differences in men’s and women’s reliance on distributive or
procedural justice in expressing job satisfaction.37 For women,
fair processes were more important in their job satisfaction
evaluations, lending to a procedural justice philosophy.
Satisfaction for men, however, was more outcome-oriented
and therefore based more on an assessment of distributive fair-
ness.38 Women show a stronger preference for equality than
men, and they are also more sensitive to variations in merit and
need.39 Scott and colleagues speculate that women’s greater
sensitivity to factors such as merit and need might reflect more
general gender differences in moral reasoning, in particular a
greater sensitivity among women to contextual features.40
There is reason to suppose that gender differences in distribu-
tive justice may be applied to other contexts, such as legal dis-
pute resolution.
Overall, these findings on individual differences suggest
two things. First, litigants will have different expectations and
preferences about what sorts of outcomes are most fair,
depending on their demographic characteristics. Although
there are criminal and civil codes, sentencing practices, and
informal norms that serve to ensure fair treatment under the
law, one person’s notion of what is fair is not necessarily the
same as another’s. Second, judges who come from different
backgrounds will have a different sense of what constitutes a
fair and just outcome. 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Burke and Leben conclude their article by offering a num-
ber of recommendations for change. Specifically, they ask:
“What can an individual judge, individual court, court admin-
istrators, researchers, judicial educators, and court leaders do
to enhance procedural fairness?” We have no quarrel with their
recommendations, the vast majority of which are reasonable,
feasible, inexpensive, and likely to accomplish their desired
aim. We do not make analogous recommendations for what
judges and courts can do to enhance distributive fairness;41
rather, in this concluding section we highlight the importance
of distributive justice with the goal of raising awareness of the
factors that can influence perceived outcome fairness.
A hallmark characteristic of both the criminal and civil jus-
tice systems is that only one side wins; and often both sides
walk away disappointed.42 Criminal convictions are “wins” for
the prosecution (and are touted as such in election campaigns)
and “losses” for defendants; whereas most civil cases are essen-
tially zero-sum games, with one party’s losses mirroring the
opposing party’s gains. Thus, there would seem to be little
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43. See, e.g., Brian H. Bornstein, Judges vs. Juries, 43 CT. REV. 56
(2006).
doubt that aspirations for, and satisfaction with, particular out-
comes reign supreme in litigants’ minds. Distributive justice
might not be litigants’ favorite justice flavor, but it is the flavor
they care about the most. It is therefore the flavor that judges
should care about the most as well.
Procedures of the utmost fairness do not necessarily mean
that litigants will readily accept a court’s outcome or decision.
Hence it is important for legal advisors, professionals, and
judges to be willing to explain outcomes and to express a will-
ingness to answer litigants’ questions, particularly if an out-
come is undesirable or unexpected. As mentioned in the indi-
vidual differences section, supra, it is important further for
legal professionals to recognize that litigants are not cookie-
cutter replicas. What makes people different will also influence
how they approach, interpret, and understand the law. This
will help to ensure that litigants have a better understanding of
their outcomes and why those particular outcomes were
reached, which would potentially lead to greater satisfaction
with the justice system and fewer appeals. 
Burke and Leben also emphasize the importance of social
science research in helping legal professionals understand how
the general population interprets fairness in the legal system.
We support this proposition with respect to distributive, as
well as procedural fairness. We similarly recommend that legal
professionals not only educate themselves by becoming famil-
iar with the existing literature, but also support ongoing
research. There are two ways in which judges can facilitate this
goal. First, they can allow researchers to survey litigants about
their perception of legal outcomes as well as legal procedures.
Second, they can serve as research participants themselves.
Social scientists who conduct research on the legal system
know much less about how judges make decisions than they
do about how juries (and especially individual jurors) make
decisions. This state of affairs exists for a number of reasons,
but primarily because compared to the average juror (or mock
juror), judges are fewer, busier, harder to obtain access to, and
less swayed by offers of token compensation for participating
in research studies.
As fact finders, judges and juries are similar in many
respects, yet they differ in subtle ways as well.43 Judges differ
from jurors in terms of their training, background, legal
knowledge, and experience with similar cases; evidentiary
rules also mean that judges might make decisions on slightly
different constellations of facts than juries. Moreover, precisely
because of their experience and training, judges are much
more likely than jurors to have reflected on the nature of their
task and to have formulated principles to which they adhere in
adjudicating the cases before them. Interviews with judges, as
well as judge-jury comparisons, could shed a great deal of light
on the justice principles that legal fact finders rely on in deter-
mining trial outcomes. Reflection by judges on the principles
and goals that they use, often unconsciously, in reaching ver-
dicts would produce a more thoughtful and better informed
judiciary.
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Judges Kevin Burke and Steve Leben, in ProceduralFairness: A Key Ingredient in Public Satisfaction,1 have pro-duced a most impressive White Paper.  It is handy, brief,
crisp, readable, and immensely practical. 
The document draws on, and makes most accessible, the
research on procedural justice, demonstrating convincingly
the importance of judges understanding and implementing in
their courtrooms concepts such as “voice” and “respect.”
Judges Burke and Leben claim procedural justice to be “the”
critical element in public trust and confidence regarding the
court system. They note, too, the role procedural fairness
likely plays in increased compliance with court orders and
even in reduced recidivism.
The latter contention—regarding compliance and reduced
recidivism—is an area where the literature of procedural jus-
tice spills over substantially into the related and indeed over-
lapping area of therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ).  The present
essay argues that therapeutic jurisprudence is “the” critical
element in how courts can reduce re-offending,2 and urges
that judges should similarly familiarize themselves with that
area, a process that, like the introduction to procedural fair-
ness, can also begin by judges perusing a few key sources and
websites.3
In fact, there is a perfect single-source TJ counterpart to,
and companion for, the procedural fairness White Paper.  In
the beginning of their White Paper, Judges Burke and Leben
note that the American Judges Association has about 150
members in Canada and that “although we make no recom-
mendations regarding the courts of Canada, we believe that the
baseline social-science research upon which this paper is based
would also be applicable there, given the similarities between
the legal systems of these two countries.”4 As it turns out, the
TJ companion to which I am referring is a handy, brief (about
50 pages), crisp, readable and immensely practical judicial
manual, available online,5 produced in 2005 by the National
Judicial Institute of Canada (and spearheaded by Justice Paul
Bentley of the Toronto Drug Treatment Court), and titled
Judging for the 21st Century: A Problem-Solving Approach.6
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
TJ’s view of the law as a potential therapeutic agent—and of
law as one of the helping/healing professions—leads it to
search for promising developments in the behavioral sciences
and to think creatively about how those developments might
be imported into the legal system without offending due
process and related justice goals.  Accordingly, TJ has prof-
itably employed insights regarding relapse prevention plan-
ning, health care compliance, and the reinforcing of law-abid-
ing behavior.7
Naturally, procedural justice has been high on TJ’s list of
highly pertinent branches of social-science inquiry.  This is no
wonder, given the relationship and close connection between
procedural fairness and therapeutic consequences.  
In the area of civil commitment, for example, procedural
fairness at a commitment hearing is likely to increase a respon-
dent’s acceptance of a judicial order of commitment as well as
a patient’s cooperativeness with treatment professionals and
with the taking of recommended medications.8 In the criminal
law context, procedural fairness factors also affect an offender’s
readiness for rehabilitation, and unfairness may indeed lead to
a “defiance” effect and increased offending.9
A.  BEYOND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
In criminal law matters, therefore, TJ often draws heavily on
the psychology of procedural justice.  But it then typically
draws on some other psychological principles to maximize the
rehabilitative clout of a recommendation.  TJ work on enhanc-
ing compliance with probation conditions is illustrative.  The
TJ literature draws on procedural fairness principles in recom-
mending giving an offender voice in the appropriateness of
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proposed conditions, in the judge clearly explaining to the
offender the terms of release, in conceptualizing probation as a
type of bilateral behavioral contract rather than a unilateral
judicial fiat.10
But the TJ recommendation of having agreed-upon family
members present at the hearing who are aware of the release
conditions is drawn from an important psychological compli-
ance principle that transcends the area of procedural justice.11
So is the recommendation that compliance is enhanced if the
offender is asked to respond to mild counterarguments about
the likelihood of his or her compliance.12 And so too is the
relapse prevention planning recommendation that the offender
be asked to think about the chain-of-events that led to past
offending behavior, to ascertain situations that put the offender
at high-risk, and to suggest how such high-risk situations can
best be avoided in the future.13
The point, of course, is that procedural fairness takes us a
good distance—especially regarding public perception and sat-
isfaction with the court system—but it needs to be combined
with TJ if judges are to realize their potential in enhancing
compliance and reducing re-offending.  The Canadian TJ judi-
cial manual does all this and more.
B.  THE CANADIAN TJ MANUAL AND MORE
In fact, the Canadian manual even adds some meat to the
bones of the very core topics of the White Paper.  For example,
regarding respectful behavior, the TJ manual suggests that
judges “refer to defendants as ‘sir’ or ma’am, or by title and
name (e.g., Mr. Smith; Ms. Jones), rather than by first name,
the word ‘defendant’, or by case number.”14 And, in a recom-
mendation clearly relevant to the White Paper’s concern
regarding minority groups and non-native English speakers,
the TJ manual urges judges to “pronounce names correctly;
when in doubt, ask court participants for guidance in pro-
nouncing names.”15
In discussing needed research, the White Paper notes that
“while there is a lot of research at the trial-court level on the
issue of procedural fairness, there is little research about how
the concept applies at the appellate level.  This could be an
important area for additional thought and research.”16
Additional thought and research is indeed needed, but TJ
has already made some substantial strides in the appellate
arena, including an entire special issue of the Seattle University
Law Review dedicated to it.17 The Canadian TJ manual also
devotes some space to the matter, including a suggestion about
the importance of appellate courts in their opinions “providing
the appellant with the assurance that his or her story was heard
and the salient facts considered by the court.”18 And other TJ
writing even takes appellate
opinion writing to the level of
recommendations for continu-
ing judicial education.  Drawing
on the implications of Nathalie
Des Rosiers’s important 2000
article in Court Review,19 I once
noted that one of her TJ propos-
als is for opinion writing to take the form of a “letter to the
loser,” and
if past opinions are read through this prism, we are
likely to find admirable, abominable, and average
illustrations.  It may be useful to collect, clarify, and
use these illustrations in educational programs for
judges, lawyers, and law students.20
There is also TJ writing regarding the relationship between
sensitively written appellate opinions and the tricky and
nuanced issue of how a defense lawyer might go about explain-
ing an appellate affirmance to a client—and in a way that
shows the client that the lawyer was indeed a vigorous advo-
cate but that the unsuccessful client has been provided by the
court with voice and validation.21
C. CRAFTING STATEMENTS OF REASONS IN
SENTENCING
Mostly, of course, both procedural fairness and TJ in the
criminal context will involve trial-level rather than appellate
pronouncements and explorations.  Not surprisingly, there-
fore, there is also TJ work speaking to the drafting of state-
ments of reason in the sentencing sphere, and the role of coun-
sel in explaining those decisions and reasons.22 Even when
imposing incarcerative penalties, judges have been urged to
condemn the act rather than the actor and to search for and
comment on any offender strengths that might be used as
building blocks in shaping a future with hope.23 Training of
judges in the drafting of statements of reasons may be espe-
cially relevant in jurisdictions—like some federal circuits24—
where courts are required to address directly defense sentenc-
ing arguments.  How rejected defense arguments are responded
to can, in TJ terms, be either helpful or devastating to defen-
dants and their responsiveness to rehabilitative efforts.  If
courts follow the traditional approach of showing why the gov-
ernment should surely win, why the defense arguments are
stretches—in other words, if they write such opinions as con-
gratulatory “letters to the winner”—the practical results could
be quite negative.  But if they follow the Des Rosers advice of
crafting a sensitive “letter to the loser” (but always remaining
TJ has already
made some 
substantial
strides in the
appellate arena...
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27. PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING
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30. U.S. v. Jeross, No. 06-2257 (6th Cir. April 4, 2008) (Merritt, J.,
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mindful of the victim), the
stage may be set for a more
positive long-term outcome.
D. VOICE NOT AFFECTING
THE LITIGANT’S CASE
TJ, then, can roost very well
with procedural fairness.
Consider one final issue from
the White Paper.  Judges Burke
and Leben note the well-estab-
lished but curious finding that
litigants feel good about hav-
ing voice even in a post-deci-
sion context, where their voice
cannot in any way influence
the decision.  Still, in policy terms, the authors agreed, for eth-
ical reasons, that “litigants should not be granted an arbitrary
voice in the courtroom merely to pacify this need to speak and
participate.”25
But TJ has tackled a similar problem in the context of vic-
tim participation in the criminal process.  A victim often par-
ticipates by preparing a Victim Impact Statement.  But a recent
TJ suggestion proposes also a Legal System Victim Impact
Statement (LSVIS), where a victim after-the-fact discusses the
process from the time of victimization until after the trial:
treatment by the police, treatment during trial, etc.  
Of course, a LSVIS cannot have any impact in the victim’s
case itself.  But its preparation can satisfy a victim’s need for
voice and the statement can, with proper distribution/dissemi-
nation, be useful in improving the system for future cases.  So
long as the victim is fully aware that the statement solicited can
have no impact on his or her own case, the ethical issue evap-
orates, the need for voice is satisfied, and the system can per-
haps be improved for future cases and for the treatment of
future victims.26
CONCLUSION
In recent years, TJ has “partnered” with related approaches,
such as preventive law and with problem-solving courts, espe-
cially drug treatment courts.  In the case of preventive law, TJ
gave preventive law an ethic of care and a rich interdisciplinary
approach, and preventive law gave TJ practical office proce-
dures, such as the “legal checkup,” whereby lawyers could
work with clients to apply the relevant law therapeutically.27
In the case of drug treatment courts, those courts offered TJ
actual laboratories with practical procedures to examine
through a TJ lens, and TJ offered drug treatment courts a num-
ber of principles or “instrumental prescriptions” that may
enhance their functioning.28
In the case of procedural justice, TJ has long looked to the
procedural fairness literature to improve the therapeutic func-
tioning of the law.  Now, procedural fairness should look to TJ
and develop a relationship that is a truly two-way street.
The need for a robust reciprocal relationship is actually an
urgent one.  One need only consider the chilling statistics of
the recently released Pew Report,29 showing 1 in 100 U.S.
adults (and numbers much, much higher for persons of color)
behind bars, placing the U.S. in first place worldwide in incar-
cerating its population, to know we are in desperate need of all
sensible solutions.  We might expect the federal criminal jus-
tice system to offer some leadership.  But consider Judge
Merritt’s lament in his recent dissent in the Sixth Circuit case
of U.S. v. Jeross:
This is another drug case in which our system
of criminal law has imprisoned for many years two
more lives and torn up two more families by
grossly excessive sentences imposed in the “War
on Drugs.”  There are many reasons that our fed-
eral system of punishment has turned in this
direction, not the least of which is the advent dur-
ing the last 20 years of our irrational set of sen-
tencing guidelines that judges apply by rote on a
daily basis.  We are constantly adding new prison-
ers like these defendants with long periods of
incarceration to the more than two million men
and women now incarcerated in the hundreds of
prisons and jails around the country.  These sen-
tencing guidelines hold that mitigating factors like
family ties, mental illness, education, and the like-
lihood of rehabilitation are simply “not relevant”
in the sentencing process.  Judges’ minds are
closed down and sentences ratcheted up by apply-
ing convoluted conversion formulas like the one
just recited in the majority opinion.  The recent
Blakely-Booker-Cunningham line of Supreme
Court cases has given judges an opportunity to rid
the system of some of the worst aspects of guide-
lines, but we judges soldier on by applying the old
mandatory system as though nothing of signifi-
cance had happened.  The cost to the taxpayers
and in human lives has become enormous and
shows no signs of change.30
For all we know, the defendants in Jeross may have received
all the procedural fairness called for in the White Paper.  But
there comes a time—and we now seem to be well past it—
where outcome is as important as process.  The public will not
and should not regard the court system with satisfaction and
perceived fairness unless the incarcerative crisis is tackled and
the rehabilitative challenge is met.  Of course, this is everyone’s
business, not just the courts’.  But for the courts to play their
The public will not
and should not
regard the court
system with 
satisfaction and
perceived fairness
unless the 
incarcerative crisis
is tackled and the
rehabilitative 
challenge is met.
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31. For how courts might set standards of expected lawyering, see
Michael Marcus, Archaic Sentencing Liturgy Sacrifices Public Safety:
What’s Wrong and How We Can Fix It, 16 FED. SENT. REP. 76 (2002)
(setting out Judge Marcus’s views on sentencing, and instructing
attorneys on how to argue sentencing matters before him).
role optimally, procedural fairness literacy shall be joined with
TJ literacy, the Canadian TJ manual should be distributed
along with the White Paper, and judges should strive to change
the legal culture in their courts and among the lawyers prac-
ticing there.31
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AN ONLINE COURSE:
OPINION WRITING
IN CONTROVERSIAL CASES
http://www.ncsconline.org/opinion
writing/
One of the keys to procedural fairness is
making sure that a judge’s order is under-
stood and the reasons for the decision are
understood too.  This can be especially
difficult in a controversial case in which
emotions are running high and under-
standing may run low.  
The National Center for State Courts,
working with the Missouri Judiciary, has
prepared an online course on “Opinion
Writing in Controversial Cases.”  We all
know that trial judges can face high-pro-
file cases that suddenly appear on the
docket and explode into the public’s inter-
est.  The United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Kelo v. City of New London,
545 U.S. 469 (2005) (upholding use of
eminent-domain powers for economic
development) showed that this is true at
the appellate level as well.  There actually
was a short-term drop in public opinion
of the Court after the Kelo decision.
This online course discusses Kelo as well
as more typical cases.  The first part of
the course is a video discussion between
Missouri Chief Justice Laura Stith and
Missouri Court of Appeals Judge Ronald
Holliger on the changing context in
which judicial opinions are being
reported in the media, in which judicial
opinions feed into economic, political,
and social controversies.  The second
part of the course is a one-hour video
lecture from Professor Nancy Wanderer,
a law professor at the University of
Maine.  She presents an approach for
writing opinions and orders in contro-
versial, high-profile cases.  The third part
of the course is a web-based seminar led
by Professor Wanderer and retired
Washington Superior Court Judge
Robert H. Alsdorf; they build on
Professor Wanderer’s lecture and lead
participants through an interactive cri-
tique of judicial opinions in selected
cases, including Kelo.  The final part of
the course gives participants an opportu-
nity to practice some of the techniques
and even to receive faculty feedback on
submitted opinion-writing samples.
There are lots of online materials
included with the course, along with the
video discussions and lectures, the inter-
active seminar, and the practice exercises.  
CALIFORNIA COURTS WEBSITE ON
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/
profair/
In September 2007, when the American
Judges Association unveiled its White
Paper on procedural fairness, the
California court system simultaneously
launched its own procedural-fairness ini-
tiative.  The AJA and the California
courts have shared our work, and we’re
pleased to note that the California courts
have a permanent website devoted to
tracking their initiatives in this area and
resources that may be helpful to all inter-
ested judges.
Douglas Denton’s article in this issue
(page 44) discusses the work already
underway in California.  The effort there
is ambitious, creative, and ongoing.
Denton described the California court
system as “one of the most innovative” in
the United States; we agree. And certainly
no court system is more involved at pre-
sent in efforts to improve procedural fair-
ness—and the public’s perception of fair-
ness—than the California court system is.  
California has prepared tools that can be
used in judicial workshops, such as the
template found on page 50.  AJA presen-
ters have used that template in work-
shops in other states.  We suggest you
check the California website on proce-
dural fairness periodically to find new
resources and updated information on
this topic.
RESOURCES ON 
PROBLEM-SOLVING JUSTICE 
National Center for State Courts
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/CourTopi
cs/ResourceGuide.asp?topic=ProSol 
Center for Court Innovation
http://www.courtinnovation.org/index.cf
m?fuseaction=page.viewPage&pageID=5
05&documentTopicID=31 
National Judicial Institute (of Canada)
http://www.nji.ca/nji/Public/documents/J
udgingfor21scenturyDe.pdf
International Network on Therapeutic
Jurisprudence
http://www.therapeuticjurisprudence.org
Whatever difference there may be
between what some call problem-solving
justice and what others call therapeutic
jurisprudence, there is sufficient overlap
between those concepts and procedural
fairness that anyone interested in any of
those topics will find in the websites we
list here of interest. The National Center
for State Courts has extensive Web-based
resources on problem-solving justice,
including the Problem-Solving Justice
toolkit, an interactive resource for find-
ing solutions to problems your court
may face.  New York’s Center for Court
Innovation also has a useful website, full
of links, fact sheets, and self-assessment
tools.
Professor David Wexler points to two
other resources in his article in this issue
(page 74).  One is a site he updates called
the International Network on Therapeutic
Jurisprudence.  The other is from the
National Judicial Institute of Canada: a
61-page monograph titled  Judging for the
21st Century: A Problem-Solving Approach.
This monograph combines much of
Professor Wexler’s therapeutic jurispru-
dence material with a discussion of ways
in which a judge may improve his or her
skills in procedural fairness in areas such
as empathy, respect, active listening, posi-
tive focus, clarity, avoiding coercion, and
avoiding paternalism.
84 Court Review - Volume 44
